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Faceless assessment of a search-linked case: wrong officer, void order?

A faceless unit assesses a person who was not searched, on material seized from someone else, in a year for which the compulsory scrutiny guidelines of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) give search cases to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer. In Salman Qureshi v. DCIT (9 October 2026) the Delhi Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal quashed such an assessment as a nullity. This article sets out what the Tribunal held, what the guidelines of 3 May 2024 and the Board's orders under section 144B(2) actually say, the authority on both sides on binding instructions, section 124(3), the scrutiny notice and natural justice, the limits of the rule of consistency, the mirror-image decisions on jurisdictional officers acting in faceless cases, the position under the Income-tax Act, 2025 and in Gujarat, and what to do on a live file. Six open questions are argued both ways.

In short

In Salman Qureshi v. DCIT (9 October 2026) the Delhi Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal annulled a faceless scrutiny assessment for assessment year 2023-24, made under section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on material seized in a search on a third party. It held that under the search parameter, Parameter 2(ii), of the compulsory scrutiny guidelines of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) of 3 May 2024 the section 143(2) notice ought to have been issued, and the assessment framed, by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO), and that a faceless unit acting instead was a jurisdictional defect. It also found that the seized material was never supplied. The CBDT's instructions bind its officers under section 119(1); what a breach does to the assessment is disputed. The order records no submission by the Revenue on jurisdiction and does not test the case against Parameter 7, though Parameter 2(ii) does not mention non-searched persons. Four other answers, all open, were not considered: the guidelines recite no statutory power, and the CBDT's orders under section 144B(2) do not exclude search-linked cases in ordinary charges; section 124(3) limits the time for objecting to jurisdiction; section 143(2) lets a prescribed authority serve the notice; and the Delhi and Allahabad High Courts have met breaches of section 124 and of faceless procedure with a fresh assessment, not annulment. From tax year 2026-27 the provisions are sections 273, 270(8) and 242 of the Income-tax Act, 2025.

A scrutiny notice under section 143(2) arrives through the portal in the last week of June, from the National Faceless Assessment Centre (the faceless centre). The reason for selection is that a search on somebody else threw up papers said to show cash dealings with the assessee. Nine months later a faceless order adds the whole of the alleged cash purchases as unexplained expenditure. The papers themselves are never supplied. The first appeal, also faceless, fails.

That, in outline, was the file before the Delhi Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in Salman Qureshi v. DCIT, 2(1)(1), Ghaziabad (ITA No. 6217/Del/2025, assessment year 2023-24, order dated 9 October 2026). The Bench quashed the assessment as a nullity. Its reason was not the merits. It was that the guidelines of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (the Board, or CBDT) for compulsory scrutiny required a case of this kind to be handled by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer (the officer of the assessee’s own ward or circle, the “JAO” of the orders), and that a faceless unit had handled it instead.

The order is useful, because the fact pattern, a third party’s return for the year of a search taken up through the faceless centre, is not peculiar to this assessee. It also decides a jurisdictional point on which the order records no submission by the Revenue, and it does so without mentioning section 124(3), section 292B, the Board’s orders under section 144B(2), or the notification that names who may issue a scrutiny notice. The 1961 Act leads here, because every file on which the point presently arises is a 1961 Act file; the corresponding provisions of the Income-tax Act, 2025 are given alongside.

Key points

  • In Salman Qureshi v. DCIT (ITAT Delhi, 9 October 2026) the Tribunal held that where the Board’s compulsory scrutiny guidelines of 3 May 2024 give a search-linked case to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO), the notice under section 143(2) ought to be issued by that officer. It held the breach to be a jurisdictional defect, and an assessment framed by a faceless unit under section 143(3) read with section 144B to be a nullity (paras 30, 37 and 42). The order quashes the assessment. It does not separately rule on the notice.
  • The Tribunal treated the guidelines as an instruction “issued in compliance with section 144B(2)”. The letter of 3 May 2024 recites no statutory power, and the Board’s orders that do recite section 144B(2) exclude cases by charge (Central Charges, International Taxation) and a few named classes, none of which is a search-linked case lying in an ordinary charge. Against that, a single judge of the Madras High Court has described the previous year’s letter as issued under section 144B(2).
  • The assessee was not the searched person. Parameter 2(ii) of the guidelines, on which the Tribunal rested, does not mention non-searched persons or the return for the year of search. Parameter 7, for specific information from the Investigation Wing where a return has been filed, sends the notice through the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NaFAC). The Bench looked at Parameter 7 only for its vocabulary. It did not consider whether the case fell under it, and the order records no submission by the Revenue on which parameter applied.
  • An instruction of the Board under section 119(1) binds the Department’s officers: the income-tax authorities “shall observe and follow” it. What a breach does to the assessment is the disputed question. Of the four High Court decisions the Bench relied on for the proposition that a breach of scrutiny instructions is jurisdictional, three are about whether a return could be selected at all and two are disposals on the footing that no substantial question of law arose. None concerns a faceless unit acting in place of the jurisdictional officer. The assessee’s line has other reasoned decisions behind it, and there are High Court decisions the other way.
  • The objection reached the Tribunal as an additional ground filed more than seventeen months after the assessment; the order records no earlier objection. Section 124(3)(a) bars a challenge to the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer, where a return has been filed under section 139(1), one month after service of a notice under section 142(1) or section 143(2), or on completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier. The order does not mention it. Whether the bar reaches this kind of objection is open, with High Courts on both sides.
  • Section 143(2) lets the notice be served by “the Assessing Officer or the prescribed income-tax authority”. Since 28 May 2022 the prescribed authority is a single officer at Delhi, who is not an officer of the faceless centre, and the Delhi High Court has upheld his notice in a case taken up by a Central Circle. A notice issued by an assessment unit in its own name does not have that footing. If the notice on a file of this kind is good, the likely consequence of the wrong unit assessing is a set-aside and a fresh assessment, and not annulment. If it is bad, the scrutiny assessment cannot be redone, though the year is not necessarily closed.
  • The same letter of 3 May 2024 has been read against the Revenue in the opposite direction: the Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed a jurisdictional officer’s section 143(2) notice because the case belonged to the faceless stream. Parliament has validated the jurisdictional officer’s reassessment notices by section 147A, a section that two High Courts have since struck down and that is now before the Supreme Court. No provision specifically validates a faceless unit acting where the jurisdictional officer should have.
  • The finding that the seized material was never given to the assessee is the strongest part of the order on the facts. On authority, a denial of that kind ordinarily ends in a set-aside for a fresh assessment.
  • On a live file the objection is worth most when it is on the record, in writing, within one month of the section 143(2) notice, and it should never be the only ground.

The file before the Tribunal

The search was under section 132 on the Maharashtra Food Processing and Cold Storage Group on 3 January 2023 (paras 6 and 27). The assessee, an individual at Hapur, was not searched. The Revenue’s case was that documents seized from the group showed unaccounted cash sales to several parties, the assessee among them.

Assessment year 2023-24 is the year of the search. The assessment order said, at its para 2, that because of the seized documents the return for that year had been selected for compulsory scrutiny under the Board’s guidelines (paras 7 and 27 of the Tribunal’s order). On the assessee’s case, which the Revenue did not dispute, the notice under section 143(2) was dated 27 June 2024 and came from the faceless side, the “Assessment Unit/NaFAC” in counsel’s words (paras 3 and 8, and the synopsis reproduced at para 5). The Bench made no finding of its own on which authority issued it.

A notice under section 142(1) followed on 4 March 2025 and a show cause notice on 10 March 2025. The assessment was completed on 21 March 2025 under section 143(3) read with section 144B. Two additions were in appeal: Rs 14,17,21,970 under section 69C as unexplained expenditure on cash purchases, and Rs 1,48,00,000 under section 68 on an unsecured loan. Section 115BBE was applied and penalty proceedings were initiated. The Commissioner (Appeals) in the National Faceless Appeal Centre confirmed the order on 4 July 2025.

Two features of the record carried the appeal.

The earlier years went the other way. For assessment years 2021-22 and 2022-23 the same seized material was used against the same assessee. The Bench found that in those years the section 143(2) notices were issued and the assessments framed by the jurisdictional officer (para 32). Counsel’s account, which was not disputed, was that the faceless unit had begun the process in those years and that the orders were passed under section 147 (paras 14 and 18). In those years, the Bench records, the officer assessed as income 2.10 per cent of the alleged cash purchases, being the profit embedded in them, where the faceless unit for 2023-24 added the whole (paras 33 and 41). Counsel’s synopsis records that the assessee disputes the additions for those years as well and has challenged them in appeals before the Commissioner (Appeals).

The material was never supplied. The section 142(1) notice alleged that the group made sales outside its books and that the assessee was a beneficiary. The show cause notice of 10 March 2025 gave a paragraph of allegation and one table row: a serial number, his name, his PAN, the figure, the words “unaccounted purchases” and the financial year (para 39, where the Bench reproduces it). The assessee’s reply of 11 March 2025 denied any unaccounted purchase, enclosed a balance confirmation from the group that tallied with his books, his ledger of the group’s account and e-way bills, and asked for the documents relied on. Nothing came, at assessment or in first appeal.

The original grounds before the Tribunal were on the merits. On 8 September 2026, six days before the hearing, the assessee filed seven additional grounds (para 2). The first two said that the notice and the order were by a non-jurisdictional officer, contrary to the guidelines. The third said that the assessment should have been framed under sections 147 and 148 and not under section 143(3). The fourth said that the approval required by section 148B was missing. The rest went to the evidence and to the 2.10 per cent treatment.

The Departmental Representative relied on the orders below and said that the documents had been furnished. The Bench records that, despite repeated queries, he could not point to that in the assessment order, the appellate order or the paper book, and could not produce any seized document (para 26). No submission by the Revenue on jurisdiction is recorded.

What the Tribunal decided

The findings are at para 4 and paras 27 to 44, and they run in this order.

The additional grounds were admitted (para 4), as grounds that were “jurisdictional in nature” and could be decided on the record, on the strength of National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1998] 229 ITR 383 (SC) and CIT v. Varas International (P) Ltd. [2006] 284 ITR 80 (SC).

Section 144B operates on the cases the Board specifies (paras 28 and 29). The Bench set out the opening of section 144B(1) and sub-section (2), and said that the guidelines of 3 May 2024 specified the classes in which the assessment is to be made by the jurisdictional officer or the Central Charges “in a non-faceless manner”, and those in which it is to be made facelessly.

The case fell under Parameter 2(ii), and the notice had to come from the jurisdictional officer (para 30). Reading Parameter 2(ii) with Parameter 2(i), and with Parameter 4(i) and paragraph 4.2, the Bench found that “the case of the assessee for the impugned year, which is the search year, is covered by Para 2(ii)”. It followed that the notice under section 143(2) “ought to have been issued by the JAO”. It added that “JAO” does not include the “FAO”, the faceless Assessing Officer, because the guidelines name the faceless centre wherever they mean it. The Bench also read the parameter as requiring the prior administrative approval of the Principal Commissioner. Counsel had submitted that the notice was silent on any approval. The Bench made no finding on whether an approval existed, and the order does not rest on its absence.

The exception in paragraph 4.2 did not apply, and would not have helped (paras 31 and 32). That paragraph relieves the Revenue of centralising a third party who had one-off or limited dealings with the searched group. Most of the group’s alleged unaccounted sales were said to have been made to this assessee, so he was not such a person. And: “Even otherwise, where this exception does apply, the assessment is to be framed by the JAO and not by the FAO.” The paragraph is tied in terms to Parameter 4, and the Bench had just described Parameter 4(i) read with paragraph 4.2 as dealing with non-searched persons for years other than the search year (para 30); it tested the exception for the search year all the same. The Revenue’s own conduct in the two earlier years was treated as reinforcing the point: the assessment “ought to have been framed by the JAO, if not by the central charge, and not by the FAO”. That inference is examined under “Consistency” below.

The departure caused prejudice (para 33). The Bench put the 2.10 per cent treatment against the addition of the whole and called the latter “contrary to the rule of consistency”. It then said:

The cases that are to be assessed in the faceless mode, or which through JAO, is for the CBDT to decide through instruction. That instruction, needless to add, is mandatory, having been issued in compliance with section 144B(2) of the Act.

The guidelines bind, and their breach is jurisdictional (paras 34 to 37). The Bench said that the High Courts “have consistently held” the scrutiny guidelines binding and have quashed assessments framed in violation of them (para 34). Four High Court decisions were relied on: Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-7 v. Raja Arora (Delhi), CIT v. Best Plastics (P) Ltd. (Delhi), CIT v. Crystal Phosphates Ltd. (Punjab and Haryana) and Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-1 v. Shree Shoppers Ltd. (Calcutta). The holding is at para 37: the guidelines “were binding in nature, and … their breach constitutes a jurisdictional defect”.

There was a clear breach of natural justice (paras 38 to 41). Neither notice carried any document. The Commissioner (Appeals) had treated the reference to the transactions in the notices as enough, had faulted the assessee for not producing an affidavit from the group when he had produced its confirmation, and had confirmed the whole addition without asking why the earlier years were treated differently.

The conclusion draws the three together (para 42):

We find that these serious jurisdictional lacunae i.e. the making huge additions to income without confronting the assessee with the documents allegedly seized, and the inconsistent approach adopted by the Revenue, have arisen only because the assessment for the impugned year was framed in a faceless manner, contrary to the CBDT Instruction dated 03.05.2024, which is mandated an assessment for the impugned year of search through JAO. The assessment so framed is, therefore, a nullity and is hereby quashed.

Every other ground was left open as academic (para 43). The Bench did not fix 2.10 per cent, or any rate, for the year.

The operative ground is jurisdiction: para 37 holds the breach to be a jurisdictional defect, and para 42 quashes the assessment because it was framed facelessly, contrary to the instruction. On the firm’s reading, the denial of the documents and the inconsistent treatment are put at para 42 as consequences of the wrong unit having acted and not as independent grounds of annulment. The paragraph can be read the other way: it calls both failures “serious jurisdictional lacunae”, and para 43 speaks of relief granted “on the above grounds”. An assessee defending the order in further appeal will say that the quashing rests on all three. Against that reading, counsel’s own submission on the documents was that the addition “ought to be deleted” (para 25). And the jurisdictional ground was decided without any recorded contest.

The quashing takes with it what was built on the order: the demand, the interest and the penalty proceedings that the order initiated. It does not, of itself, close the year. That depends on the notice, which is taken up below.

The guidelines of 3 May 2024: what the letter says

The Board issues, each year, guidelines for the compulsory selection of returns for complete scrutiny. The letter for financial year 2024-25 is F.No. 225/72/2024/ITA-II dated 3 May 2024. It governed here because the notice of 27 June 2024 was issued in that financial year.

On its face it is a letter from an Under Secretary in the ITA-II division to all Principal Chief Commissioners, Chief Commissioners, Principal Directors General and Directors General. It opens with the subject and goes straight to the parameters. It recites no statutory power: section 119, section 120 and section 144B are not mentioned in it. Its last paragraph says that “These instructions may be brought to the notice of all concerned for necessary compliance.”

The parameters are in a table of seven serial numbers, each with a procedure. What each says about who serves the notice is the whole of the present question.

Serial Class of case Who serves the section 143(2) notice Where the case then goes
1 Survey under section 133A (other than section 133A(2A)) “the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) concerned”, with prior administrative approval Central Charges under section 127 within 15 days
2(i) Search or requisition before 1 April 2021: section 153C assessments, “and also for return filed for assessment year relevant to previous year in which the search was conducted” “the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer concerned”, with prior administrative approval Central Charges within 15 days; if not centralised, the jurisdictional officer serves the section 143(2) or section 142(1) notice in the section 153C proceedings
2(ii) Search or requisition on or after 1 April 2021 “the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer concerned”, with prior administrative approval Central Charges within 15 days
3 No return in response to a section 142(1) notice Further action “through NaFAC” Faceless
4(i) Section 148 notice issued pursuant to a search or survey on or after 1 April 2021 “the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer concerned”, with prior administrative approval Central Charges within 15 days if lying outside them, “(subject to para 4.2)”
4(ii) Other section 148 cases “served on the assessee through NaFAC” Faceless
5, 6 Registration or approval cases; recurring additions “served on the assessee through NaFAC” Faceless
7 Specific information pointing to tax evasion from a law enforcement agency, including the Investigation Wing, where the return for the year has been furnished “served on the assessee through NaFAC” Faceless

Parameter 2(ii), on which the decision turns, reads in full:

Search & seizure/ requisition on or after 01.04.2021: Assessments in search & seizure cases/ requisitions cases u/s 132/132A conducted on or after 01.04.2021.

and its procedure:

The cases shall be selected for scrutiny with prior administrative approval of Pr. CIT/Pr. DIT/CIT/DIT concerned, who shall ensure that such cases are transferred to Central Charges u/s 127 of the Act within 15 days of service of notice u/s 143(2)/142(1) of the Act by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer concerned.

Paragraphs 4, 4.1, 4.2 and 5 matter as well.

Paragraph 4 says that the International Taxation and Central Circle charges select cases under the same parameters with the same approval, and that information pertaining to compulsory scrutiny “may not be transferred to NaFAC unless the case itself transferred”. Paragraph 4.1 says that cases those charges select continue to be handled by them.

Paragraph 4.2 is the exception the Tribunal dealt with:

During the course of Search & Seizure action, information relating to some other persons, who may have one-off/ very few or limited financial transaction(s) with the main assessee group covered in the search u/s 132/132A of the Act, may be found. Such persons are not integrally connected with the core business of the main assessee searched and do not belong to the same business group. Often such persons are also not residing in the same city as that of the main assessee. In such cases, the relevant information is generally passed on to the jurisdictional AO for assessing them u/s 148 (for searches conducted/requisition made after 01.04.2021) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Accordingly, with reference to above-referred Parameter (4) of Para 2 of these Guidelines, it is clarified that all such non-search cases selected are not required to be transferred to the Central Charges unless covered by the Board’s guidelines under F.No. 299/107/2013-IT(Inv.III)/1568 dated 25.04.2014.

Paragraph 5 fixes the calendar for returns filed in financial year 2023-24. Cases under Parameters 4(ii), 5, 6 and 7, “wherein assessments have to be completed in faceless manner”, were to be selected and transferred to the faceless centre by 31 May 2024, and notices under section 143(2) in all compulsory scrutiny cases served by 30 June 2024, which is the statutory limit under the proviso to section 143(2).

Read as a whole, the letter does sort the seven classes into two streams. Survey, search and search-based reassessment cases begin with the jurisdictional officer and are meant to end in a Central Charge, one of the charges to which search cases are assigned. The rest go through the faceless centre. That much supports the Tribunal. The letter’s vocabulary also supports its reading of the expression “Jurisdictional Assessing Officer”: the letter says “NaFAC” wherever it means the faceless centre. It uses the two expressions in opposition to one another in Parameters 3, 4(ii), 5, 6 and 7, where the jurisdictional officer uploads the material and the notice is served, or further action taken, through the centre.

The difficulties are of a different kind. The letter does not say what it is. Parameter 2(ii) does not say that it covers a person who was not searched. And nothing in the letter says what follows if the wrong stream is used.

Each year has its own letter. The letter for 2023-24 (F.No. 225/66/2023/ITA-II, 24 May 2023) is described by the Gujarat High Court, in a decision noted below, as requiring service “by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer concerned”. A file has to be read against the guidelines in force when its notice was issued, including any letter modifying them during the year.

Was this a Parameter 2(ii) case at all?

The assessee was a third party to the search, assessed under section 143(3) for the year of the search. Before 1 April 2021 such a person would have been reached through section 153C for the years that section covered and, where the search year fell outside them, by an ordinary scrutiny assessment for that year. Parameter 2(i), which is for searches before that date, says so in terms: it covers assessments “under Section 153C read with section 143(3)” and adds “and also for return filed for assessment year relevant to previous year in which the search was conducted”.

Parameter 2(ii) has neither phrase. It speaks only of “Assessments in search & seizure cases/ requisitions cases” for searches on or after 1 April 2021. Section 153C does not apply to those searches (section 153C(3)), and a third party’s earlier years are reached by reassessment. Under the text of section 148 in force until 31 August 2024, clauses (iii) and (iv) of Explanation 2 deemed the Assessing Officer to have information where assets or documents seized from another person belonged or related to the assessee, with the prior approval of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. Those reassessments are Parameter 4(i), and the third party with limited dealings is dealt with in paragraph 4.2, which is tied in terms to “Parameter (4)”.

So where does the third party’s return for the search year go? The Tribunal’s answer was Parameter 2(ii), reached by reading it “along with” Parameter 2(i). That is a construction, and a reasonable one: the split of the search parameter at 1 April 2021 looks like a change of date and not a change of coverage, and it would be odd if the third party’s search year, expressly inside the search parameter for old searches, had dropped out of it for new ones. The assessment order itself said that the return was selected because incriminating documents were seized in the search on the group.

There is another candidate. The Bench looked at Parameter 7 for its vocabulary (para 30) and did not consider whether the case fell under it. Parameter 7 covers a case where “specific information pointing out tax-evasion for the relevant assessment year is provided by any law-enforcement agency, (Investigation Wing/ Intelligence/ Regulatory Authority/ Agency, etc.)” and the return for that year has been furnished. A return had been furnished, and what the faceless unit had, on the wording of its own show cause notice, was “information” that during the search on the group the assessee was found to have made cash purchases. Under Parameter 7 the jurisdictional officer lists the case with the Principal Commissioner’s approval and uploads “the underlying documents containing specific information”, and the notice is “served on the assessee through NaFAC”. If that was the parameter, the faceless unit was the right unit. A Revenue that falls back on Parameter 7 has its own difficulty, though. The parameter requires the Principal Commissioner’s approval and the upload of the underlying documents. The assessee will say, on the passage of Crystal Phosphates that the Bench quotes, that it is for the Revenue to show both, on a record where the Departmental Representative could not produce a single seized document.

The line between the search parameter and the information parameter is not new. In Raja Arora, on the Board’s Instruction No. 5/2017, whose search clause was worded much as Parameter 2(i) is, the Revenue said that the return had been picked up under the search clause. The Delhi High Court held (para 8) that the clause applied only where the search was in the assessee’s own case, or where an assessment was to be framed on incriminating material found in the search of another, and that neither condition was satisfied. The notice had gone out on the footing of information pointing to tax evasion (para 9), under a clause that required an approval which, admittedly, had not been taken (para 10). The decision cuts both ways here. Its second limb describes a third party assessed on material found in another’s search, which is how the Tribunal read Parameter 2(ii) and how the Assessing Officer described this case. It also shows the Court testing the clause the Revenue argued for against that clause’s own conditions, and then holding the Revenue to the clause on which the Department’s own communication had put the selection, without examining whether the information in fact existed (paras 6, 8 and 9). Under the 2024 letter the information clause sends the notice through the faceless centre.

The order does not say which parameter the selection was recorded under. On Raja Arora the Revenue is likely to be held to what its own record says, and a clause it names for the first time in argument will be tested against that clause’s conditions.

Is the letter a specification under section 144B(2)?

Section 144B(1) of the 1961 Act opens with a non obstante clause and requires that an assessment under section 143(3), section 144 or section 147, “with respect to the cases referred to in sub-section (2), shall be made in a faceless manner”. Sub-section (2) reads:

The faceless assessment under sub-section (1) shall be made in respect of such territorial area, or persons or class of persons, or incomes or class of incomes, or cases or class of cases, as may be specified by the Board.

The whole of the Tribunal’s reasoning rests on the proposition that the letter of 3 May 2024 is such a specification, or at least was issued “in compliance with” the sub-section. If it is, a case the letter keeps with the jurisdictional officer is a case not “referred to in sub-section (2)”, section 144B(1) does not apply to it, and a faceless unit has no business with it. If it is not, the position is the reverse: the case is inside section 144B by the Board’s actual specification, the non obstante clause requires it to be assessed facelessly, and the letter is an administrative instruction about how to get a case out of that stream.

The Board has made orders that say, in terms, that they are made under section 144B(2). They are in a different file series (F.No. 187/3/2020-ITA-I), and their scheme is this:

  • The order of 31 March 2021 directs that all assessment proceedings pending on that date or initiated on or after 1 April 2021, “(other than those in the Central Charges and International Taxation charges)”, falling in the listed classes, shall be completed under section 144B. One of the listed classes is a case where a notice under section 143(2) “has been issued by the Assessing Officer or the Prescribed Income-tax Authority, as the case may be”.
  • An order of 6 September 2021 adds an exclusion for cases where pendency could not be created on the Department’s system for technical reasons and cases with no PAN. The order of 16 December 2021 recites a further amendment by an order of 22 September 2021. The Board’s order under section 119 of that date excepted set-aside and section 147 assessments that were getting barred by limitation on 30 September 2021 and could not be completed under section 144B in time.
  • An order of 16 December 2021 excludes “Cases where assessment proceedings are pending / initiated pursuant to action u/s 133A of the Act or where action u/s 133A of the Act is conducted in ongoing assessment proceedings”. A companion order under section 119 of the same date directs that such cases, other than those in International Taxation, be transferred to the Central Charges under section 127.

The Board knows how to exclude a class of case from section 144B and has done so, for survey cases, by an order under the sub-section. None of these orders does the same for search-linked cases. They leave the faceless stream by being in a Central Charge, which, for a person who was not searched and whose file lies in an ordinary circle, takes an order under section 127. Part 1 of the firm’s faceless assessment series reached the same conclusion on a search-linked case that has not been centralised.

The jurisdiction notification points the same way. By Notification No. 22/2021 (S.O. 1434(E), 31 March 2021), issued under section 120(1), (2) and (5), the authorities of the National Faceless Assessment Centre exercise the powers and functions of Assessing Officer “concurrently”, to facilitate faceless assessment under section 144B, in respect of all persons and cases in India. It excludes those covered by two notifications of November 2014, Nos. 57/2014 and 70/2014, the second of which is the notification for the Central Charges. An assessee in a Ghaziabad circle whose case had not been centralised was within it.

On this material the Revenue’s answer to para 33 of the order is as follows. The specification under section 144B(2) is the Board’s order of 31 March 2021 as amended, made under the sub-section as first enacted and continuing under the identically worded sub-section substituted from 1 April 2022. It works by charge and by a few named classes. On 27 June 2024 the assessee’s case was in none of them. The scrutiny letter is a selection instruction, signed by an Under Secretary, reciting no power, whose direction to move search cases to Central Charges within 15 days of the notice presupposes that until they are moved they are where they were. Paragraph 5, on which the assessee’s argument leans, is a timetable and not a classification: it leaves out Parameter 3, which the table itself routes through the faceless centre.

The assessee has an answer, and it has authority. Section 144B(2) prescribes no form for the Board’s specification. The letter is the Board’s, it is general, it classifies cases, and paragraph 5 of it identifies in so many words the parameters “wherein assessments have to be completed in faceless manner”, which do not include Parameters 1, 2 and 4(i). The orders under section 144B(2) set out above were all made in 2021, before the section was recast from 1 April 2022. Since then, the assessee will say, it is the annual letter that tells officers which classes are to be completed in faceless manner. Parameter 3 is missing from paragraph 5 because that paragraph is about returns filed in 2023-24, and Parameter 3 is the class in which none was filed. A Board that says in an annual letter which classes are to be assessed facelessly and which are not has, in substance, specified.

A single judge of the Madras High Court has said so in terms. In Mark Studio India Private Limited v. Income Tax Officer (20 December 2024), upholding section 148 notices issued by jurisdictional officers, the Court described the 2023 guidelines as “issued by the Board by virtue of the power available under Sub-Section (2) of Section 144B” (para 21). The petitioners had argued that the guidelines, issued after 31 March 2022, were beyond the scope of section 151A (para 27). The Court answered that “the Board has issued the guidelines in terms of the provisions of Section 144B(2) of the IT Act, which empowers them to issue such guidelines” (para 29). It read sub-clause (i) of clause 4, on section 148 notices that follow a search or survey, as one for cases that “will not comes under faceless assessment scheme” (para 20(a)).

It was the Revenue that asked the Court to hold this (paras 3.6 and 3.7). The decision is of a single judge, on the letter for the previous year, in a reassessment case, and the Court was not asked what follows when a faceless unit nonetheless acts. It is still a High Court accepting, at the Revenue’s instance, the premise on which para 33 of the order rests. The same Court, in Zigma Global Environ Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (13 July 2026), described the 2024 letter itself as a “clarification of the Board” that is “in line with the intent of the legislation” (para 115).

The Delhi High Court has described these letters differently. In Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Trust v. CIT (Exemption) (26 May 2023) assessees whose cases had been centralised wanted a faceless assessment, and it was they who relied on the guidelines. The Court held that the scrutiny guidelines then in force “are limited for the purpose of compulsory selection of returns for complete scrutiny” and “do not in any manner curtail or control the power of transfer under Section 127” (para 59). It also held that “no assessee has any fundamental or vested legal right to be assessed by a Faceless Assessing Officer” (para 60). And it said what did fix the scope of faceless assessment: clause 3 of the Faceless Assessment Scheme, 2019, which is in the words of section 144B(2), and “the CBDT order dated 13th August, 2020 passed under clause (3) of the Faceless Assessment Scheme, 2019, which excludes Central Charges and International Taxation charges from Faceless Assessment Scheme” (para 61). On that reading the specification is the Board’s order, made by charge, and the scrutiny guidelines are a separate document about selection. The case arose under that Scheme and in the opposite direction. The Revenue will say that the converse holds: if there is no vested right to a faceless officer, there is none to a jurisdictional one.

Tribunal Benches have not been consistent either. When the Revenue has relied on the previous year’s letter to defend an assessment, they have called it a set of selection parameters and no more. The Delhi Bench in Abha Khanna v. ITO (15 July 2026) said that the 2023 letter “merely contains parameters for compulsory selection” and “does not render any assistance to the case of the revenue”. The Chandigarh Bench in DCIT v. Om Sons Marketing Pvt. Ltd. (13 January 2026) called it “merely administrative in nature”. In Salman Qureshi the 2024 letter is mandatory, and an assessment framed in breach of it a nullity. If the letter is an instruction under section 119, the two descriptions can stand together: such an instruction binds the officers, and gives the Revenue no power that the Act does not give. If it is a specification under section 144B(2), they cannot: a specification settles which cases are faceless whichever side relies on it.

Do the guidelines bind, and what does a breach cost?

Nobody disputes that an instruction of the Board binds the officers. Section 119(1) says that the income-tax authorities “shall observe and follow” the Board’s orders, instructions and directions, and the Supreme Court in UCO Bank v. CIT [1999] 237 ITR 889 (SC) held a circular relaxing the rigour of the law to be binding on the Department. The question that matters is the next one: when an officer departs from an instruction about selection, is the assessment that follows bad, and if it is, is it void or only irregular?

Counsel had put the letter both ways, as a specification under section 144B(2) (para 13) and as an instruction issued under section 119 (para 16). The Bench’s premise at para 33 is the first; the four decisions it relied on are all on the second.

The Bench answered with four High Court decisions. They are not all of one kind, and what each decided has to be stated exactly.

Decision Instruction What was breached How the High Court disposed of it
Pr. CIT-7 v. Raja Arora, Delhi High Court, ITA 132/2025, 14 May 2025 Instruction No. 5/2017, scrutiny guidelines for 2017-18 Selection on information pointing to evasion without the prior approval of the Principal Commissioner that the clause required “we find no infirmity” in the Tribunal’s order (para 11); “No substantial question of law arises” (para 12)
CIT v. Best Plastics (P) Ltd., Delhi High Court, 5 April 2006 Instruction No. 1922 of 9 March 1995 A return within a class excluded from sample scrutiny was scrutinised No substantial question of law, “in the light of the settled legal position emanating from” judgments of the Supreme Court
CIT v. Crystal Phosphates Ltd., Punjab and Haryana High Court, [2024] 461 ITR 289 Scrutiny guidelines for 2007-08 The case did not satisfy the selection clause relied on; the objection had been taken before the Assessing Officer Tribunal’s order quashing the notice and the assessment upheld: the instructions “have not been complied with in letter and spirit”, and the Tribunal “has rightly allowed the appeal(s)”
Pr. CIT-1 v. Shree Shoppers Ltd., Calcutta High Court, ITAT/39/2023, 15 March 2023 Instruction No. 1/2011 on monetary limits The section 143(2) notice was issued by an Income-tax Officer when the returned income placed the case with a Deputy or Assistant Commissioner Questions answered against the Revenue: the “defect in issuance of notice is incurable as it goes to the root of the matter”

Three of the four are about whether a return could be selected at all. Only Shree Shoppers is about which officer had to issue the notice, and its instruction was the monetary limits instruction, which allocates cases between ranks, and not a scrutiny selection guideline. None of the four concerns a faceless unit and a jurisdictional officer.

Two of the four, Raja Arora and Best Plastics, are disposals on the footing that no substantial question of law arose from a Tribunal’s order. In Crystal Phosphates, in the passage the Bench quotes, the High Court agreed with the Tribunal on the facts. In Raja Arora the High Court did construe the search clause of the instruction, and held it inapplicable (para 8). The absence of approval was admitted (para 10). The Revenue’s counsel had confirmed a communication stating that the return was selected under the information clause (para 6), while still submitting that it had been picked up under the search clause (para 7). The words “void ab initio” and “jurisdictional defect” are the Tribunal’s in that case, and not the Court’s.

In each case where the stage of the objection is recorded, in the High Court’s order or the Tribunal’s below, it had been taken early: before the Assessing Officer in Crystal Phosphates and Shree Shoppers, and at least before the first appellate authority in Raja Arora. None deals with an objection first taken before the Tribunal, and none mentions section 124(3). The passage of Crystal Phosphates that the Bench quotes turns on this: the assessee had objected in its reply to the notice, so that “it cannot be held that the appellant had acquiesced to the jurisdiction”.

The four decisions are the assessee’s line, and the line has more support than the order uses. The Orissa High Court in Nababharat Shiksha Parishad v. DCIT (ITA No. 59 of 2018, 15 December 2022) held that the prior approval the 2011 guidelines required for a scrutiny selection “was mandatory” and set the assessment aside. Among the decisions counsel cited and the Bench did not use are two that decided the point. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Smt. Nayana P. Dedhia [2004] 270 ITR 572 (27 August 2004) held, on the strength of UCO Bank, that “the Tribunal was right in holding that the income-tax authorities could have not selected the case for detailed scrutiny in view of the circular issued by the Board”.

The Calcutta High Court in Amal Kumar Ghosh v. ACIT (ITA No. 21 of 2011, 21 January 2014) held the Board’s time limit for selection binding on the Department under section 119 and allowed the assessee’s appeal. It put the rule on a second footing as well: “When the department has set down a standard for itself, the department is bound by that standard and cannot act with discrimination”, failing which its act is liable to be struck down under Article 14 of the Constitution. That footing does not depend on what the letter is called, and the assessee will say that it fits a file on which the Department used one officer for two years and another for the third.

The ‘A’ Bench at Delhi, differently constituted, had sixteen days earlier quashed a section 143(2) notice of the same date, in a search-linked case assessed by the ward officer under section 143(3), because no approval under the same letter appeared on it (Mayank Singla v. ITO, ITA No. 737/Del/2026, 23 September 2026). That Bench did not say which parameter applied. Read together, the two orders suggest that in a case under the search parameter the Revenue may be put to showing both the right officer and the approval. The Revenue’s answer to Mayank Singla is that the letter requires approval of the selection, which is an internal step that can be proved from the record, and does not require the notice to recite it.

The other line is not cited in the order at all.

The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, in Reshi Construction Company v. CIT (ITA No. 15/2009, 31 August 2024), had an assessee who said that his case fell within no clause of the selection circular. It held (para 17):

As is held herein above, CBDT circular laying down procedure for picking up cases for scrutiny may be binding on the Assessing Officers of the Income Tax Department but the same does not have the force of law nor can it supplant the express statutory provisions contained in Sections 143 and 144 of the Act.

A violation “may invite an administrative action but cannot be a ground for setting aside the assessment”. The Court found support in the proviso to section 119(1), under which the Board may not issue instructions “so as to require any income-tax authority to make a particular assessment or to dispose of a particular case in a particular manner” (paras 24 and 27), and it noted that the assessee had participated without objection (para 16).

Reshi Construction distinguished Nayana P. Dedhia and did not dissent from it (para 23). In the Andhra Pradesh case the Board had placed “a complete embargo” on selection. The circular before the Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court only listed the classes for compulsory scrutiny, and the case in any event “squarely fell within the purview” of section 143(2) (para 18). The assessee in a Salman Qureshi file will say that the 2024 letter is of the first kind: it is mandatory in terms about who serves the notice.

The Allahabad High Court had said much the same as Reshi Construction long before, in Janta Metal Works v. ITO [1990] 186 ITR 458. The case concerned a letter of the Board’s Chairman setting out the summary assessment scheme and its sample scrutiny. Such instructions, the Court held, “cannot and do not create any legal right in the assessee” and “cannot deprive the Income-tax Officers of the powers vested in them by the statute”. That Court, though, held the letter before it not to be a direction under section 119 at all.

The use made of the proviso in Reshi Construction is open to an answer. The proviso is aimed at a direction about “a particular assessment” or “a particular case”. A general instruction about which classes of return are scrutinised, and by whom, is neither, and section 119(2)(a) expressly contemplates general orders “in respect of any class of incomes or … class of cases” setting out the “guidelines, principles or procedures to be followed” in the work of assessment. The Revenue’s reply is that an instruction which fixes when an officer may take up a return does, for every return it covers, tell him how to dispose of the case. The proviso does not settle the point either way. What Reshi Construction does establish is that there is a reasoned High Court decision for the proposition that a breach of a selection instruction is the Department’s internal affair.

The High Courts are divided on selection, and the assessee’s side of the division is the better populated. None of the decisions on either side decides the question in Salman Qureshi, which is not about selection but about which unit acts after selection.

The section 124(3) problem

The order admits the point as “jurisdictional in nature” (para 4) and decides it without asking whether it was raised in time. The statute has a provision about when the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer can be questioned, and the order does not mention it.

Section 124(3) says that no person shall be entitled to call in question the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer:

(a) where he has made a return … under sub-section (1) of section 139, after the expiry of one month from the date on which he was served with a notice under sub-section (1) of section 142 or … sub-section (2) of section 143 or after the completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier;

Clause (a) applies where a return was filed under section 139(1); where none was, clause (b) applies and runs from other events. Sub-section (4) is the other half of the scheme: where the assessee questions the jurisdiction in time and the officer is not satisfied that the claim is correct, he must refer the question for determination by the higher authorities under sub-section (2) “before the assessment is made”.

On the dates in Salman Qureshi the notice under section 143(2) is dated 27 June 2024 and the assessment was completed on 21 March 2025. The objection was raised on 8 September 2026. If clause (a) applies, the month had expired by about the end of July 2024, more than two years before the objection was raised.

The Supreme Court applied the clause in DCIT (Exemption) v. Kalinga Institute of Industrial Technology [2023] 454 ITR 582 (SC), a short order of 1 May 2023 allowing the Revenue’s petition against an Orissa judgment. In the Supreme Court’s words, that judgment had set aside the assessment for assessment year 2014-15 “on the ground that the jurisdictional officer had not adjudicated upon the returns”, the jurisdiction having been changed after the returns were filed. The assessee had participated in response to the section 142(1) notice without objecting, and the Court said that section 124(3)(a) “precludes the assessee from questioning the jurisdiction of the assessing officer” beyond the period stated. It is a brief order with no analysis of the kinds of jurisdiction, and the firm’s article on pecuniary jurisdiction treats its sentence on the clause as an observation made in disposing of a case on its facts. It is nonetheless the Supreme Court applying the clause to an objection that the officer who had jurisdiction had not dealt with the returns.

Whether the bar reaches every objection about the officer, or only territorial ones, divides the High Courts.

The narrow reading. The Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Ramesh D. Patel (Tax Appeal No. 347 of 2013, 21 January 2014) held that “section 124 of the Act pertains to territorial jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer” and that it had no bearing on an objection to the inherent jurisdiction to assess under section 153A where no search on the assessee was shown. The Calcutta High Court decisions on the monetary limits, Shree Shoppers among them, allow the objection without discussing section 124(3). That Court has since admitted a Revenue appeal, Pr. CIT v. Ashika Stock Broking Ltd. (17 May 2024), on the question whether the clause bars it.

The wide reading. The Karnataka High Court in Chandrika Investments v. ITO (review order, 28 January 2025, para 11) held that the clause “would cover both territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction” and that to confine it would be to rewrite it. A single judge of the same Court in Adarsh Developers v. DCIT (W.P. No. 1109/2023, 13 December 2023) went further (para 44): the restriction “must extend to all grounds on which jurisdiction is called in question”, because otherwise proceedings would remain inconclusive. That case is close to this one from the other side: the section 143(2) notice had been issued by an officer of the faceless centre in a case that lay with a Central Circle, the assessee participated, and the challenge failed.

The Delhi view. The Delhi High Court has drawn the line differently. In CIT v. S.S. Ahluwalia [2014] 46 taxmann.com 169 (14 March 2014) the Court held (para 34) that section 124 “postulates waiver of objection to assumption of jurisdiction”, and that this can only happen where the authority does not suffer from “inherent lack of subject matter jurisdiction”. The question which officer assesses “was the matter of administrative convenience and not strictly a matter of subject matter jurisdiction”. It then said (para 35):

Section 120/124/127 govern the process of procedure for assessment and not the subject matter or its purpose. … It is a matter of merely a process. A irregularity in procedure need not result in annulment unless the statute specifically stipulates to the contrary. The appellate authorities have right to put a clock back and direct the Income Tax Officer/Assessing Officer to follow the procedure notwithstanding the difference between mandatory and directory procedural norms.

The case was one of an officer who had not made the reference that section 124(4) requires. The Court held that the breach “would not make the assessment … a nullity” (para 52(i)); the remedy was to set aside and remit. It also said (para 34) that the “question of jurisdiction cannot be made subject matter of appeal, as the issue has to be decided on the administrative side”, an appeal lying only against the officer’s failure to follow the procedure in section 124. Abhishek Jain v. ITO [2018] 405 ITR 1 (1 June 2018) applied the same distinction: an objection about the place of assessment, between officers with concurrent jurisdiction, is not an objection of subject matter and is lost if not taken in time (paras 19 and 23).

The Allahabad decisions. The Allahabad High Court is the one that matters most on this file. In Salman Qureshi the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, the respondent to the appeal, is at Ghaziabad. On the rule in Pr. CIT v. ABC Papers Ltd. (Supreme Court, 18 August 2022), which the Delhi High Court has applied to a faceless assessment by looking to the seat of the jurisdictional officer (Ramesh Kumar Bagri v. ITO, 2 April 2026), a further appeal lies to the Allahabad High Court and not to Delhi. It is that Court’s decisions that bound the Bench, and the Delhi decisions were persuasive only. Three Allahabad decisions bear on the point, and the order refers to none of them. Janta Metal Works, noticed above, holds that selection instructions create no right in the assessee. Shivaaditiya Jems and Jewellery (P.) Ltd. v. ITO [2022] 143 taxmann.com 64 rejected an objection to a section 148 notice based on the monetary limits, holding that a pecuniary limit “fixed for purpose of distribution of work between officers” does not mean an inherent lack of jurisdiction in the officer who has the territory. And Sapna Flour Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (Writ Tax No. 718 of 2022, 9 December 2022), on section 144B itself, is taken up with the notice below.

Two questions have to be answered before the order’s premise can be accepted, and it answers neither. The first is whether the complaint that a faceless unit acted in place of the jurisdictional officer is a complaint about “the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer” within section 124 at all. The second is whether, if it is, it is of the waivable or the unwaivable kind.

On the first, an assessment unit is, by section 144B(3)(ii), “an Assessing Officer having powers so assigned by the Board”, and the authorities of the National Faceless Assessment Centre hold the powers of an Assessing Officer concurrently under Notification No. 22/2021. Section 2(7A) defines the Assessing Officer as the officer vested with the relevant jurisdiction by directions or orders under section 120 or any other provision of the Act. So the objection is, on the words, to the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer. The assessee’s reply is that section 124(1) vests jurisdiction by area, that sub-section (3) takes its colour from that, and that the allocation between the faceless stream and the jurisdictional officer is made by section 144B and not by section 124. The unit’s jurisdiction is something the Board specifies under section 144B(3) itself. On that view the time bar in section 124 has nothing to bite on. Of the decisions discussed here only Adarsh Developers, a single judge, has applied the bar to an objection that an officer of the faceless centre acted, and it did so on the general ground that the bar extends to every challenge to jurisdiction.

One instrument made after the orders and the notification of 2021 bears on this question, and on the earlier question whether the letter is a specification under section 144B(2). The Faceless Jurisdiction of Income-tax Authorities Scheme, 2022, made by the Central Government under section 130 and set out by the Madras High Court in Mark Studio (para 46, where it is dated 28 March 2022), deals with the exercise of powers under section 120 and the vesting of jurisdiction with the Assessing Officer under section 124. Both are to be in a faceless manner, through automated allocation, “in accordance with and to the extent provided in” section 144B, so far as assessment is concerned. The assessee will say that this measures a faceless unit’s jurisdiction by the reach of section 144B: in a case outside the Board’s specification the unit has none, whatever the notification of 2021 says. The Revenue will say that the same clause places the unit’s jurisdiction under section 124, so that an objection to it is an objection to which section 124(3) applies.

On the second, the Revenue has the easier task. On its case the faceless authority holds the powers of an Assessing Officer over the assessee by a notification under section 120, concurrently with the jurisdictional officer, and so looks very like the officer in Abhishek Jain. The assessee’s best answer is that section 144B(1) is itself a provision conferring and withholding power, so that a unit acting outside the cases specified under sub-section (2) is acting outside the only provision that enables it to act, which is a want of power and not a misallocation of work. That argument is as good as the proposition that the letter is a specification under sub-section (2), and no better.

The assessee has a second answer, which counsel put and the Bench recorded (para 15). The requirement that the jurisdictional officer serve the notice with a superior’s approval is not housekeeping. It gives a person assessed on another’s seized papers a check of the kind the Act itself requires when such a person is reached by reassessment, through the approvals under the former Explanation 2 to section 148, section 151 and section 148B. On that view the instruction protects the assessee and does not merely distribute work. The Revenue’s reply is that the letter states no such purpose, and that Parameter 7 also requires the Principal Commissioner’s approval before a case goes to the faceless centre.

The admission of the additional ground is a separate matter and does not answer any of this. National Thermal Power allows the Tribunal, in its discretion, to entertain a question of law arising on facts already on record that bears on the tax liability. It says nothing about a ground that a statute says may not be raised after a certain date. Varas International is an order in which the Supreme Court declined to shut out a pure question of law raised late by the Revenue and remanded for the other side to meet it. Neither touches section 124(3). The Revenue has a further point on admission: the ground was not purely one of law. It depended on the selection record, on the approval and on the identity of the officer who issued the notice. The order does not record that any selection record or approval was produced, and it makes no finding on who issued the notice, although the assessee’s paper book is recorded as containing all the notices (para 26).

Sections 292B and 292BB

Two general provisions will also be cited, and the order mentions neither.

Section 292BB deems a notice to have been duly served where the assessee “has appeared in any proceeding or co-operated in any inquiry relating to an assessment or reassessment”. It then stops him from objecting that the notice was “not served upon him”, “not served upon him in time” or “served upon him in an improper manner”, unless he raised the objection before the assessment was completed. The assessee in Salman Qureshi took part in the assessment, and the order records no objection before 21 March 2025. But the three objections the section shuts out are objections to service. The complaint here is about who issued the notice and who assessed, and the section does not reach it.

The Tribunal in Raja Arora held (para 10 of its order) that a jurisdictional defect “cannot be cured by provisions of section 292BB”. The Calcutta High Court in Pr. CIT v. Nopany & Sons (4 February 2022), where the only section 143(2) notice had come from an officer who “had no jurisdiction over the assessee at the relevant time”, upheld the Tribunal’s refusal to apply the section. That case is weaker support than it looks: the year was one before the section came into force, and the assessee had objected before the assessment was completed. The firm’s article on the section 143(2) notice deals with the section at length.

Section 292B is wider in what it covers and narrower in its test. It saves an assessment or notice from invalidity “merely by reason of any mistake, defect or omission” if it is “in substance and effect in conformity with or according to the intent and purpose of this Act”. The Revenue will say that an assessment made after a notice and a show cause notice, by an authority that holds the powers of an Assessing Officer over the assessee, is in substance an assessment under the Act, and that the choice of stream is a defect of the kind the section forgives. The assessee will say that want of authority is not a mistake in the assessment but the absence of one of its conditions. Like section 124(3), section 292B turns on the prior question whether the allocation between the two streams goes to power or to procedure.

The notice and the assessment are two questions

The order holds that the notice ought to have come from the jurisdictional officer (para 30) and quashes the assessment (para 42). It does not separately rule on the validity of the notice or quash it. The two do not stand on the same footing, and the difference matters to what happens next.

Section 143(2) does not say that the Assessing Officer serves the notice. It says “the Assessing Officer or the prescribed income-tax authority, as the case may be”. The prescribed authority is an income-tax authority, not below the rank of Income-tax Officer, authorised by the Board under rule 12E of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. From 1 April 2021 the officer so authorised was the Assistant or Deputy Commissioner in the National Faceless Assessment Centre (Notification No. 25/2021, S.O. 1437(E), 31 March 2021). That notification was superseded by Notification No. 56/2022 (S.O. 2432(E), 28 May 2022), which authorises “the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax/ Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation), Circle -1(1)(1), Delhi” to act as the prescribed income-tax authority “for the purpose of issuance of notice under sub-section (2) of section 143”. So a section 143(2) notice issued by that officer has a statutory footing of its own, which does not depend on the case being one for faceless assessment, or on the officer being either the jurisdictional officer or an assessment unit. A notice issued by any other officer has to be supported as the act of an Assessing Officer.

The Delhi High Court has held exactly that for a case which then went to a Central Circle. In Ambience Farms Private Limited v. ACIT (W.P.(C) 13788/2024, 1 October 2024) the notice, dated 23 June 2024, was issued by the officer named in Notification No. 56/2022, and the assessment was taken up by the Central Circle. The Court held that on “a plain reading” of section 143(2) either of the two authorities can issue the notice, and rejected the contention that the officer lacked jurisdiction to issue it. It also rejected the contention that only officers of the faceless centre can be authorised, and declined to go into section 144B because no such ground had been pleaded (paras 5, 7, 10, 11 and 15). The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition on 20 January 2025. Adarsh Developers is to the same effect for a notice of June 2021 issued, as prescribed income-tax authority, by an officer of the faceless centre in a Central Charge case.

The order in Salman Qureshi does not go into who signed the notice of 27 June 2024. It records the assessee’s contention that the notice came from the faceless officer (para 3), and counsel’s synopsis describes it as issued by “the Assessment Unit/NaFAC”. The document has to be looked at, because two different arguments follow from it.

If the notice was issued in the name of the officer notified under rule 12E, it was a good notice on Ambience Farms, dated three days inside the limit for service, and the only defect was in who went on to assess. The guidelines say that the notice is to be served “by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer concerned”. But the guidelines are an instruction to officers about procedure. The Revenue will say that they cannot take away from the prescribed authority a power that the section and a statutory notification give it: a circular contrary to the statute “has really no existence in law” (Commissioner of Central Excise, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries, Supreme Court, 14 October 2008, para 6). The assessee’s answer is that the Board that issued the notification is the Board that issued the guidelines, and that where the Board has said which officer is to serve the notice in a class of case, the general notification gives way.

If the notice was issued by an assessment unit in its own name, the prescribed authority limb does not save it. The Revenue then has to support it as the act of an Assessing Officer, on section 144B(3)(ii), the concurrent jurisdiction notification and the authorities on section 124(3) above. Section 144B(1)(iii) does provide for the section 143(2) notice to be served “through the National Faceless Assessment Centre”, but only in a case to which section 144B applies, which is the question in dispute.

The distinction governs the remedy.

If the notice was bad, the scrutiny assessment cannot be redone: the time for a fresh notice under the proviso to section 143(2) ran out on 30 June 2024. That is not the same as saying that the year is closed. The return then stands, and the Revenue’s remaining route is reassessment under section 147. The assessee’s own third additional ground, which the Tribunal left open, was that sections 147 and 148 were the proper route for this year. For a search initiated on or after 1 April 2021 but before 1 September 2024, sections 147 to 151 apply “as they stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024” (section 152(3)). Whether a reassessment can be founded on the same seized material after a scrutiny assessment on it has been annulled is a question the order does not touch, and an assessee who wins on this ground should expect it to be asked.

If the notice was good and only the assessment was made by the wrong unit, the ordinary appellate course is the one described in S.S. Ahluwalia: set the order aside and send the case to the officer who should have made it. Where the Tribunal does that, section 153(3) allows the fresh assessment to be made within twelve months from the end of the financial year in which the Tribunal’s order is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner, Chief Commissioner, Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. The demand and the penalty initiation would still fall with the order, and would have to be raised again in the fresh one.

The Act once answered the question of consequence in terms. Section 144B(9), as enacted, declared that an assessment under section 143(3) or section 144 in the cases covered by the section “shall be non-est if such assessment is not made in accordance with the procedure laid down under this section”. The Finance Act, 2022 omitted the sub-section with retrospective effect from 1 April 2021, and nothing in the Act now attaches invalidity to a departure from section 144B in either direction. The Allahabad High Court upheld the omission in Sapna Flour Mills as procedural. In the same judgment it held that a section 143(2) notice issued by the circle officer, in a reassessment which that officer had begun by a section 148 notice of 31 March 2021 and which was thereafter conducted through the National Faceless Assessment Centre, “cannot be said to suffer from any error of law” (para 30). And, for the denial of a hearing in the faceless assessment, it set the order aside and remitted the matter (paras 38 and 39).

The Supreme Court, in National Faceless Assessment Centre v. Automotive Manufacturers Pvt. Ltd. and connected appeals (21 March 2023), on the earlier text of the section, remanded faceless assessments for fresh orders and left the effect of the omission undecided. None of this is about a faceless unit acting in a case meant for the jurisdictional officer. It does show the course that the Allahabad High Court, to which an appeal in Salman Qureshi would go, has taken on a departure from section 144B.

The Act itself provides two ways in which a case leaves the faceless stream, and neither was used. Section 127 lets the Principal Commissioner transfer a case to a Central Charge, on recorded reasons and after a hearing where the offices are in different places, and section 127(4) says that a transfer “shall not render necessary the re-issue of any notice already issued”. Section 144B(8) lets the head of the faceless centre “at any stage of the assessment, if considered necessary, transfer the case to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such case, with the prior approval of the Board”. The guidelines’ own 15-day direction is an instruction to use section 127. A case that began in the faceless stream by mistake could have been sent to the jurisdictional officer under section 144B(8) at any time before 21 March 2025. Section 144B(8) has no counterpart to section 127(4), but it transfers “the case” at “any stage of the assessment”, and section 129, on a change of incumbent, lets an authority that succeeds another continue a proceeding from the stage at which it was left, subject to the assessee’s right to ask to be reheard. The natural reading is that the proceedings continue from where they stood.

A Delhi Bench has declined to treat such a change of hands as fatal. In Ebro India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT (ITA No. 1291/Del/2022, 9 September 2024, para 17) the faceless centre had passed the draft order and the jurisdictional officer the final order, after the Dispute Resolution Panel’s directions. The Bench found “no illegality” and no prejudice, on being told that the administrative heads had been permitted to transfer cases to the jurisdictional officer. It also said that an assessment “once initiated u/s 144B … has to be completed in the same way”, and that “the jurisdiction always lies with the JAO”, which are sentences for the assessee.

That the Act provides for a case to leave the faceless stream at any stage is some indication that it does not regard the two streams as sealed compartments, and the Delhi High Court said in T.K.S. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO (28 October 2024, para 84) that “faceless and jurisdictional assessments are not mutually exclusive”. It is equally an indication that a case is in one stream or the other until an order moves it. Both sides can use the point.

The seized material that was never supplied

On the facts this is the firmest ground in the order. The assessee asked for the documents in terms; the notices carried an allegation and a figure; the first appellate authority treated the mention of the transactions as confrontation; and before the Tribunal the Revenue could not show that anything had been supplied, or produce the document on which the selection itself rested. An addition of Rs 14.17 crore on material the assessee has never seen cannot stand.

What follows from that is a different question, and the authorities do not all point to annulment.

Kishinchand Chellaram v. CIT [1980] 125 ITR 713 (SC) is the leading decision that material collected behind the assessee’s back cannot be used against him unless it is shown to him and he is allowed to meet it. It was a reference. The Supreme Court excluded the undisclosed letters, found that nothing remained to support the addition, and answered the question for the assessee. The addition fell. The assessment was not declared void. Andaman Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise (Supreme Court, 2 September 2015) goes further in its language: refusing cross-examination of witnesses whose statements were the basis of the order was “a serious flaw which makes the order nullity”. That was a central excise adjudication that had already been remanded once.

Against that, Tin Box Company v. CIT [2001] 249 ITR 216 (SC) is an income tax case in which the Tribunal had itself accepted that the assessee had not been given a proper opportunity. The Supreme Court held that the opportunity could not be made good on appeal, “for it is the assessment order that counts”, and for that very reason set aside all three orders and remanded “to the assessing authority for fresh consideration”. Kapurchand Shrimal v. CIT [1981] 131 ITR 451 (SC) holds that an appellate authority has the duty to correct the error and direct a fresh assessment where the officer failed to follow the required procedure, unless the statute forbids it. S.S. Ahluwalia (para 35) records that the same principle is followed where natural justice has been denied.

One of the decisions the assessee’s counsel cited beside Kishinchand Chellaram is CIT v. Odeon Builders (P.) Ltd. [2019] 418 ITR 315 (SC). It is an order dismissing the Revenue’s review petition against the deletion of a disallowance of purchases, on concurrent findings that the disallowance rested on third-party information which had not been tested and that the assessee had discharged its own onus. It is a case about deleting an addition on the evidence. It is not a case about the validity of the assessment.

So the natural justice finding supports deleting the section 69C addition, or setting the order aside for the material to be supplied. It does not, by itself, make the assessment a nullity, and on the firm’s reading of para 42 the Tribunal did not say that it did. Para 42 treats the denial as something that happened because the wrong unit was assessing.

The order does not explain that link, but the letter gives it some support. Paragraph 4, which deals with cases selected by the International Taxation and Central Circle charges, says that the information is not to be sent to the faceless centre unless the case itself is transferred. The search parameter is built the same way: the jurisdictional officer serves the notice, the case goes to the Central Charge, and nothing in the parameter provides for the seized record to be sent to the faceless centre. A faceless unit that takes up such a case has only what the system shows it. What this unit put to the assessee was one row, numbered 18, of a table it described as an extract, and the Departmental Representative could not produce more even before the Tribunal (para 26).

The Revenue’s answer is that the link is one of likelihood and not of law. A faceless unit can attach a seized document to a show cause notice as well as any other officer. Parameter 7 requires the jurisdictional officer to upload the underlying documents for it. And section 144B(6)(vii) and (viii) give the assessee a right to ask for a hearing, a right examined in Part 1 of the firm’s faceless assessment series.

Consistency: the 2.10 per cent treatment of the earlier years

The Tribunal used the contrast between 2.10 per cent and the whole for a limited purpose: as the prejudice that flowed from the faceless unit having acted, and as a departure from “the rule of consistency”. Counsel’s reason for linking the inconsistency to the faceless framing was that the procedure in the guidelines avoids an inconsistent approach by the jurisdictional officer and the faceless officer to the same seized material across years (para 17). The Tribunal did not hold that the Revenue was bound to apply 2.10 per cent in 2023-24.

That restraint is right, because the conditions of the rule were not met. In Radhasoami Satsang v. CIT [1992] 193 ITR 321 (SC) the Supreme Court said that although res judicata does not apply and each year is a separate unit, a position should not be changed in a later year “where a fundamental aspect permeating through the different assessment years has been found as a fact one way or the other and parties have allowed that position to be sustained by not challenging the order”. It added that the decision was confined to its facts. In CIT v. Excel Industries Ltd. [2013] 358 ITR 295 (SC) the Revenue had accepted the Tribunal’s orders in the assessee’s favour in several years, had failed before the Bombay High Court in others, and was not allowed to “flip-flop” (para 31).

Here the earlier treatment is in two assessment orders of the officer, not in appellate findings. It is an estimate of profit and not a finding on a fundamental aspect. And the assessee, on his counsel’s statement, has not let it rest, having appealed against both years. The true value of the earlier orders is evidential. They show that an officer of the same Department, on the same seized material, concluded that what the material evidenced was trading and that only the profit on it was income. An appellate authority asked to sustain the whole amount for the third year has to explain why that was wrong, and the order of the Commissioner (Appeals) contains no such explanation.

The inference the Bench drew from the earlier years on jurisdiction (para 32) is weaker than it looks. Those were, on counsel’s account, reassessments under section 147. Reassessment after a search is the subject of Parameter 4(i), with which counsel said the notices in those years conformed, and which names the jurisdictional officer in terms. They say nothing about which parameter governs the ordinary scrutiny of the search year. They also sit badly with the finding on paragraph 4.2. Under Parameter 4(i) a case stays with the jurisdictional officer, and is not sent to the Central Charge, only where paragraph 4.2 applies. If the assessee’s dealings were too substantial for that paragraph, as the Bench held, the earlier years ought to have been centralised as well.

The mirror image: when the jurisdictional officer acts in a faceless case

The better-known dispute runs the other way. From 2022 assessees challenged reassessment notices under section 148 issued by jurisdictional officers, on the ground that the scheme under section 151A required them to come from the faceless centre. The Bombay High Court in Hexaware Technologies Ltd. v. ACIT (3 May 2024) held that there was “no question of concurrent jurisdiction” and that jurisdiction assigned to one was “to the exclusion of the other”. The Delhi High Court in T.K.S. Builders declined to follow it and held (para 103) that “the distribution of functions between the JAO and NFAC is complimentary and concurrent” (NFAC there is the National Faceless Assessment Centre). Parliament then inserted section 147A by the Finance Act, 2026, deemed to have been in the Act from 1 April 2021:

Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, order or decree of any court or in section 151A or in any scheme framed thereunder, for the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the Assessing Officer for the purposes of sections 148 and 148A shall mean and shall always be deemed to have meant to be an Assessing Officer other than the National Faceless Assessment Centre or any assessment unit referred to in sub-section (3) of section 144B.

The Supreme Court set aside the judgments for assessees, Hexaware among them, on 10 April 2026 for fresh consideration in the light of the new section, without ruling on the merits. The Punjab and Haryana High Court struck section 147A down on 10 September 2026. On 18 September 2026, in Union of India v. Bharat Industrial Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court granted leave against that judgment, stayed it on the condition that the assessment and reassessment proceedings do not go further, and fixed the appeal for final hearing on 3 December 2026. The Andhra Pradesh High Court has since struck the section down as well, in Bala Sreenivas Rao Somisetty v. ITO (12 October 2026). The full account is in Part 2 of the firm’s faceless assessment series.

Section 147A says nothing that helps the Revenue here. It defines the officer “for the purposes of sections 148 and 148A” (the notice and the procedure before it), and it runs in one direction: that officer is not the faceless centre. It does not mention section 143(2) or section 143(3). No provision specifically validates a faceless unit’s notice or order in a case that should have been the jurisdictional officer’s. If the defect found in Salman Qureshi is a defect, the Revenue has only the general provisions, sections 124(3), 292B and 292BB, to meet it with.

The exclusivity reasoning the assessee needs is the reasoning that is presently under a cloud. Hexaware is set aside. T.K.S. Builders, which holds the two streams concurrent and complementary, was applied by the Delhi High Court to a Central Circle case in Inder Dev Gupta v. ACIT (21 November 2025). That judgment recorded that T.K.S. Builders was under challenge in the Supreme Court and had not been stayed, and that it still held the field in Delhi. T.K.S. Builders was about the jurisdictional officer’s power to start a reassessment and does not decide that a faceless unit may act in a case the Board has kept out of the faceless stream. It also says (para 89) that an assessment unit “derives no authority or jurisdiction till such time as a case is randomly allocated to it”. But its general statement is the one the Revenue will rely on.

The mirror of Salman Qureshi has been decided under the same letter of 3 May 2024. In Pradeep Kumar Garg v. ITO (Punjab and Haryana High Court, CWP-24807-2024, 19 December 2024) a jurisdictional officer issued a section 143(2) notice for assessment year 2023-24, with the Principal Commissioner’s approval, relying on Parameter 4(i). No notice under section 148 had been issued for that year. The Court held that the guidelines let the jurisdictional officer act only where a section 148 notice had issued for the year in question, that otherwise the notice had to come through the faceless centre under section 144B, and (para 16):

The notice dated 18.06.2024 issued under section 143(2) of the Act is therefore found to be without jurisdiction. Merely taking approval from the concerned Principal Commissioner would not be sufficient to grant jurisdiction to the JAO.

The two decisions agree that acting in the wrong stream is fatal: the High Court quashed the notice, the Tribunal the assessment. They differ on where the rule comes from. The High Court treats section 144B as the rule and the guidelines as a narrow exception that cannot enlarge the jurisdictional officer’s authority; it quotes its own earlier judgment that instructions and circulars “can be issued only for the purpose of supplementing the statutory provisions”. The Tribunal treats the guidelines as the source of the jurisdictional officer’s exclusive authority.

The earlier judgment from which Pradeep Kumar Garg reasons, Jasjit Singh v. Union of India (29 July 2024), was a decision quashing jurisdictional officers’ section 148 notices on the exclusivity view. Section 147A does not touch a section 143(2) notice, but the reasoning on which the decision stands is the reasoning that the Supreme Court has sent back to the High Courts. And the case came by writ, before any assessment, on an objection taken about two months after the notice; section 124(3) was not raised or considered.

For an officer the choice between the two streams has to be made before 30 June, on a classification (which parameter applies) that the guidelines do not make easy.

What the Tribunal left open

All remaining grounds were left open as academic (para 43). They will matter on other files, and on this one if the Revenue appeals and succeeds on jurisdiction.

Whether section 143(3) was the right provision at all. The third additional ground said that the assessment should have been framed under sections 147 and 148, “which prescribe the mandatory procedure for framing assessments arising out of a search”. The approvals that route carries are in Explanation 2 to the earlier section 148, section 151 and section 148B. A Delhi Bench quashed a faceless section 143(3) order on a third party on that reasoning in Abha Khanna. Five days after Salman Qureshi, another Delhi Bench applied the same reasoning to a searched person assessed by a Central Circle, in Nugraj Jain v. DCIT (ITA No. 4038/Del/2026, 14 October 2026). A single judge of the Madras High Court has held the opposite, also in a searched person’s case, in Zigma Global: an assessment under section 143(3) is the correct course so long as the time for the section 143(2) notice is open, and the four Tribunal orders cited for the contrary view are “incorrect” to that extent. If the reassessment-only line is right, the search-year return of a third party is not a scrutiny case under any parameter, and the premise of para 30 goes with it.

The approval under section 148B. Section 148B, inserted by the Finance Act, 2022 from 1 April 2022, provides that no order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation shall be passed by an officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner, for an assessment year to which clauses (i) to (iv) of Explanation 2 to section 148, as that section stood until 31 August 2024, apply, except with the prior approval of the Additional or Joint Commissioner or Director. The fourth additional ground said there was none.

The evidence. Whether an addition under section 69C can rest on Excel sheets seized from a third party, without authentication, without a shown nexus with the assessee and without a certificate under section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, was raised and not decided. So was the complaint in the second original ground that cross-examination was not allowed. The questions are the same as those in the firm’s articles on extrapolation from a seized cash book and on cross-examination in third-party search cases.

The whole amount or the profit. The Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Simit P. Sheth (Tax Appeal No. 553 of 2012, 16 January 2013) held that where goods were in fact bought, though not from the parties shown, “not the entire purchase price but only profit element embedded in such purchases can be added”. The Bombay High Court in Pr. CIT v. Kanak Impex (India) Ltd. (3 March 2025) held that where the assessee has not explained the source of the expenditure on the purchases, estimating a profit on them is “contrary to the express provision of Section 69C”, and restored the whole. The Supreme Court dismissed the special leave petition on 21 November 2025. Both are decisions on purchases entered in the books and disallowed as bogus, and they apply here only by analogy. In Kanak Impex the Court distinguished the profit cases as ones where the assessee had taken part in the assessment and discharged the initial onus. It also recorded: “It was nobody’s case that both the sales and purchases are unaccounted.” That remark is the one that matters on a file of this kind, where the allegation is of cash purchases outside the books from a named supplier.

Section 115BBE, section 68 and the penalty. The rate under section 115BBE, the loan addition of Rs 1.48 crore, and the fifth original ground against the initiation of penalty under sections 271AAC and 272A(1)(d) were not reached. On the loan, which the order does not connect with the seized material, the third original ground was that the assessee had discharged his onus. Counsel’s synopsis said that the addition was vitiated by the denial of an effective opportunity and asked, without prejudice, that the matter be restored to the Assessing Officer to examine the lender’s confirmation and the supporting evidence. The annulment disposed of it with the rest.

If the Revenue appeals. An appeal under section 260A is likely to raise the questions argued below as open questions 2, 4 and 5: whether the letter of 3 May 2024 is a specification under section 144B(2), whether section 124(3)(a) barred the objection, and whether the order should have been set aside for a fresh assessment and not annulled. A further question is whether a ground that turned on the selection record could be decided without calling for that record.

Searches from 1 September 2024, and the Income-tax Act, 2025

The fact pattern in Salman Qureshi, a third party’s ordinary scrutiny assessment for the year of the search, belongs to searches initiated between 1 April 2021 and 31 August 2024.

For a search initiated on or after 1 September 2024, Chapter XIV-B of the 1961 Act applies. Under section 158BD the seized material relating to another person’s undisclosed income is handed to “the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person”, who proceeds against him under section 158BC. The statute, and not an annual letter, names the officer. And section 144B(1) applies only to an assessment “under sub-section (3) of section 143 or under section 144 or under section 147”; a block assessment is not among them. The regime is set out in the firm’s article on block assessment.

For a search initiated on or after 1 April 2026 the Income-tax Act, 2025 applies (section 292(1), with section 1(3)), and section 295 takes the place of section 158BD: the material is again handed to “the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person”, who proceeds under section 294. Section 295(2)(c) and (d), which have no counterpart in section 158BD, shorten the other person’s block period in two cases.

By section 536(2)(c) and (v) of the 2025 Act, the 1961 Act, with its procedure, continues to govern proceedings for a tax year beginning before 1 April 2026 and every proceeding connected with a search initiated before that date. The exception that matters here is the block assessment that follows a search initiated on or after 1 April 2026, which section 292(1) places under the new Act whatever the years it covers. So the whole of the argument in this article, which concerns scrutiny assessment, remains a 1961 Act argument for assessment years up to 2026-27.

For tax year 2026-27 onwards the provisions carry over with little change. Section 273(2) of the 2025 Act is section 144B(2) word for word, and section 273(12) corresponds to section 144B(8) and keeps “with the prior approval of the Board”. Section 273(5) repeats that an assessment unit is “an Assessing Officer having powers so assigned by the Board”. The step-by-step procedure has moved to Rule 176 of the Income-tax Rules, 2026, which applies to “cases as specified by the Board under section 273(2)”. The scrutiny notice is under section 270(8), which still reads “the Assessing Officer or the prescribed income-tax authority”, and section 273(3)(a) lists the serving of that notice among the functions of the faceless centre, where section 144B(1)(iii) had it served “through the National Faceless Assessment Centre”. The time bar on questioning jurisdiction is section 242(4). The Board’s power to instruct is section 239, with the old proviso now a sub-section of its own, (2).

Section 536(2)(j) deems the instructions, orders and notifications issued under the 1961 Act to have been issued under the corresponding provisions of the new Act, “so far as it is not inconsistent with” them. The Board’s orders under section 144B(2) and the notification under section 120 therefore carry over to sections 273(2) and 241. A scrutiny letter issued for returns under the new Act will be a fresh instruction, and has to be read for itself.

Gujarat: the High Court’s decisions

Six decisions of the Gujarat High Court bear on the argument. None of them concerns a faceless unit acting in a case that the scrutiny guidelines give to the jurisdictional officer.

Ramesh D. Patel is the authority for the narrow reading of section 124(3) in this State: the section “pertains to territorial jurisdiction”, and it does not bar an objection that goes to the inherent power to assess. The inherent defect in that case was the absence of a search, which is a statutory precondition of section 153A. Whether a breach of the Board’s allocation between the faceless centre and the jurisdictional officer is a defect of that order is the question the decision leaves.

In Diamond TMT and Procon Private Limited v. ITO (Special Civil Application No. 5370 of 2022, 16 September 2025) a section 148 notice was issued by the Ahmedabad officer although the case stood transferred to Bhavnagar by an order under section 127. The Revenue pleaded section 124(3)(a), Abhishek Jain and S.S. Ahluwalia; the objection had been filed some four months after the notice. The Court distinguished the two Delhi decisions on their facts, did not rule on section 124(3), and quashed the notice, observing (para 14) that “the system cannot be the master of the proceedings in absence of the orders passed under the statute”. That is helpful to an assessee who can point to an order, under section 127 or section 144B(8), that placed the case with one officer while another acted. It is less help where, as in Salman Qureshi, the complaint is that an order which should have been made was not.

In Chartered Capital and Investment Limited v. Pr. CIT-1, Ahmedabad (Special Civil Application No. 18886 of 2023, 7 October 2025) the Revenue relied on the 2023 letter to support a transfer to the Central Charge under section 127. The Court quashed the transfer for want of material and reasons. It said that the letter “only states” that cases are to be selected with approval and transferred “within 15 days of the service of the notice under Section 143(2) or 142(1) of the Act by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer concerned”, and that no such notice had been issued by the jurisdictional officer (para 15). The Court read the letter’s direction to transfer as operating on a notice served by the jurisdictional officer, which is the reading the assessee needs.

Fusion Granito Private Limited v. ACIT (14 June 2024), discussed in Part 1 of the faceless assessment series, is the nearest Gujarat decision on a case moving between the streams. The Court rejected a contention that the jurisdictional officer had no jurisdiction because no transfer under section 144B(8) had been notified to the assessee, on the order-sheet notings and because the proceedings followed an order under section 263 (para 12). It then quashed the order for denial of a hearing and remanded the matter to that officer.

Dineshkumar Chhaganbhai Nandani v. ITO (Special Civil Application No. 7864 of 2022, 19 June 2023) was decided after sub-section (9) had been omitted. The Court quashed and set aside a faceless order passed without adequate opportunity, and added (para 17) that this “would not preclude the respondent in initiating any action from the stage from where it has been left”. A breach of section 144B led to the order going, and the Revenue being allowed to resume.

On reassessment notices in search cases, the Delhi High Court in T.K.S. Builders records (paras 96 and 97) what the Gujarat High Court held in Talati and Talati LLP v. Office of Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 4(1)(1), Ahmedabad (1 October 2024). Faceless allocation “cannot be applied to the case of Search and Seizure under Section 132, where the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) is required to record his satisfaction”. So in Gujarat the view that search-based proceedings belong to the jurisdictional officer has judicial support, though in the setting of section 148 and not of scrutiny under section 143(2).

Open questions, argued both ways

1. Is a breach of a scrutiny instruction a jurisdictional defect at all?

For the assessee. Section 119(1) obliges the officer to follow the instruction. The Delhi, Punjab and Haryana, Calcutta and Orissa High Courts have upheld or ordered the quashing of assessments made in breach of selection instructions or of the monetary limits, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court has upheld a Tribunal’s order allowing the assessee’s appeal on the ground that the case could not have been selected. The Calcutta High Court has added that a Department which sets a standard for itself cannot depart from it without offending Article 14.

For the Revenue. The power to scrutinise is in section 143(2) and the power to assess in section 143(3), and an instruction cannot take either away (Reshi Construction; Janta Metal Works, a decision of the High Court to which an appeal in Salman Qureshi would go). Two of the four decisions the Bench relied on were disposed of as raising no substantial question of law, and none concerned a faceless unit: the one decision about which officer acts, Shree Shoppers, was on the monetary limits between ranks.

The firm’s view. On selection the assessee’s line has the greater weight of authority. On allocation between the faceless centre and the jurisdictional officer, none of the High Court decisions discussed here holds a faceless unit’s assessment void for breach of the guidelines, and the answer will follow the answer to the next question.

2. Is the annual scrutiny letter a specification under section 144B(2)?

For the assessee. The sub-section prescribes no form. The letter is the Board’s, it sorts cases into classes, and it says which classes are to be completed “in faceless manner” and which begin with the jurisdictional officer and go to Central Charges. The Madras High Court in Mark Studio accepted, on the Revenue’s own submission, that the previous year’s letter was issued under section 144B(2). The orders that recite section 144B(2) all date from 2021, before the section was recast from 1 April 2022, and since then it is the annual letter that tells officers which classes are to be completed in faceless manner.

For the Revenue. The Board has a series of orders that recite section 144B(2), and they define the faceless stream by charge and by a few named classes. When the Board wanted survey cases out, it excluded them by such an order. The scrutiny letter recites no power, is addressed to officers as an instruction, and its direction to transfer a search case within 15 days assumes that the case is inside the ordinary allocation until transferred. Mark Studio is a single-judge decision in a reassessment case, in which the Court was not asked what follows when a faceless unit acts. The Delhi High Court in Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Trust described the guidelines of 2020 as limited to selection and treated the Board’s order under clause 3 of the Faceless Assessment Scheme, 2019 as what fixed the reach of faceless assessment (paras 59 and 61).

The firm’s view. On the Board’s own orders the Revenue has the better of it: the letter is evidence of what the Board wants done, and the orders under section 144B(2) are what the Board has specified. On authority the position is divided. A single judge of the Madras High Court in Mark Studio treated the previous year’s letter as issued under section 144B(2), at the Revenue’s instance. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Trust described the guidelines then in force as limited to selection, under the earlier Scheme. Neither Court was asked what follows when a faceless unit acts in a case the letter gives to the jurisdictional officer, and the point remains open.

3. Does Parameter 2(ii) reach a person who was not searched?

For the assessee. Parameter 2(i) expressly includes the search-year return in a third-party case; Parameter 2(ii) is the same parameter for later searches, and the change at 1 April 2021 reflects the end of section 153C and nothing more. “Assessments in search & seizure cases” is wide enough to include an assessment founded on what the search produced. The Delhi High Court in Raja Arora read the predecessor clause as covering an assessment framed on incriminating material found in the search of another, and the Assessing Officer’s own order said the selection was because of the search.

For the Revenue. Where the Board meant to include the third party’s search year it said so, in 2(i), and it left those words out of 2(ii). A third party with a filed return and information from the Investigation Wing is described exactly by Parameter 7, which sends the notice through the faceless centre. Paragraph 4.2 shows that the Board thinks of third parties under Parameter 4, as reassessment cases.

The firm’s view. Open. The selection record is the first thing to obtain. In Raja Arora the Court held the Revenue to the clause its own communication named, and tested the clause its counsel argued for against that clause’s conditions. Where the record shows a selection under Parameter 7, with the approval and the documents that parameter requires, the assessee’s argument is much harder, though he can still say that his case answers the Court’s description of a search-clause case. Where it shows Parameter 2, or shows nothing, the Tribunal’s reading is tenable.

4. Is the objection barred by section 124(3)?

For the assessee. The section is about area. The allocation between the faceless centre and the jurisdictional officer is made by section 144B, which has no time bar. A unit acting outside the cases specified under section 144B(2) lacks power, and want of power cannot be waived (Ramesh D. Patel; the Calcutta decisions). S.S. Ahluwalia itself confines waiver to cases where there is no “inherent lack of subject matter jurisdiction”, and T.K.S. Builders says that an assessment unit “derives no authority or jurisdiction” until a case is allocated to it. The Gujarat High Court quashed a notice in Diamond TMT although the bar was pleaded. Kalinga Institute is a short order on its facts. And the routing is a safeguard for the person assessed, modelled on the approvals the Act requires in reassessment, and not a distribution of work (para 15 of the order).

For the Revenue. The assessment unit is an Assessing Officer by section 144B(3)(ii), and the authorities of the faceless centre hold concurrent powers under a section 120 notification. An objection to its acting is an objection to the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer. Kalinga Institute applied the clause to an objection that the jurisdictional officer had not dealt with the returns. Chandrika Investments and Adarsh Developers refuse to confine it. S.S. Ahluwalia and Abhishek Jain treat the allocation of a case between officers as procedure, capable of waiver. And Shivaaditiya Jems, of the Allahabad High Court, treats a limit fixed for the distribution of work as creating no inherent want of jurisdiction.

The firm’s view. An objection first taken more than seventeen months after the assessment is exposed. The assessee’s argument that the defect is one of power depends on question 2 being answered in his favour. Where the objection was taken within the month, the bar does not arise and the argument is far stronger.

5. If the wrong unit assessed, is the order void or to be set aside and redone?

For the assessee. A notice by an officer without jurisdiction is an incurable defect that goes to the root of the matter (Shree Shoppers), and the notice and the proceedings founded on it are quashed (Pradeep Kumar Garg). The assessee will say that an appellate authority cannot confer jurisdiction by sending the case back. Where the notice itself is bad and the time for a fresh one has expired, there is nothing to send back.

For the Revenue. Sections 120, 124 and 127 are procedural; “A irregularity in procedure need not result in annulment unless the statute specifically stipulates to the contrary” (S.S. Ahluwalia, para 35). Section 144B(9), the non est clause, was omitted with retrospective effect from 1 April 2021, and the Allahabad High Court, which upheld the omission in Sapna Flour Mills, set a faceless order aside and remitted it. If the notice was issued by the prescribed authority it was validly issued, and a fresh assessment by the right officer is possible.

The firm’s view. If the notice is good, set-aside is the more likely outcome in a High Court. If the notice is bad, the scrutiny assessment ends, though not necessarily the year. In Part 1 of the faceless assessment series the firm’s view was that a wrong-stream assessment will be set aside only where the stream cost the assessee a statutory step. That remains the firm’s view. Salman Qureshi is the first order considered here to annul an assessment on the stream alone. The steps this assessee can point to are the approval at selection, which the letter requires, and the reasoned order under section 127, made after a hearing where the offices are in different places, which the Act requires for a transfer to a Central Charge. The outcome turns on the validity of the notice, and it was not examined.

6. Can the faceless centre issue the notice in a case the jurisdictional officer must assess?

For the assessee. The guidelines say in terms that in Parameter 2 cases the notice is served “by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer concerned”. Pradeep Kumar Garg treats the two streams as exclusive for the notice, and the Gujarat High Court in Chartered Capital read the letter’s scheme as starting from a notice served by the jurisdictional officer.

For the Revenue. Section 143(2) authorises the prescribed income-tax authority as well as the Assessing Officer, and since 28 May 2022 the Board’s notification under rule 12E names a single officer at Delhi for the purpose. Ambience Farms upholds a notice by that officer in a case taken up by a Central Circle, and Adarsh Developers upholds one issued in June 2021 by an officer of the faceless centre as prescribed authority. Sapna Flour Mills upholds a circle officer’s notice in a reassessment that he had begun and that was then completed facelessly. An instruction cannot cut down a statutory notification.

The firm’s view. Where the notice was issued by the officer notified under rule 12E, the Revenue’s argument is the stronger on the statute. Where it was issued by an assessment unit in its own name, the Revenue has to fall back on the unit being an Assessing Officer, and the argument is weaker. None of the decisions above reconciles section 143(2) with the wording of the guidelines.

On a live file

Classify the file first. The argument in Salman Qureshi is for a file with four features. The assessment is a scrutiny assessment made by a faceless unit under section 143(3) read with section 144B. The assessee was not searched. The year is the year of a search initiated between 1 April 2021 and 31 August 2024. And the section 143(2) notice was issued at a time when the guidelines gave search cases to the jurisdictional officer. Read the guidelines in force when the notice was issued, including any letter modifying them during that year, and not the 2024 letter by default.

Check the calendar. A search initiated up to 31 August 2024 falls, at the latest, in previous year 2024-25. Where the return for that year was furnished in financial year 2025-26, the last date for serving a section 143(2) notice was 30 June 2026, three months from the end of that financial year. On almost every such file, therefore, the month allowed by section 124(3)(a) has already run. Where the assessment is still pending, and the guidelines in force when the notice was issued give the case to the jurisdictional officer, put the objection in writing now, before the order is passed. Ask that the case be sent to the jurisdictional officer under section 144B(8) or centralised under section 127 (which says in terms that notices need not be re-issued). An objection on the record before the order is weaker than one within the month, and much stronger than one first taken in appeal. Once the assessment is complete, the only way back is through the appellate authority.

Where a notice has just been served, object in writing within one month of service. Say that the case is a search-linked case under the relevant parameter. Say that the guidelines require the notice to be served by the jurisdictional officer with prior approval and the case to be transferred to the Central Charge, and that the faceless unit has no jurisdiction. Ask in terms for a reference under section 124(4), the provision that obliges an officer who does not accept a timely objection to refer it to the higher authorities before assessing. Do this even though it is not settled that section 124 applies: an objection on the record within the month removes the Revenue’s best answer whichever way that question goes. File it as a separate response on the portal and keep the acknowledgment.

Reassessment files. The one-month step remains live where a faceless unit serves a notice in a reassessment that follows a search, which the 2024 letter deals with in Parameter 4(i). There the month runs from service of the section 142(1) or section 143(2) notice where a return was filed under section 139(1); where none was, the objection has to be taken within the time the section 148 notice allows for the return.

Ask for the selection record. The parameter under which the return was selected; the approval of the Principal Commissioner and its date; any order under section 127; any order under section 144B(8) and the Board’s approval for it. Ask also for a copy of the section 143(2) notice as issued, to see which officer signed it. A refusal is worth having.

Ask for the seized material, specifically. Not “the documents relied on”, but the document, its page, the panchnama entry, the statement of the person from whose custody it was seized, and the appraisal report extract that names the assessee. Ask again in reply to the show cause notice, and ask for a hearing by video. The record of unanswered requests is what carried para 38 of the order.

Consider a writ where the objection is fresh. Pradeep Kumar Garg succeeded by writ before any assessment. A challenge at the notice stage, on an objection filed within the month, avoids both section 124(3) and the argument that a completed assessment should be set aside and not annulled. In Delhi the petition will meet Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Trust.

Before the Commissioner (Appeals), take the ground under section 250(5). Do this if the ground was not taken at assessment, and do not leave it for the Tribunal. If it reaches the Tribunal as an additional ground, put on record that every fact needed is in the assessment record, and be ready for section 124(3), sections 292B and 292BB, Kalinga Institute, S.S. Ahluwalia and the Board’s order of 31 March 2021.

Put the earlier years in the paper book, after weighing two things. The Tribunal relied on the notices, orders and treatment of the same material in the earlier years twice: as showing which officer the Revenue itself thought was the right one, and as showing prejudice. But the finding that paragraph 4.2 does not apply is equally a finding that the earlier years were for the Central Charge. And the Commissioner (Appeals) hearing those years has the power of enhancement under section 251(1)(a): an assessee who tells him that the 2.10 per cent orders and the 2023-24 order cannot both stand invites the question which of them is wrong.

Never run the jurisdictional ground alone. The order records no submission by the Revenue on it in Salman Qureshi. On a file where the Departmental Representative argues it, the merits grounds (no nexus, material not supplied, profit element, section 148B) must be argued in full, and a finding asked for on each, so that a reversal on jurisdiction does not send the case back with nothing decided.

For the Revenue’s representative. Produce the selection record, the approval and the notice. Ask in the alternative for a set-aside under S.S. Ahluwalia and Sapna Flour Mills, so that the choice before the Bench is not only between upholding the order and annulling it.

Concordance: Income-tax Act, 1961 and Income-tax Act, 2025

Subject Income-tax Act, 1961 Income-tax Act, 2025
“Assessing Officer” defined Section 2(7A) Section 2(12)
Board’s instructions to subordinate authorities; limits on them Section 119(1) and its proviso Section 239(1) and (2)
Jurisdiction of income-tax authorities, including concurrent jurisdiction Section 120 Section 241
Jurisdiction of Assessing Officers; time bar on objection; reference Section 124(3), (4) Section 242(4), (5)
Power to transfer cases Section 127 Section 243
Change of incumbent of an office Section 129 Section 244
Scrutiny notice; its time limit; the assessment Section 143(2), its proviso, section 143(3) Section 270(8), (9), (10)
Faceless assessment; cases specified by the Board; assessment unit an Assessing Officer; transfer to the officer having jurisdiction Section 144B(1), (2), (3)(ii), (8) Section 273(1), (2), (5), (12), with Rule 176 of the Income-tax Rules, 2026
Officer for the reassessment notices Section 147A Section 279(3)
Reassessment notice; procedure before notice Sections 148, 148A Sections 280, 281
Assessment of a person other than the searched person Section 153C (searches up to 31 March 2021); sections 147 and 148 (searches from 1 April 2021 to 31 August 2024); the year of the search itself, where it falls outside those provisions, by ordinary scrutiny under section 143(3), a course that is disputed for the later period; section 158BD (searches from 1 September 2024) Section 295
Unexplained expenditure Section 69C Section 105
Tax on unexplained income Section 115BBE Section 195
Mistake, defect or omission not to invalidate Section 292B Section 522(1)
Notice deemed to be valid Section 292BB Section 523
Repeal and savings Not applicable Section 536(2)(c), (j), (v)

Two of these rows differ in substance, besides the block-period provisions in section 295(2)(c) and (d). Section 105(1) of the 2025 Act says that unexplained expenditure “shall be deemed” to be income, where section 69C says “may be deemed”. And section 195(1)(i) of the 2025 Act, as it now stands, taxes such income at 30 per cent, where section 115BBE(1)(i) says 60 per cent.

Decisions referred to

Decision Court and date or citation Point
Salman Qureshi v. DCIT ITAT Delhi, 9 October 2026 Faceless assessment of a search-linked case contrary to the guidelines quashed
National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. CIT; CIT v. Varas International (P) Ltd. Supreme Court, 4 December 1996; 2 March 2006 Additional grounds on a question of law
Pr. CIT-7 v. Raja Arora Delhi High Court, 14 May 2025 Selection without the required approval; no substantial question of law
CIT v. Best Plastics (P) Ltd. Delhi High Court, 5 April 2006 Scrutiny of an excluded case; no substantial question of law
CIT v. Crystal Phosphates Ltd. Punjab and Haryana High Court, [2024] 461 ITR 289 Case outside the selection clause
Pr. CIT-1 v. Shree Shoppers Ltd. Calcutta High Court, 15 March 2023 Notice by the wrong rank incurable
Nababharat Shiksha Parishad v. DCIT Orissa High Court, 15 December 2022 Approval for selection mandatory
CIT v. Smt. Nayana P. Dedhia Andhra Pradesh High Court, 27 August 2004 Case excluded by the Board’s norms could not be selected
Amal Kumar Ghosh v. ACIT Calcutta High Court, 21 January 2014 Board’s standard binds the Department; Article 14
Mayank Singla v. ITO ITAT Delhi, 23 September 2026 Section 143(2) notice without approval under the 2024 letter quashed
Pradeep Kumar Garg v. ITO Punjab and Haryana High Court, 19 December 2024 Jurisdictional officer’s notice quashed; case belonged to the faceless stream
Jasjit Singh v. Union of India Punjab and Haryana High Court, 29 July 2024 Jurisdictional officers’ section 148 notices quashed on the exclusivity view
Reshi Construction Company v. CIT High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, 31 August 2024 Breach of a selection circular no ground to set aside
Janta Metal Works v. ITO Allahabad High Court, 18 July 1990 Selection instructions create no right in the assessee
UCO Bank v. CIT Supreme Court, 13 May 1999 Circulars bind the Department
CCE, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries Supreme Court, 14 October 2008 A circular contrary to the statute has no existence in law
Mark Studio India Private Limited v. ITO Madras High Court (single judge), 20 December 2024 Scrutiny guidelines issued under section 144B(2); search and survey reassessment clause outside the faceless scheme
Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Trust v. CIT (Exemption) Delhi High Court, 26 May 2023 Guidelines are for selection; no vested right to a faceless officer
Abha Khanna v. ITO; Nugraj Jain v. DCIT ITAT Delhi, 15 July 2026; 14 October 2026 Section 143(3) not the route after a search; in Abha Khanna, guidelines “merely” selection parameters
DCIT v. Om Sons Marketing Pvt. Ltd. ITAT Chandigarh, 13 January 2026 Guidelines “merely administrative”
Zigma Global Environ Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India Madras High Court (single judge), 13 July 2026 Section 143(3) is the route while the notice period is open
DCIT (Exemption) v. Kalinga Institute of Industrial Technology Supreme Court, 1 May 2023 Section 124(3)(a) applied
CIT v. S.S. Ahluwalia Delhi High Court, 14 March 2014 Sections 120, 124 and 127 procedural; set aside and remit
Abhishek Jain v. ITO Delhi High Court, 1 June 2018 Concurrent jurisdiction; objection lost by delay
Shivaaditiya Jems and Jewellery (P.) Ltd. v. ITO Allahabad High Court, [2022] 143 taxmann.com 64 Distribution of work creates no inherent lack of jurisdiction
Sapna Flour Mills Ltd. v. Union of India Allahabad High Court, 9 December 2022 Omission of section 144B(9) upheld; faceless order set aside and remitted
National Faceless Assessment Centre v. Automotive Manufacturers Pvt. Ltd. and connected appeals Supreme Court, 21 March 2023 Faceless orders passed without a show cause notice remanded for fresh orders; effect of omitting section 144B(9) left open
Chandrika Investments v. ITO Karnataka High Court, 28 January 2025 Section 124(3)(a) covers pecuniary jurisdiction
Adarsh Developers v. DCIT Karnataka High Court (single judge), 13 December 2023 Faceless centre’s notice in a Central Charge case upheld; section 124(3)
CIT v. Ramesh D. Patel Gujarat High Court, 21 January 2014 Section 124 territorial
Pr. CIT v. Ashika Stock Broking Ltd. Calcutta High Court, 17 May 2024 Appeal admitted on section 124(3)(a)
Pr. CIT v. ABC Papers Ltd.; Ramesh Kumar Bagri v. ITO Supreme Court, 18 August 2022; Delhi High Court, 2 April 2026 High Court follows the seat of the Assessing Officer, including in a faceless assessment
Pr. CIT v. Nopany & Sons Calcutta High Court, 4 February 2022 Section 292BB not applied where the only notice was by an officer without jurisdiction; objection taken before completion
Ambience Farms Private Limited v. ACIT Delhi High Court, 1 October 2024; Supreme Court, 20 January 2025 Prescribed authority may issue the section 143(2) notice
Ebro India Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT ITAT Delhi, 9 September 2024 Change of hands from the faceless centre to the jurisdictional officer not illegal
T.K.S. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. ITO; Inder Dev Gupta v. ACIT Delhi High Court, 28 October 2024; 21 November 2025 The two streams complementary and concurrent
Hexaware Technologies Ltd. v. ACIT Bombay High Court, 3 May 2024; set aside by the Supreme Court, 10 April 2026 Exclusive jurisdiction
Union of India v. Bharat Industrial Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Supreme Court, 18 September 2026 Section 147A; final hearing 3 December 2026
Bala Sreenivas Rao Somisetty v. ITO Andhra Pradesh High Court, 12 October 2026 Section 147A struck down
Diamond TMT and Procon Private Limited v. ITO Gujarat High Court, 16 September 2025 Notice by an officer from whom the case had been transferred quashed
Chartered Capital and Investment Limited v. Pr. CIT-1 Gujarat High Court, 7 October 2025 Transfer under section 127 quashed; 2023 letter inapplicable without a notice by the jurisdictional officer
Fusion Granito Private Limited v. ACIT Gujarat High Court, 14 June 2024 Objection for want of a notified transfer under section 144B(8) rejected; order quashed for want of hearing and remanded
Dineshkumar Chhaganbhai Nandani v. ITO Gujarat High Court, 19 June 2023 Faceless order quashed for want of opportunity; Revenue free to resume
Talati and Talati LLP v. Office of ACIT Gujarat High Court, 1 October 2024 Faceless allocation not applicable to search-based reassessment
Kishinchand Chellaram v. CIT Supreme Court, 16 September 1980 Undisclosed material cannot be used
Andaman Timber Industries v. CCE Supreme Court, 2 September 2015 Denial of cross-examination a nullity
Tin Box Company v. CIT Supreme Court, 27 February 2001 No opportunity: set aside and remand
Kapurchand Shrimal v. CIT Supreme Court, 28 August 1981 Duty to direct fresh assessment
CIT v. Odeon Builders (P.) Ltd. Supreme Court, 21 August 2019 Review dismissed; disallowance on untested third-party information deleted
Radhasoami Satsang v. CIT; CIT v. Excel Industries Ltd. Supreme Court, 15 November 1991; 8 October 2013 Consistency and its limits
CIT v. Simit P. Sheth Gujarat High Court, 16 January 2013 Profit element in purchases
Pr. CIT v. Kanak Impex (India) Ltd. Bombay High Court, 3 March 2025; Supreme Court, 21 November 2025 Whole of unexplained purchases under section 69C
faceless assessmentsection 144Bcompulsory scrutiny guidelinessearch and seizurejurisdictional Assessing Officersection 143(2) noticesection 124(3)CBDT instructionssection 119Central ChargesITAT Delhisection 273 Income-tax Act 2025

This note is general commentary on the law as at 19 November 2026 and is not advice on any matter. The position in a particular case depends on its own facts.

Common questions

Frequently asked.

What did the Tribunal hold in Salman Qureshi v. DCIT?

The Delhi Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITA No. 6217/Del/2025, 9 October 2026) held that a scrutiny assessment for assessment year 2023-24, made by a faceless unit under section 143(3) read with section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on a person who had not been searched but against whom material seized from a third party was used, was a nullity. Its reason was that under the search parameter (Parameter 2(ii)) of the compulsory scrutiny guidelines of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) of 3 May 2024 the section 143(2) notice ought to have been issued by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, and the assessment framed by that officer, if not by a Central Charge. It also found that the seized material was never supplied to the assessee. The Tribunal quashed the assessment; it did not separately rule on the notice. The merits were left open, and the order records no submission by the Revenue on jurisdiction.

Is a faceless assessment valid in a search case, and do the CBDT guidelines keep search cases out of it?

A case in a Central Charge is outside faceless assessment under the orders of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT, the Board) under section 144B(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. For a search-linked case still lying in an ordinary charge, it is contested. The Board's compulsory scrutiny guidelines for financial year 2024-25, a letter of 3 May 2024 (F.No. 225/72/2024/ITA-II), say that in survey, search and search-based reassessment cases the section 143(2) notice is served by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) with prior administrative approval, and the case is to be transferred to Central Charges under section 127 within 15 days of the notice (for search-based reassessments, subject to the exception in paragraph 4.2 of the letter for persons with limited dealings with the searched group). Other classes go through the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NaFAC), and paragraph 5 of the letter names four of them, and none of the survey or search classes, as cases to be completed in faceless manner. In Salman Qureshi v. DCIT (ITAT Delhi, 9 October 2026) a faceless assessment of a search-linked case was quashed on that basis. But the letter recites no statutory power and does not say what follows if a faceless unit acts, and the Board's orders under section 144B(2) do not exclude a search-linked case lying in an ordinary charge. Each year's letter is separate and has to be read for the year in which the notice was issued.

Are the CBDT compulsory scrutiny guidelines an order under section 144B(2) of the Income-tax Act?

In Salman Qureshi v. DCIT (9 October 2026) the Delhi Bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal treated the compulsory scrutiny guidelines of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT, the Board) of 3 May 2024 as issued in compliance with section 144B(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The letter itself does not cite that provision. The Board's orders of 31 March 2021, 6 September 2021 and 16 December 2021, which do cite it, direct that assessments be made under section 144B except in Central Charges and International Taxation charges and in a few named classes, of which survey-linked cases are one. They do not exclude a search-linked case that is still lying in an ordinary charge. A single judge of the Madras High Court, in Mark Studio India Private Limited v. ITO (20 December 2024), described the previous year's guidelines as issued under section 144B(2), at the Revenue's instance, in a reassessment case. The Delhi High Court in Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Trust v. CIT (Exemption) (26 May 2023) described such guidelines as limited to selection. On the Board's own orders the Revenue has the better of it; on authority the position is divided, and the point is open. It is the question on which the ruling depends.

I was not the searched person. Does the search parameter of the CBDT compulsory scrutiny guidelines apply to me?

In Salman Qureshi v. DCIT (ITAT Delhi, 9 October 2026) the Tribunal held that it does for the year of search, reading Parameter 2(ii) of the compulsory scrutiny guidelines of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) of 3 May 2024, which covers searches on or after 1 April 2021, with Parameter 2(i). The text of Parameter 2(ii) does not mention non-searched persons or the search-year return, although Parameter 2(i), for searches before 1 April 2021, does. Parameter 7 covers a case where the Investigation Wing has provided specific information and a return has been filed, and it sends the notice through the National Faceless Assessment Centre. The Bench looked at Parameter 7 only for its vocabulary and did not consider whether the case fell under it, and the order records no submission by the Revenue on which parameter applied. The point is open. On any file the first step is to obtain the selection record.

Do the CBDT compulsory scrutiny guidelines bind the Assessing Officer, and does a breach void the assessment?

An instruction of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT, the Board) under section 119(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 binds the Department's officers: the income-tax authorities shall observe and follow the Board's orders, instructions and directions. What is disputed is the consequence for the assessment when an officer departs from one, and on that the High Courts are divided. The Delhi, Punjab and Haryana, Calcutta and Orissa High Courts have upheld or ordered the quashing of assessments where a selection instruction or the monetary limits instruction was not followed, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court has upheld a Tribunal's order that a case could not have been selected, though two of the four decisions relied on in Salman Qureshi v. DCIT (ITAT Delhi, 9 October 2026) are disposals holding that no substantial question of law arose. The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh held in 2024 that a breach of a selection circular may invite administrative action but is no ground to set an assessment aside, and the Allahabad High Court held in 1990, of a letter it found not to be a direction under section 119, that selection instructions create no right in the assessee. None of these decisions holds an assessment void because a faceless unit, and not the jurisdictional officer, framed it.

Can the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NaFAC) issue the section 143(2) notice in a search-linked case, or must the jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO)?

The compulsory scrutiny guidelines of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) of 3 May 2024 say that in search cases the notice is served by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) with prior administrative approval. Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 itself allows the notice to be served by the Assessing Officer or the prescribed income-tax authority. Since 28 May 2022 the authority notified under rule 12E of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 is a single officer at Delhi (Notification No. 56/2022), and not an officer of the National Faceless Assessment Centre (NaFAC). The Delhi High Court in Ambience Farms Private Limited v. ACIT (1 October 2024) upheld a notice issued by that officer in a case taken up by a Central Circle. In Salman Qureshi v. DCIT (ITAT Delhi, 9 October 2026) the Tribunal said the notice ought to have come from the JAO, without examining who had signed it. Where the notice was issued by the officer notified under rule 12E, the likely consequence of the wrong unit assessing is a set-aside and a fresh assessment, and not annulment. A notice issued by an assessment unit in its own name does not have that footing: the Revenue has to support it as the act of an Assessing Officer, and the argument is weaker. If the notice is bad, the scrutiny assessment cannot be redone, though the year is not necessarily closed. The point is open.

Can an objection that the wrong officer made the assessment be raised for the first time in appeal?

In Salman Qureshi v. DCIT (ITAT Delhi, 9 October 2026) the Tribunal admitted it as an additional ground filed more than seventeen months after the assessment, as a jurisdictional point arising on the record. It did not consider section 124(3)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which, where a return was filed under section 139(1), bars a challenge to the jurisdiction of an Assessing Officer after one month from service of a notice under section 142(1) or section 143(2), or after completion of the assessment, whichever is earlier. The Supreme Court applied that clause in DCIT (Exemption) v. Kalinga Institute of Industrial Technology (1 May 2023). The Gujarat High Court reads section 124 as territorial; the Karnataka High Court reads the bar as covering pecuniary as well as territorial jurisdiction, and a single judge of that Court as covering every ground; the Delhi High Court treats the allocation of a case between officers as procedure that can be waived. Whether the bar reaches an objection that a faceless unit acted is open, but an objection first taken in appeal is exposed, so the safe course is to object in writing within the month, or at least before the order is passed.

If the seized documents were never given to me, is the assessment void?

The addition cannot stand on material the assessee has not seen: in Kishinchand Chellaram v. CIT (16 September 1980) the Supreme Court excluded the undisclosed material and the addition fell. But the usual consequence of a denial of opportunity at assessment is that the order is set aside and a fresh assessment directed, as the Supreme Court did in Tin Box Company v. CIT (27 February 2001). In Salman Qureshi v. DCIT (ITAT Delhi, 9 October 2026) the Tribunal found that the seized documents were never supplied. On the firm's reading it treated the denial as a consequence of the faceless unit having acted and not as a separate ground of nullity, though the order can be read the other way. Ask for the documents specifically and repeatedly, and keep the record of each request.

Does section 147A validate a faceless unit acting in place of the jurisdictional officer?

No. Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, inserted by the Finance Act, 2026 with effect from 1 April 2021, says that the Assessing Officer for the purposes of sections 148 and 148A means an officer other than the National Faceless Assessment Centre or an assessment unit. It validates reassessment notices issued by jurisdictional officers. Two High Courts have struck it down, and the Supreme Court has stayed the first of those judgments and fixed the appeal for final hearing on 3 December 2026. The section says nothing about a section 143(2) notice or a section 143(3) order made by a faceless unit in a case that the jurisdictional officer should have handled. For that the Revenue has only the general provisions: sections 124(3), 292B and 292BB.

What changes for searches from 1 September 2024 and under the Income-tax Act, 2025?

For a search initiated on or after 1 September 2024 the undisclosed income of a person other than the searched person is assessed under Chapter XIV-B of the Income-tax Act, 1961: section 158BD hands the material to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over that person, and section 144B(1) does not list block assessments. For a search initiated on or after 1 April 2026 the corresponding provision is section 295 of the Income-tax Act, 2025. Scrutiny and reassessment proceedings for tax years beginning before 1 April 2026 stay under the 1961 Act. From tax year 2026-27, section 273(2) and (12) of the 2025 Act correspond to section 144B(2) and (8), section 270(8) is the scrutiny notice, and section 242(4) is the time bar on questioning an Assessing Officer's jurisdiction.

What should be done on a file where a faceless unit has taken up a search-linked case?

If a notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has just been served, file a written objection within one month of service that the case is a search-linked case under the relevant parameter of the compulsory scrutiny guidelines of the Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) in force when the notice was issued and must be handled by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer and the Central Charge, and ask the officer to refer the objection to the higher authorities under section 124(4). On almost every scrutiny file for the year of a search initiated up to 31 August 2024 the month has already run. The step remains live where a faceless unit serves a notice in a reassessment that follows a search. Where the assessment is still pending, object in writing before the order is passed and ask for the case to be transferred under section 127 or section 144B(8). Ask for the selection record, the approval and a copy of the notice as issued. Ask for the seized material by description. Take the ground before the Commissioner (Appeals) under section 250(5) if it was missed, and argue the merits in full alongside it, because the jurisdictional point decided in Salman Qureshi v. DCIT (ITAT Delhi, 9 October 2026) is open.