Faceless assessment after Finance Act 2026: DIN, sections 147A and 292BC

This is Part 2 of a three-Part series on faceless assessment and faceless appeal. Part 1 covers the assessment itself under section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and section 273 of the Income-tax Act, 2025; this Part covers jurisdiction and form after the Finance Act, 2026 (the Document Identification Number, the signature, the officer who issues the section 148 notice and approvals); Part 3 covers the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).

The assessment has been made and the file is in appeal, or in a writ petition, on a ground that has nothing to do with the merits: the order carries no Document Identification Number, it was digitally signed after the last date for making it, the section 148 notice came from the jurisdictional Assessing Officer and not from a faceless unit, or the approval says only that the draft is approved. Each of these grounds has High Court authority behind it, and assessments have been annulled on them.

The Finance Act, 2026, dated 30 March 2026, has changed the footing of three of the four with retrospective effect. Section 292BA deals with the number from 1 October 2019, section 147A with the officer from 1 April 2021, and section 292BC with approvals from 1 April 2021. Section 282A, on the signature, is not amended, though the authentication clause in section 144B(6)(i)(b) has been reworded from 1 April 2022. None of the three new sections is settled: section 147A has been struck down by two High Courts and is before the Supreme Court, the validity of section 292BA is under challenge in two High Courts, and the Tribunal Benches that have applied section 292BC cannot rule on its validity.

This Part takes each ground in turn: what the courts held before the amendment, what the new section says, what has happened since, and what is left of the ground on a file in hand. The Income-tax Act, 1961 continues to govern every tax year beginning before 1 April 2026, including proceedings for those years begun later (section 536(2)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 2025). The counterparts for tax year 2026-27 onwards, sections 522(2), 279(3) and 522(3) of the 2025 Act, are set against the 1961 text in each section.

Key points

• The Finance Act, 2026 inserted section 292BA (Document Identification Number), section 147A (the officer for the section 148 notice) and section 292BC (approvals), each retrospectively. Section 147A has been struck down by two High Courts; the Supreme Court stayed one of those judgments on 18 September 2026, on condition that the assessment and reassessment proceedings do not proceed, and has listed the appeal for final hearing on 3 December 2026.
• Circular No. 19/2019 required a Document Identification Number on every communication from 1 October 2019, and its paragraph 4 treated a non-compliant communication as invalid and never issued. The Circular ceased to have effect on 31 March 2026, so the deeming is available only for a communication issued between 1 October 2019 and 30 March 2026.
• Section 292BA, retrospective from 1 October 2019, saves an assessment from a mistake, defect or omission in quoting the number “if the assessment order is referenced by such number in any manner”. Its validity is under challenge in the Madras and Bombay High Courts. Whether it reaches an order for which no number was generated is open; our view is that it does not, and that on its words it does not extend to an approval, a satisfaction note or a notice.
• On a later intimation letter the High Courts differ. The Bombay High Court (4 September 2023) held that it does not cure an order issued without a number; the Karnataka High Court (7 July 2026) held that an order is invalid under the Circular only where no number is generated or communicated at all. The Delhi High Court’s decision of 20 March 2023 is under an interim stay granted by the Supreme Court on 3 January 2024, which is not a decision on the DIN.
• The signature is a separate requirement. The Bombay High Court held on 30 March 2026 that an order is made only when it is signed, manually or digitally, and quashed without remand a faceless order dated within limitation and signed after it; on 5 August 2026 it held the signature under section 282A(1) mandatory for a section 151 sanction. A single judge of the Chhattisgarh High Court (15 March 2022) upheld an unsigned approval. The Finance Act, 2026 reworded section 144B(6)(i)(b) from 1 April 2022 and did not amend section 282A.
• On the officer who issues the section 148 notice the High Courts were divided. On 10 April 2026 the Supreme Court set aside the judgments in favour of assessees on the limited ground that section 147A had altered their foundation, remitted the matters to the High Courts, and expressed no opinion on the validity, scope or retrospectivity of the section.
• Section 292BC, retrospective from 1 April 2021, deems an approval in assessment, reassessment or recomputation proceedings to be administrative and supervisory, and says it is not invalid for insufficiency of the reasons recorded or a defect of authentication or communication, “where such approval is granted electronically”. The Bombay High Court (5 August 2026) held that it does not apply to an approval granted on 30 March 2021.
• The Tribunal, which cannot rule on validity, applied section 292BC against assessees in 2026. Our view is that the section does not reopen an annulment that had become final before 30 March 2026 with no appeal pending, and that in a pending appeal it covers, if it is valid, thin or absent reasons and defects of signature or communication, not a record which proves that the authority did not examine the file.
• For tax year 2026-27 onwards the counterparts are sections 522(2), 279(3) and 522(3) of the Income-tax Act, 2025. None carries the override of judgments. Our view on section 522(3) is that the ground that an approval gives no reasons is gone, but the requirement of an approval by the right authority, given after the authority has in fact considered the matter, survives.
• From 1 April 2027, under section 274(4) and (5), the penalty under section 270A is imposed as part of the assessment or reassessment order, or forms part of the draft order under section 144C, for assessment year 2026-27 or any earlier year.

The Document Identification Number after section 292BA

Since 1 October 2019 every communication issued by an income-tax authority has had to carry a computer generated Document Identification Number (DIN); the dispute is what happens when it does not. The requirement came from Circular No. 19/2019 dated 14 August 2019. Paragraph 3 allowed a manual communication without a number only in listed exceptional situations, with written reasons and the prior approval of the Chief Commissioner or Director General. Paragraph 4, as reproduced in the judgments below, supplied the consequence:

Any communication which is not in conformity with Para-2 and Para-3 above, shall be treated as invalid and shall be deemed to have never been issued.

Two facts frame every DIN ground today. Circular 19/2019 ceased to have effect on 31 March 2026, replaced by Circular No. 4/2026 of that date, which carries no counterpart to paragraph 4; the deeming is therefore available only for a communication issued between 1 October 2019 and 30 March 2026. And the Finance Act, 2026 inserted section 292BA into the 1961 Act with retrospective effect from 1 October 2019, the date from which the Circular applied.

Delhi, and the Supreme Court’s interim order

In The Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation)-1, New Delhi v. Brandix Mauritius Holdings Ltd. (Delhi High Court, 20 March 2023, assessment year 2011-12) the final assessment order of 15 October 2019 admittedly bore no DIN. The Revenue pleaded a mistake curable under section 292B. The Bench held (para 17) that paragraph 4 “fairly puts such communication, which includes communication of assessment order, in the category of communication which are non-est in law”, and (para 18) that recourse to section 292B “is untenable, having regard to the phraseology used in paragraph 4 of the 2019 Circular.” The Court found no substantial question of law and closed the Revenue’s appeal (para 22).

In the Revenue’s Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 688 of 2024 the Supreme Court on 3 January 2024 issued notice and granted “Interim stay of impugned order dated 20.03.2023 as well as order of the ITAT dated 19.09.2022, until further orders.” That is a stay of the High Court’s order and the Tribunal’s order, not a decision on the DIN.

The Bombay line

Ashok Commercial Enterprises v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Taxation, Central Circle 2(4) (Bombay High Court, 4 September 2023) concerned section 153C assessments for assessment years 2011-12 to 2019-20. The order of 28 September 2021 bore no DIN; the Revenue produced an intimation letter of 13 October 2021 stating one. The Bench held (para 18(c)) that even if this complied with paragraph 5 of the Circular, “this can only seek to regularize the failure to generate a DIN, but yet the requirements of paragraph 3 of the Circular will still remain contravened”. The Circular applied to the satisfaction note as well (para 18(d)), and both note and order “ought to be treated as invalid and deemed never to have been issued” (para 18(e)). The petitions were allowed in terms of the prayer for quashing. The same Court recorded on 8 January 2026 that the Department had not carried the decision to the Supreme Court.

Two later Bombay decisions follow it. (A third, Hexaware Technologies Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (3 May 2024), on a section 148 notice without a number, was, as the Bombay High Court has since recorded, among the matters remanded by the Supreme Court for fresh consideration in the light of section 147A, so its findings do not presently stand as a subsisting adjudication.)

• Siemens Limited v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 8(2)(1), Mumbai (2 December 2025): a section 154 order without a number was quashed (para 27). On the stay in Brandix the Bench held (para 22) that the fact that the Delhi, Calcutta and one of the Madras decisions “are stayed by the Supreme Court, does not mean that these judgments have lost their precedential value”, applying the Supreme Court’s distinction between quashing an order and staying its operation. The order was also found to be back-dated (para 25), so the case does not rest on the DIN alone.
• Sanjay Nathalal Shah v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle 5(2) (8 January 2026): a special audit order under section 142(2A) carried a number but the Principal Commissioner’s approval did not. The approval was held “invalid and non-est in law” (para 13), and the audit order and report were quashed. The Revenue argued that an approval is an internal document outside the Circular and that the number on the audit order was sufficient compliance; it relied on a decision of the Gujarat High Court, Rameshkumar Tulsidas Kaneriya v. ACIT, and its counsel pointed out that a special leave petition against that decision had been dismissed (para 3). The Bench records the Gujarat decision (para 12) as one “in the context of a satisfaction note and not a case of a mandatory approval or sanction”, as holding that “the satisfaction note is an internal communication which does not fall within the meaning of the word ‘communication’ as contemplated in Circular No. 19/2019”, and as holding that such a note “can be regularized by issuing the same with a DIN and the same would be a procedural aspect”. It distinguished the decision on the first ground and declined to follow it on the other two: “Circular No. 19/2019 specifically includes approval as a correspondence”; the Bench was bound by the Bombay High Court’s earlier holding that internal communications are “any other correspondence” to “any other person”; and “not following Circular No. 19/2019 cannot be simply termed as a procedural irregularity”. On the special leave petition it said that dismissal in limine “would not amount to merger of the order of the High Court with that of the Supreme Court”.

The Karnataka ruling for the Revenue

On 7 July 2026 the Karnataka High Court decided The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Unisys India Pvt Ltd with The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central) v. Shri H. K. Suresh. The Tribunal had annulled Dispute Resolution Panel directions and a section 263 order for want of a DIN. On the Department’s affidavit the Bench found that an order prepared outside the departmental system is uploaded to generate a number, that the upload itself e-mails the order without the number, and that an intimation letter bearing its own number and stating the number of the order follows (paras 25 to 30). In its conclusions after para 46 the Bench held that quoting a DIN “is mandatory”, but:

An order would attract invalidity under Circular No.19/2019 only where no DIN is generated or communicated at all.

Prior approval is needed only for a manual communication, and a mistyped number does not invalidate an order that the intimation letter identifies correctly. The Revenue’s appeals were allowed and the matters remitted to the Tribunal on the other grounds (para 47). The Additional Solicitor General pressed section 292BA (para 7.3), but the conclusions rest on compliance with the Circular, not on the new section. On the later intimation letter this is the opposite of Ashok Commercial para 18(c).

Section 292BA and section 522(2)

Section 292BA, inserted by section 32 of the Finance Act, 2026 with retrospective effect from 1 October 2019:

Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, order or decree of any court, for the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified for the purposes of section 292B that no assessment under any of the provisions of this Act shall be invalid or shall be deemed to have been invalid on the ground of any mistake, defect or omission in respect of quoting of a computer generated Document Identification Number, if the assessment order is referenced by such number in any manner.

Section 522(2) of the Income-tax Act, 2025 carries the rule from 1 April 2026 in substantially the same words, without the override of judgments, without “for the removal of doubts”, without the reference to section 292B and without the words “or shall be deemed to have been invalid”.

The Memorandum explaining the Finance Bill, 2026 (page 51) states the mischief: assessments had been annulled on grounds “like non-quoting of DIN on every page of the assessment order or non-quoting of DIN on the body of the order even where DIN was lawfully generated and quoted in communication accompanying the said orders.” The amendment is to clarify that “as long as there is a reference of DIN in the assessment order, the same would be sufficient compliance”.

On 5 August 2026 the Delhi High Court framed, as a substantial question, whether a Tribunal order annulling an assessment for want of a DIN is sustainable in view of section 292BA (Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-3, New Delhi v. Wonder Infrabuild Pvt Ltd). The validity of the section is under challenge in the Madras High Court (The Revenue Bar Association v. Union of India, order of 7 September 2026) and the Bombay High Court (Manish Keshavlal Shah v. ITO, order of 25 August 2026).

Open question 4: does section 292BA reach an order that carries no number at all?

That it does (the Revenue). The section saves an assessment from any “omission in respect of quoting” the number, and an order issued without the number on it is an omission to quote. The saving applies if the order “is referenced by such number in any manner”, and “in any manner” takes in an intimation letter or the portal entry. The Memorandum names the very case of a number generated and quoted in the accompanying communication. On that reading Ashok Commercial para 18(c) is overridden for assessments and the Karnataka conclusions become the statutory rule.

That it does not (the assessee). The condition presupposes a number: the assessment order must be “referenced by such number”. Where none was generated for the order, nothing references it and the section does not begin to operate. That is also where the Karnataka High Court, deciding for the Revenue, drew the line. Further, the subject of the section is “assessment” and “the assessment order”. An approval, a satisfaction note, a section 148 notice or Dispute Resolution Panel directions are not assessments; counsel took that point for Dispute Resolution Panel directions in the Karnataka case (para 8.2) and the Court did not need to decide it. The Memorandum itself speaks of a DIN “lawfully generated” and of “minor mistakes, defects or omissions”.

Our view. Section 292BA cures a failure to print the number on an assessment order where a number for that order was generated and is linked to it by an accompanying or later intimation. It does not supply a number that never existed, and on its words it does not extend to a document that is not an assessment order. The ground worth taking now is the narrow one, pleaded on facts: that no number was generated, or that the document attacked is an approval, a note or a notice. In Gujarat the ground on a satisfaction note has first to meet Rameshkumar Tulsidas Kaneriya, recorded in Sanjay Nathalal Shah (para 12) as holding such a note to be outside the Circular. Validity is a separate matter (see open question 5).

Authentication: the digital signature and the date an order is made

The signature is a separate requirement. In the Bombay High Court’s words, a valid DIN and a valid signature “are two different facets … One cannot dispense with the requirement of the other” (Nikhil Nagindas Modi, para 19).

For the assessee

ECGC Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, Circle 3(1)(1), Mumbai (Bombay High Court, 30 March 2026, assessment year 2023-24) is a faceless assessment case. The order under section 143(3) read with section 144B was dated 21 March 2025. The Assessment Unit digitally signed it on 25 December 2025. Limitation had expired on 31 March 2025. The Bench held (para 11):

signature, either manual or digital, is necessary for an order to have been made and for such order to be within the period of limitation, such signature must be before the period of limitation prescribed to make such an order.

The order and the demand notice were quashed without remand (paras 12, 13). For a faceless order the consequence is direct: the date typed on the order does not decide limitation under section 153; the date of signing does.

Nikhil Nagindas Modi v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax 1(2)(1), Mumbai (Bombay High Court, 5 August 2026, assessment year 2017-18) applied the rule to an approval. The sanction under section 151 for a notice dated 30 March 2021 was unsigned. The Revenue relied on section 282A(2), under which a document is deemed authenticated if the name and office of the authority appear on it. The Bench held (para 20) that sub-section (2) “does not override sub-section (1)”, and (para 22) that “the requirement of having a valid signature, either manual or digital, as per the provisions of Section 282A(1), is mandatory and cannot be dispensed with.” The notice and consequential orders were quashed.

Vikas Gupta v. Union of India (Allahabad High Court, 8 September 2022) is a timing case: where the section 151 satisfaction was digitally signed only after the section 148 notice had issued, the officer had no jurisdiction when he issued it (para 29), and the notices and reassessment orders were quashed with liberty “if still permissible” (para 31).

For the Revenue

In Bharat Krishi Kendra v. Union of India (Chhattisgarh High Court, single judge, 15 March 2022) a section 151 approval without a digital signature was upheld because section 282A deems a document authenticated where name and designation are given, the more so when it bears a DIN (para 14). The Bombay High Court in Nikhil Nagindas Modi records (para 21) that the Delhi High Court in Asro Arcade v. Income-tax Officer held: “Since the name and the designation of the issuing officer has been mentioned, according to us, no signature is necessary.” The Bombay Bench recorded (para 22) that it was “unable to agree with the view taken by the Delhi High Court”. And in a faceless assessment case the Telangana High Court rejected the plea that an order “digitally signed by the Assessment Unit” was not made by the proper officer (Raja Reddy Sannareddy v. Assessment Unit, Income Tax Department, National Faceless Assessment Centre, 3 March 2026, para 10). The High Courts are in conflict on whether name and designation suffice. Our view is that the objection should still be taken, on the words of section 282A(1) and on Nikhil Nagindas Modi, and that it is strongest where the missing signature also bears on the date the order was made.

What the Finance Act, 2026 changed, and what it did not

Section 7 of the Finance Act, 2026 substituted, in section 144B(6)(i)(b), “by way of an electronic communication” for “by affixing digital signature”, with effect from 1 April 2022. The assessment, verification, technical and review units that the Board sets up under section 144B(3) (the units) now authenticate by the formula that has applied since 1 April 2022 to the National Faceless Assessment Centre (the Centre), set up under the same sub-section “to facilitate the conduct of faceless assessment proceedings in a centralised manner”. On the text, four things remain as they were:

1. Section 282A is not amended. Nikhil Nagindas Modi rests on section 282A(1), not on section 144B(6).
2. The clause does not say when an order is “made”. ECGC rests on section 153. After the substitution the question becomes when the electronic communication authenticating the order came into existence; an order typed with one date and released through the system nine months later is no better placed under the new words. Our view is that the substitution does not answer ECGC.
3. The clause applies “for the purposes of faceless assessment”. A notice under section 148 issued by the jurisdictional officer is outside it.
4. For approvals the relevant provision is section 292BC (“defect in the form or manner of its authentication or communication”), taken up below. The Tribunal at Raipur, dismissing a Revenue application under section 254(2) against an order on an unsigned section 143(2) notice, observed in parting that section 292BC “applies only to approvals” and has not taken away compliance with section 282A(1) for other notices (DCIT, Central Circle-1(1), Raipur v. G.T Reality Private Limited, single member, 9 October 2026, para 7).

Reassessment: which officer issues the section 148 notice, and section 147A

The 2022 Scheme

The question is which officer may issue the notice that reopens a past year: the local, “jurisdictional” Assessing Officer (the JAO of the judgments) or a faceless unit (the FAO). If it had to be the faceless unit, the notices issued by jurisdictional officers since the Scheme of 29 March 2022 are bad.

Section 151A empowers a scheme for reassessment under section 147, for the notice under section 148, for the enquiry, show cause notice and order under section 148A, and for sanction under section 151. The e-Assessment of Income Escaping Assessment Scheme, 2022 (Notification No. 18/2022, S.O. 1466(E), 29 March 2022) defines “automated allocation” as “an algorithm for randomised allocation of cases”. Clause 3 is its whole operative text:

3. For the purpose of this Scheme,—
(a) assessment, reassessment or re-computation under section 147 of the Act,
(b) issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act,
shall be through automated allocation, in accordance with risk management strategy formulated by the Board as referred to in section 148 of the Act for issuance of notice, and in a faceless manner, to the extent provided in section 144B of the Act with reference to making assessment or reassessment of total income or loss of assessee.

The Scheme names the section 148 notice. It does not mention section 148A or section 151. The dispute is whether clause 3(b) took the notice away from the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, or whether the closing words confine the faceless manner to the assessment that follows.

The clause numbers in the decisions that follow (section 148A(b), section 148A(d)) are those of the text in force until 31 August 2024. Sections 148, 148A and 151 were substituted with effect from 1 September 2024: the show cause notice is now under section 148A(1), the order “determining whether or not it is a fit case to issue notice under section 148” under section 148A(3). The earlier text is kept by section 152(3) and (4) for searches, requisitions and surveys (other than under section 133A(2A)) between 1 April 2021 and 31 August 2024, and where the section 148 notice was issued or the section 148A(d) order passed before 1 September 2024. Section 147A speaks of “the Assessing Officer for the purposes of sections 148 and 148A” and is not confined to either text.

The two High Court lines

For the assessee. Kankanala Ravindra Reddy v. The Income Tax Officer (Telangana High Court, 14 September 2023) held (para 26) that “it becomes mandatory for the Revenue to conduct/initiate proceedings pertaining to reassessment under Section 147, 148 & 148A of the Act in a faceless manner.” In Hexaware Technologies the Bombay High Court held (para 35):

there is no question of concurrent jurisdiction of the JAO and the FAO for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act or even for passing assessment or reassessment order. When specific jurisdiction has been assigned to either the JAO or the FAO in the Scheme dated 29th March, 2022, then it is to the exclusion of the other.

No prejudice need be shown (para 37); the section 148A(b) notice, the section 148A(d) order and the section 148 notice were quashed (para 48). The Punjab and Haryana High Court followed in Jatinder Singh Bhangu v. Union of India (19 July 2024), and later counted “as many as nine constitutional courts” on this side (Jyoti Sareen, para 62). The judgments for assessees that were before the Supreme Court on 10 April 2026 were set aside by the order described below; the Bombay High Court has recorded that Hexaware was among them.

For the Revenue. A single judge of the Calcutta High Court dismissed a challenge in Triton Overseas Private Limited v. Union of India (13 September 2023) by a short order resting on the Board’s Office Memorandum of 20 February 2023, without discussing the Scheme. The reasoned decision is T.K.S. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer Ward 25(3) New Delhi (Delhi High Court, 28 October 2024). It read clause 3 as dividing reassessment into two stages, the jurisdictional officer following section 148A and faceless allocation beginning after that, and, declining to follow the Bombay High Court (para 103: “The distribution of functions between the JAO and NFAC is complimentary and concurrent”), dismissed the petitions (para 105). A single judge in Madras held likewise in Mark Studio India Private Limited v. Income Tax Officer (20 December 2024). The Punjab and Haryana High Court itself, in M/s Patran Foods Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (20 December 2024), held, for the notices of 2021 that the Supreme Court had revived under Article 142, that “the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer would continue to proceed and have jurisdiction to decide the notices which were originally issued by him” (para 23).

Two other High Courts record the Gujarat High Court as standing with the Revenue. The Delhi High Court in T.K.S. Builders records (paras 96 and 97) that the Gujarat High Court, in Talati and Talati LLP v. Office of Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 4(1)(1), Ahmedabad, a decision of 1 October 2024, held that automated allocation “cannot be applied to the case of Search and Seizure under Section 132, where the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) is required to record his satisfaction”. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Jyoti Sareen records (para 38) that a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court, by a judgment of 17 September 2025 in Snehdham Trust v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, decided the issue in the Revenue’s favour, and reproduces its reasoning that the notice “has to be issued by the Assessing Officer who has passed the order under section 148A(d) of the Act”, a notice issued by the faceless Assessing Officer on the jurisdictional officer’s order being one that “would result in absurdity”.

What the Supreme Court has done

On 16 July 2025, in ADIT (Int Taxn) 2 Hyd v. Deepanjan Roy, it dismissed a Revenue petition against a Telangana order, saying only “we find no good reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court.” That is a dismissal at the threshold, without reasons: it leaves the High Court’s order standing in that case and decides nothing for any other.

On 10 April 2026, in Income Tax Officer, Ward 2(1), Chandigarh v. Tej Partap Singh and a large batch (Surya Kant CJI, B. V. Nagarathna and Joymalya Bagchi JJ), the Court disposed of the Revenue’s appeals in the light of the Finance Act, 2026 without examining the correctness of the judgments under appeal (para 20). The operative part is para 22:

Since the High Courts have primarily quashed the reassessment notices on the ground that the JAOs lacked competence to initiate such proceedings, and the very foundation of that view now stands altered by the amending legislation, the impugned judgments in favor of the assessees are set aside on this limited ground. The matters are accordingly remitted to the respective High Courts for fresh consideration.

The assessees were given liberty to amend their petitions to challenge section 147A “within a period of four (4) weeks from the date of uploading of this order” (para 23), and the Court added (para 25): “No additional time shall be granted to the parties beyond what has been granted above.” The Court said (para 26): “we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy, including the validity, scope, effect, retrospectivity or applicability of the amended provisions”. It directed (para 27) “an interim stay of further assessment/reassessment proceedings pursuant to the impugned notices”, subject to terms imposed by the High Courts, and asked them (para 28) to decide preferably by 30 September 2026. The order did not uphold section 147A, did not overrule Hexaware on its reasoning and did not approve T.K.S. Builders.

Section 147A and section 279(3)

Section 147A, inserted by section 9 of the Finance Act, 2026 and deemed inserted from 1 April 2021:

Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, order or decree of any court or in section 151A or in any scheme framed thereunder, for the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the Assessing Officer for the purposes of sections 148 and 148A shall mean and shall always be deemed to have meant to be an Assessing Officer other than the National Faceless Assessment Centre or any assessment unit referred to in sub-section (3) of section 144B.

Section 279(3) of the 2025 Act says that the Assessing Officer for sections 280 and 281 “shall mean to be an Assessing Officer other than the National Faceless Assessment Centre or any assessment unit referred to in section 273(3).” It has no override, no “removal of doubts” and no retrospective date.

The Memorandum (pages 49 to 50) says “it was never the intention of the legislature to mandate the NaFAC or the Assessment Units in NaFAC to involve pre-assessment enquiry in any manner” (para 4), and records that “divergent views have been expressed on this issue by various High Courts” (para 5).

Two High Courts have struck section 147A down

Punjab and Haryana. In Jyoti Sareen v. Union of India (10 September 2026) the Bench held the section unconstitutional (paras 58 to 63). The non-obstante clause names section 151A and its scheme, but “reference to Section 130 of the Act or the scheme framed thereunder dated 28.03.2022 is conspicuously found missing” (para 58). The core is para 60:

Without amending Section 151A of the Act or the scheme framed thereunder, the “clarification” made by the legislature through the retrospective enactment of Section 147A … is in defiance of and in conflict with the law laid down by the constitutional courts.

Independently of section 147A the Bench concurred with Hexaware (para 75) and differed from T.K.S. Builders, Snehdham Trust and Triton Overseas (para 77). The section was struck down and the notices set aside.

Andhra Pradesh. In Bala Sreenivas Rao Somisetty v. The Income Tax Officer (12 October 2026) the Bench noted the Punjab and Haryana judgment and the Supreme Court’s stay of it (described below), and said that it had “dealt with the matter independently” (para 100): “the amendment brought in through Section 147A with retrospective effect without excluding Section 148 from the scheme, is not sustainable under law” (para 88). It added a second ground (paras 101 to 106). By section 1(2)(a) of the Finance Act, 2026 (which the judgment calls section 2(a)), sections 2 to 129 of that Act “shall come into force on the 1st day of April, 2026”, the day the Income-tax Act, 2025 commenced. The Revenue answered that assent was given on 30 March 2026, when the 1961 Act stood unrepealed (para 102). The Bench held (para 104):

it is clear that Income Tax Act, 1961 was repealed on the mid night of 31.03.2026. Therefore insertion of Section 147A to Income Tax Act, 1961 is not sustainable

Section 147A was struck down and all proceedings by jurisdictional officers under sections 148A and 148 were held to be without jurisdiction (para 107).

The second ground matters beyond reassessment. Section 147A is section 9 of the Finance Act, 2026; the substitution in section 144B(6)(i)(b) is section 7; section 292BA is section 32; section 292BC is section 33. The Bench put the point generally (para 106: “any amendment/insertion made to the Repealed Act is not sustainable under law and it has no legal sanctity”), but the only provision before it, and the only one it struck down, was section 147A (para 107). The Revenue’s answer is in the Finance Act itself: section 1(2) opens “Save as otherwise provided in this Act”, and each of sections 7, 9, 32 and 33 provides that its amendment “shall be deemed to have been” made from its own earlier date.

The Supreme Court’s order of 18 September 2026

The Revenue’s petition against the Punjab and Haryana judgment came up as Union of India v. Bharat Industrial Enterprises Pvt Ltd before J. B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran JJ. The Court framed three questions, each beginning “Whether the High Court erred in holding”. The first two ask whether it erred in holding that the notices under sections 148 and 148A “must be issued only by the Faceless Assessing Officer”: the first, when section 144B “makes no reference to Sections 148 and 148A”; the second, “overlooking the fact that no Notification under Section 120 was ever issued by the Board” empowering the faceless officer or ousting the jurisdictional officer. The third asks whether it erred in holding that section 147A “does not pass the muster of a Validation Enactment”. The Court granted leave, listed the appeal for final hearing on 3 December 2026, and ordered (para 5):

The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court shall remain stayed from its operation on the condition that the assessment and reassessment proceedings shall not proceed further till the final disposal of the main matter.

The stay suspends the Punjab and Haryana judgment for the time being, on a condition that binds the Revenue: the reassessments do not move. It does not touch the Andhra Pradesh judgment, delivered on 12 October 2026 with the stay before the Bench (para 100). Meanwhile the Calcutta High Court has stayed proceedings until the Supreme Court decides (Girdhar Gopal Dalmia v. Union of India, 1 October 2026), and the Orissa High Court, on a notice issued by a jurisdictional officer on 25 June 2026, recorded that in view of the stay granted on 10 April 2026 no further interim order was needed (Manisha Behera v. Union of India, 7 October 2026).

In Bombay, petitions allowed on Hexaware have come back. Two orders of one Division Bench of 30 October 2026, in the same terms, show the course: Dilip Enterprises v. Income Tax Officer-28 (1)(1), Mumbai and Rajendra Dadasaheb Pandhare v. Income Tax Officer Ward 2 Pandharpur. Each petition had been allowed on 29 July 2025 by following Hexaware, with liberty to the Revenue to revive it if Hexaware was set aside by the Supreme Court (paras 1 and 2). Each was revived and restored to file by an order of 20 July 2026 of another Division Bench (para 3), before the stay of 18 September 2026. By the orders of 30 October 2026 the Bench allowed the assessee to amend the petition to plead that the notice is time-barred under section 149(1)(b) read with sections 153A and 153C (paras 4 and 5), held that the petitioner “will be entitled to ad-interim reliefs in terms of prayer clause (c)” (para 7) and listed the petition for admission on 4 December 2026 (para 8). Neither order rules on section 147A.

Open question 5: is section 147A valid, and what should an assessee with a pending challenge do meanwhile?

That it is valid (the Revenue). Parliament may remove the basis of a judgment retrospectively. Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality (Supreme Court, Constitution Bench, 25 April 1969) recognises that “Sometimes the legislature gives its own meaning and interpretation of the law under which the tax was collected and by legislative fiat, makes the new meaning binding upon courts.” Section 147A defines the Assessing Officer for sections 148 and 148A, and its override names section 151A and any scheme under it, which were the basis of the adverse judgments; the Scheme needed no amendment because the section overrides it in terms. The High Courts were in fact divided. On commencement, section 1(2) of the Finance Act, 2026 opens “Save as otherwise provided in this Act”, and section 9 itself provides that section 147A “shall be inserted and shall be deemed to have been inserted with effect from the 1st day of April, 2021”, when the 1961 Act was in full force.

That it is not (the assessee). Prithvi Cotton Mills also says “it is not sufficient to declare merely that the decision of the Court shall not bind”. Under NHPC Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh (Supreme Court, 6 September 2023) the alteration must be such that “it would no more be possible for the Court to arrive at the same verdict” (para 11), and a non-obstante clause used “as a technique” without curing the defect will not do (para 13). Section 151A and the Scheme stand unamended; clause 3(b) still says the notice shall be through automated allocation; and after 31 March 2022 the proviso to section 151A(2) barred any direction modifying the Act (Jyoti Sareen, para 61). If the Andhra Pradesh commencement ground is right, the section was never validly inserted.

Our view. The validation question is evenly balanced and will be decided by the Supreme Court on or after 3 December 2026; no assessee should plan on either result. The stronger objection is that the Scheme was left untouched, and the Revenue’s best answer is that the override names it. The commencement ground would also unseat sections 292BA and 292BC and is the one most likely to be resisted; on the words of section 1(2) and of section 9 we think it the weaker ground. Meanwhile an assessee with a pending challenge should see that the petition challenges section 147A, amending it if that has not been done. For a petition remitted by the order of 10 April 2026 the liberty to amend was for four weeks from the uploading of that order, with no additional time (paras 23 and 25); an amendment outside that liberty is for the High Court to allow. He should also ask the High Court to stay the proceedings on the strength of the condition in the Supreme Court’s order, as the Calcutta High Court did in Girdhar Gopal Dalmia (para 5), and keep every other ground alive (the order of 10 April 2026 preserved “any other grounds available to them to question the impugned notices”); where no writ is pending, the ground should be taken before the Assessing Officer and in the grounds of appeal.

Approvals after section 292BC

Assessments depend on approvals: the Joint Commissioner’s approval for a search assessment under section 153D, the sanction for reopening under section 151, the approval for special audit. A ground regularly taken against such an approval is that it was given mechanically. Section 292BC is directed at that ground.

For a file in hand the working rule is short. If the approval is dated before 1 April 2021, the new section does not apply. If it is later, the section applies, if it is valid, “where such approval is granted electronically”, the words on which it ends. An approval letter that says little is then no longer enough to win; the assessee must show from the record that the authority did not examine the file, or that the wrong authority approved.

The judicial line it answers

Section 153D. The decisions fall into two groups, and the difference matters for what section 292BC changes: in the first the approval was bad for what it failed to say; in the second the record showed that the authority could not have examined the file. In ACIT, Circle-1(2), Bhubaneswar v. M/s. Serajuddin & Co. (Orissa High Court, 15 March 2023, assessment years 2003-04 to 2009-10) the Additional Commissioner approved seven draft orders by a single letter of 30 December 2010, the day before limitation expired. The Revenue argued that the approval “was a mere administrative order and not open to challenge before a court of law” (para 8(ii), counsel’s submission). The Bench rejected that (para 17): “Where the approval is granted mechanically, it would vitiate the assessment order itself.” It held (para 22) that “While elaborate reasons need not be given, there has to be some indication that the approving authority has examined the draft orders”.

The Revenue’s special leave petitions were dismissed by five separate orders between 28 November 2023 and 28 July 2026, none with reasons. The first (B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan JJ) reads: “Having regard to facts and circumstances of the case, we are not inclined to interfere in the matter.” The fifth, four months after the Finance Act, 2026, dismissed the petition “on merits as well as on delay” and does not mention section 292BC. None lays down any proposition on section 153D.

The second group begins with Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-2 v. Anuj Bansal (Delhi High Court, 13 July 2023), where the approved draft carried figures that were wrong on their face and the Tribunal had found that only the draft, without the records, went to the approving authority. The Bench found no substantial question of law and held that section 292B could not correct this (para 15). The Supreme Court dismissed the Revenue’s petitions on 11 July 2024 “Having regard to peculiar facts of these cases”. In The Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sapna Gupta (Allahabad High Court, 12 December 2022) one letter approved 85 cases on the day the drafts arrived. The Revenue admitted that the approval “is an administrative exercise of power” but argued that its existence sufficed. The Bench called that “a fallacy”: “the approval must reflect the application of mind to the facts of the case”. In Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax -15 v. Shiv Kumar Nayyar (Delhi High Court, 15 May 2024, para 17) both features were present: a single approval for seven assessment years which “fails to make any mention of the fact that the draft assessment orders were perused at all”, and 43 cases approved in a day. The Ahmedabad Bench of the Tribunal went the other way on its facts in Shri Champaklal Narayanlal Prajapati v. ACIT, Central Circle-2(3), Ahmedabad (12 March 2026, assessment year 2021-22): the assessee pointed to more than 80 approvals on the last day of limitation, and the Bench found “no merit in the above contention” (para 22) for want of material showing that the approving authority had not examined the records.

Section 151. In Chhugamal Rajpal v. S. P. Chaliha (Supreme Court, 21 January 1971) the Commissioner had answered the question whether it was a fit case with the single word “Yes”. The Court held that he “has mechanically accorded permission”; the primary ground was want of material under section 147. The Supreme Court restated the passage on 28 October 2026 in Chetan Sabharwal v. ACIT, Circle 28(1), New Delhi (para 33), a case the Revenue won on other points and which does not refer to section 292BC. In Capital Broadways Pvt. Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer Ward 5(3) Delhi (Delhi High Court, 3 October 2024) the Principal Commissioner wrote “Yes I am satisfied”; the Bench held (para 14) that “Reasons are the link between material placed on record and the conclusion reached” and set the notice aside. The Gujarat High Court has been less strict. In Mehrunnisa Mohamed Fazal Maniar v. Income Tax Officer (20 January 2021) the assessee complained that the sanctioning authorities had recorded no more than their satisfaction (para 6). Each had written that, on the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer, “I am satisfied that this is a fit case for reopening”. The Bench found that the proposal and the reasons had been placed before them (para 20), applied an earlier decision of the same Court that a sanction given by writing “yes” does not fail “on that count alone” if “application of mind is demonstrable from the material on record”, and rejected the writ applications (paras 21, 22).

The view the section adopts. In Kailash Moudgil v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax (Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Special Bench, Delhi, 2 December 1999) the questions were whether the Commissioner approving a block assessment under section 158BG must give a hearing and record reasons. The Special Bench reasoned that “the approval contemplated under section 158BG proviso is only an administrative approval and not a judicial approval”, and answered (para 31) that the Commissioner need not record reasons and that approval without reasons does not render the order void ab initio. The first limb of section 292BC tracks that reasoning and the second those answers. The same order sets out (para 8) the Black’s Law Dictionary definition, under which “‘Approval’ implies knowledge and exercise of discretion after knowledge”. It did not decide that an approval given without looking at the record is valid. (On block assessment generally see our article on section 158BC and section 294.)

The two texts side by side

Point	Section 292BC, 1961 Act	Section 522(3), 2025 Act
Opening words	“Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any judgment, order or decree of any Court”	“Irrespective of anything contained in this Act”
Declaratory form	“for the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified”	None
First limb	Any approval by an income-tax authority in relation to assessment, reassessment or recomputation proceedings “shall be deemed to be administrative and supervisory in nature”	Same words
Second limb	“shall not be invalid or shall not be deemed to be invalid by reason of any insufficiency of the reasons recorded or by reason of any defect in the form or manner of its authentication or communication including whether digital signature have been appended to such approval or not”	“shall not be invalid by reason of” the same matters
Closing words	“where such approval is granted electronically”	“where such approval has been granted electronically”
Commencement	Inserted by section 33 of the Finance Act, 2026, with retrospective effect from 1 April 2021	Section 522 substituted by section 121 of the Finance Act, 2026, with effect from 1 April 2026

Section 292BC was not in the Finance Bill, 2026 as introduced, and the Memorandum says nothing about approvals. For section 147A and for the DIN the Memorandum identifies the judicial divergence being resolved; for approvals there is no official statement of what the doubt was.

On its own words the section does not supply an approval where none was given, validate an approval by the wrong authority, or reach an approval granted before 1 April 2021. It nowhere uses the words “application of mind”; it speaks of “insufficiency of the reasons recorded” and of defects of “authentication or communication”.

What courts and Tribunals have done since 30 March 2026

Against the assessee. In The Income Tax Officer v. Joseph Chacko (Karnataka High Court, 16 April 2026) a single judge had set aside a reassessment because the section 151 sanction was unsigned. The Division Bench held (para 6.1) that “The impact of Section 292BC on the issue in question necessitates reconsideration upon appropriate pleadings”, set the order aside and remitted the writ petition with all contentions open. The Tribunal has dismissed approval grounds on the strength of the section in Jasbir Singh v. ITO, Ward-57(4), Delhi (Delhi, 22 May 2026, para 7, an appeal for assessment year 2011-12), Suraj Rolling Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT, Central Circle, Bilaspur (Raipur, 2 July 2026, para 14: a section 153D approval of 1 June 2021 for seven years), and Clarion Agro Products Private Limited v. ACIT, Central Circle 3(1), Hyderabad (Hyderabad, 8 July 2026, paras 9.1 and 9.2), where factual errors in the approval and the absence of any reference to the records were treated as defects of form. In Income Tax Officer, Ward-3(1), Raipur v. Manohar Gangwani (Raipur, single member, 16 October 2026) the Tribunal recalled its own order of 6 April 2026, which had quashed a reassessment for a mechanical sanction dated 29 March 2024, because the section had been overlooked. These orders apply the section to pending matters; the Tribunal cannot rule on its validity, and the Karnataka Division Bench did not.

Confining the section to its words. The Bombay High Court in Nikhil Nagindas Modi (para 23) held that the provisions, being retrospective from 1 April 2021, “would not apply to the facts of the present case where the approval has been granted on 30 March 2021”, and expressed no view on their validity. In Shri Minji Kiran Kumar Goud v. ITO, Ward-1, Nandyal (Hyderabad, 1 July 2026, para 13) sanction by an authority other than the one specified in section 151 was held to be a defect of competence which “goes to the root of the assumption of jurisdiction and is not cured by section 292BC of the Act.” And on 9 October 2026 the Delhi High Court dismissed six Revenue appeals against the quashing, for a consolidated section 153D approval, of assessments for assessment years 2008-09 to 2013-14, on the earlier line (Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax -10 v. Atul Kumar Bansal). The judgment does not refer to section 292BC and is not a decision on it.

Open question 6: what does section 292BC do to orders already set aside, to pending appeals and to fresh files?

For the Revenue. A retrospective change of basis binds every matter still in the appellate chain. In Prithvi Cotton Mills the validating Act was applied to writ petitions pending when it was passed. S.R. Bhagwat v. State of Mysore (Supreme Court, 12 September 1995) accepts that against a decision “pending in appeal” which “had not become final” the State “could rely upon” the retrospective provisions “for whatever such reliance was worth”. In Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India (Supreme Court, seven judges, 21 February 1978) Bhagwati J said that where a retrospective alteration renders a judgment erroneous “the remedy may be by way of appeal or review”; and in State of Tamil Nadu v. Arooran Sugars Ltd (Supreme Court, Constitution Bench, 31 October 1996) that case was distinguished because the Act there had “no non-obstante clause purporting to take away the effect of the judgment”, which section 292BC has. In NHPC the validating law was upheld against the very assessee that had won in the High Court. For the bare-approval cases the basis is removed in terms: Serajuddin para 22 and Capital Broadways turn on what the approval records, and the section says insufficiency of recorded reasons does not invalidate. The doubt was real, since Kailash Moudgil had held the other way; and the dismissals of the special leave petitions declare no law that Parliament can be said to have overruled.

For the assessee. First, an order final between the parties cannot be displaced by legislation. S.R. Bhagwat: “a binding judicial pronouncement between the parties cannot be made ineffective with the aid of any legislative power by enacting a provision which in substance over-rules such judgment”. In Madan Mohan Pathak four of the seven judges (Bhagwati, Krishna Iyer and Desai JJ, with Beg CJ agreeing on the point) held that a final mandamus could not be disregarded on the strength of the later Act; the other three (Chandrachud, Fazal Ali and Shinghal JJ) rested on Article 31(2) and found it “unnecessary to express any opinion on the effect of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court”. Dr. Jaya Thakur v. Union of India (Supreme Court, 11 July 2023, para 111) applied the rule to a mandamus “binding on the parties before it”. Even in NHPC the party that had won the first round was, under Article 142, made liable only “w.e.f. 01.04.2023” and “not for the period prior thereto” (para 26). Unlike the Acts in Prithvi Cotton Mills and NHPC, section 292BC has no clause validating assessments or reviving annulled ones, and its override names “any Court” while most of these annulments are Tribunal orders.

Second, the label does not remove the basis. The Revenue argued that the approval is administrative in Serajuddin and conceded it in Sapna Gupta, and lost both times, because the courts required application of mind from an administrative authority. NHPC para 12 treats validation “without curing the defects” as legislative overruling. And “insufficiency of the reasons recorded” is not a record showing that the authority never saw the file (Anuj Bansal; Sapna Gupta).

Third, the section stops at its date. Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Private Limited (Supreme Court, Constitution Bench, 15 September 2014) states the rule that “no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication” (para 34). Union of India v. M/s Martin Lottery Agencies Ltd (Supreme Court, 5 May 2009) holds that expressions like “for the removal of doubts” “are not conclusive” (para 37), and Sedco Forex International Drill. Inc. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Dehradun (Supreme Court, 17 November 2005) refused to read back an Explanation, so worded, that changed a judicially settled meaning. The section also ends “where such approval is granted electronically”; whether those words confine both limbs, so that an approval given on paper is outside it, is a question of construction, as is whether a “sanction” under section 151 is an “approval” at all.

Our view. There are three classes. An annulment that had become final before the Finance Act, 2026 was enacted on 30 March 2026, with no appeal pending, is not reopened by section 292BC; the section does not say so and, on S.R. Bhagwat, could not validly say so. In a pending appeal, and on a fresh file, the section applies if it is valid, but only to an approval granted on or after 1 April 2021 and only to what its words cover: thin or absent reasons on the face of the approval, and defects of signature or communication. It does not answer a record which proves that the authority did not examine the file. Clarion Agro, which treats proven factual errors as defects of form, goes beyond the words and should be met directly.

Open question 7: does the absence of the override in section 522(3) leave the judicial line intact under the 2025 Act?

That the line survives (the assessee). In one Finance Act Parliament used two forms. For sections 147A and 292BC it used an override of judgments, the words “for the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified” and a retrospective date; for section 522(3) it used a plain provision opening “Irrespective of anything contained in this Act”. Vatika Township para 39 treats the choice between such forms as “a conscious decision of the legislature”. Section 522(3) is therefore an ordinary substantive provision, consistent with a line built on the footing that the approval is administrative (Sapna Gupta); its opening words override other provisions of the Act, not Chhugamal Rajpal.

That it does not (the Revenue). No override was needed because no judgment had construed the 2025 Act, and prospectively Parliament may define the character of an approval and the conditions of its validity. The operative words of the two provisions are substantially the same and were enacted together; for the sibling provisions on the DIN and on section 147A the Memorandum states the aim that “the intent is uniformly reflected in the two Acts”. The leading decisions turn on what the approval letter says, and section 522(3) removes that ground in terms.

Our view. Under the 2025 Act the ground that an approval is bad because it gives no reasons, or says only “approved”, is gone. What survives is the requirement that there be an approval, by the right authority, given after the authority has in fact considered the matter; a provision that calls the approval “supervisory” assumes as much. The ground is narrower and must be proved from the record, but it is not abolished.

Faceless penalty and faceless revision: flagged

Penalty and revision are noted here only for the points a faceless assessment file meets.

Penalty. Under section 274(2A) of the 1961 Act a scheme may be made for imposing penalty with dynamic jurisdiction, and the Faceless Penalty Scheme, 2021 (Notification S.O. 117(E), 12 January 2021) was made under it. By paragraph 3 it applies to such penalties or classes of penalties “as may be specified by the Board”. Paragraph 11 dispenses with personal appearance, lets the assessee request a personal hearing before the penalty unit, and provides that the income-tax authority of the relevant unit “shall allow such hearing”, exclusively by video, “to the extent technologically feasible”.

A change of substance takes effect from 1 April 2027. Section 274(4) and (5), inserted by the Finance Act, 2026, provide that where a draft order under section 144C, an assessment under section 143 or a reassessment under section 147 is made on or after 1 April 2027 for assessment year 2026-27 or any earlier year, the penalty under section 270A “shall constitute part of such draft assessment or shall be imposed as a part of such order of assessment or reassessment”, and the Joint Commissioner’s approval for the order is deemed to be approval for the penalty. The same provision is made, without the limit of assessment year, by section 471(4) and (5) of the 2025 Act for the penalty under section 439. From that date the penalty in such cases is decided inside the assessment, faceless or not.

Revision. Under section 264A a scheme may be made for faceless revision of orders under section 263 or section 264. The section is an enabling power (“The Central Government may make a scheme, by notification in the Official Gazette”) and does not itself make revision faceless. On section 264 see our article on revision and fresh claims.

Gujarat: what the record shows

The Gujarat High Court’s decisions discussed in this Part, all on jurisdiction and form:

1. Mehrunnisa Mohamed Fazal Maniar, 20 January 2021: challenge to a section 151 sanction as mechanical rejected.
2. Talati and Talati LLP, 1 October 2024, as the Delhi High Court records it in T.K.S. Builders (paras 96 and 97): automated allocation does not apply to search cases.
3. Snehdham Trust, 17 September 2025, as the Punjab and Haryana High Court records it in Jyoti Sareen (para 38): the officer who passes the section 148A(d) order issues the section 148 notice.
4. Rameshkumar Tulsidas Kaneriya, as the Bombay High Court records it in Sanjay Nathalal Shah (paras 3 and 12): a satisfaction note is an internal communication outside Circular 19/2019, and one issued without a number can be regularised by issuing it with one.

On jurisdiction and form the decisions in this list are with the Revenue. On the accounts given in T.K.S. Builders and Jyoti Sareen, the ground that a section 148 notice had to come from a faceless unit did not succeed in the High Court even before section 147A: in Talati and Talati for search cases, in Snehdham Trust on the general question. On the account given in Sanjay Nathalal Shah, the High Court has held a satisfaction note to be outside Circular 19/2019, a view the Bombay High Court declined to follow. A brief section 151 sanction was upheld where application of mind was demonstrable from the record. The Ahmedabad Bench of the Tribunal rejected the mechanical approval ground under section 153D in Champaklal Narayanlal Prajapati before the Finance Act, 2026. The Gujarat decisions on the procedure under section 144B and on limitation are listed in Part 1.

The Gujarat decisions above do not decide: whether a faceless order is made only when digitally signed; the validity of section 147A; the construction of section 292BA; mechanical approval under section 153D; or the validity or reach of section 292BC.

Open questions, argued both ways

Four questions in this Part are open. Each is argued, with our view, in the section named; Part 1 carries questions 1 to 3 and Part 3 questions 8 to 10.

4. Does section 292BA reach an order that carries no number at all? (The Document Identification Number.)
5. Is section 147A valid, and what should an assessee with a pending challenge do meanwhile? (Reassessment.)
6. What does section 292BC do to orders already set aside, to pending appeals and to fresh files? (Approvals.)
7. Does the absence of the override in section 522(3) leave the judicial line intact under the 2025 Act? (Approvals.)

On a live file

The checks on the procedure of a faceless assessment (the show cause notice, the hearing, the time to reply, the writ and the remand) are in the list in Part 1. The checks below are for files under the Income-tax Act, 1961, which continues to govern every tax year beginning before 1 April 2026, including proceedings for those years begun later (section 536(2)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 2025). On jurisdiction and form:

1. The signature. If the digital signature is dated after the last day under section 153, take limitation as a distinct ground on ECGC. For an unsigned notice rely on section 282A(1) and Nikhil Nagindas Modi, knowing that the Chhattisgarh High Court treats name and designation as enough and that Nikhil Nagindas Modi (para 21) records a Delhi High Court decision to the same effect.
2. DIN. Find out whether a number was generated for the order and whether an intimation letter links it; if so, section 292BA and the Karnataka ruling answer the ground for an assessment order. Plead it where no number exists, or where the document is an approval, a satisfaction note, a notice or Dispute Resolution Panel directions. In Gujarat the ground on a satisfaction note is taken knowing that Sanjay Nathalal Shah (para 12) records the Gujarat High Court, in Rameshkumar Tulsidas Kaneriya, as holding a satisfaction note to be an internal communication outside the Circular; the Bombay High Court declined to follow that view. Paragraph 4 of Circular 19/2019 is available only for a communication issued between 1 October 2019 and 30 March 2026.
3. Section 148 notice by the jurisdictional officer. Plead that the notice is contrary to section 151A and the Scheme and that section 147A is invalid, citing Hexaware and the other remitted judgments for their reasoning only. In a writ petition the challenge to section 147A has to be in the pleadings; for a petition remitted on 10 April 2026 the liberty to amend was for four weeks from the uploading of that order, with no additional time (paras 23 and 25). In Gujarat the ground is taken knowing that Jyoti Sareen (para 38) records the Gujarat High Court’s decision in Snehdham Trust as one for the Revenue; take it there to keep it alive for the Supreme Court. Ask for the proceedings to be kept in abeyance on the Supreme Court’s orders of 10 April 2026 (para 27) and 18 September 2026 (para 5). Never run the officer point alone: limitation under section 149, the sanction and the section 148A procedure are independent of section 147A.
4. Approval: get the record. Ask for the approval, the forwarding letter and the order sheet, and classify the defect: no approval; wrong authority; approval before 1 April 2021; approval on or after that date with thin reasons or without a signature; approval that the record shows was given without the file. Only the fourth is squarely within section 292BC, and on its closing words only “where such approval is granted electronically”. Build the fifth on facts (how many cases were approved that day, what was sent up, errors that could not have been missed).
5. Orders already won. If an annulment for a mechanical approval became final before 30 March 2026, resist any application under section 254(2) or section 154 founded on section 292BC, on S.R. Bhagwat.
6. Raise every ground early and in writing: in the reply to the show cause notice, in Form 35, before the Tribunal, and as an additional ground where it was missed. Section 292BB concerns service of a notice, not these defects; see the article on the section 143(2) notice and section 292BB.

Concordance: Income-tax Act, 1961 and Income-tax Act, 2025

Subject	Income-tax Act, 1961	Income-tax Act, 2025
Faceless assessment	Section 144B	Section 273, with Rule 176 of the Income-tax Rules, 2026
Officer who issues the reassessment notices	Section 147A	Section 279(3)
Reassessment notice; procedure before notice	Sections 148, 148A	Sections 280, 281
Faceless schemes (reassessment, penalty, revision, appeal, Dispute Resolution Panel)	Sections 151A, 274(2A), 264A, 250(6B), 144C(14B)	Section 532
Mistake, defect or omission not to invalidate	Section 292B	Section 522(1)
Document Identification Number	Section 292BA	Section 522(2)
Approvals	Section 292BC	Section 522(3)
Notice deemed to be valid	Section 292BB	Section 523
Special audit	Section 142(2A)	Section 268(5)
Time limit for completing assessment	Section 153	Section 286
Penalty procedure, including penalty within the assessment order from 1 April 2027	Section 274	Section 471

Decisions referred to in this Part

Decision	Court and date	Cited for
Brandix Mauritius Holdings Ltd.	Delhi High Court, 20 March 2023; Supreme Court, interim order of 3 January 2024	Order without DIN; stay
Ashok Commercial Enterprises	Bombay High Court, 4 September 2023	Later intimation does not cure
Hexaware Technologies Limited	Bombay High Court, 3 May 2024	Faceless officer exclusive; since remanded by the Supreme Court
Siemens Limited	Bombay High Court, 2 December 2025	Stayed judgments keep precedential value
Sanjay Nathalal Shah	Bombay High Court, 8 January 2026	Approval without DIN
Rameshkumar Tulsidas Kaneriya	Gujarat High Court, as recorded in Sanjay Nathalal Shah (paras 3 and 12)	Recorded as holding a satisfaction note outside Circular 19/2019
Unisys India Pvt Ltd with Shri H. K. Suresh	Karnataka High Court, 7 July 2026	Invalid only where no DIN generated or communicated
Wonder Infrabuild Pvt Ltd	Delhi High Court, 5 August 2026	Question framed on section 292BA
The Revenue Bar Association	Madras High Court, order of 7 September 2026	Challenge to section 292BA
Manish Keshavlal Shah	Bombay High Court, order of 25 August 2026	Same
Nikhil Nagindas Modi	Bombay High Court, 5 August 2026	Signature mandatory; section 292BC left open
ECGC Limited	Bombay High Court, 30 March 2026	Order made when signed
Vikas Gupta	Allahabad High Court, 8 September 2022	Sanction signed after the notice
Bharat Krishi Kendra	Chhattisgarh High Court, 15 March 2022	Unsigned approval upheld
Asro Arcade	Delhi High Court, as recorded in Nikhil Nagindas Modi (para 21)	Recorded as holding that name and designation suffice
Raja Reddy Sannareddy	Telangana High Court, 3 March 2026	Order digitally signed by the Assessment Unit upheld
G.T Reality Private Limited	Tribunal, Raipur, 9 October 2026	Observation that section 292BC is confined to approvals
Kankanala Ravindra Reddy	Telangana High Court, 14 September 2023	Reassessment notice must be faceless
Jatinder Singh Bhangu	Punjab and Haryana High Court, 19 July 2024	Same
Jyoti Sareen	Punjab and Haryana High Court, 10 September 2026	Section 147A struck down
Triton Overseas Private Limited	Calcutta High Court, 13 September 2023	Jurisdictional officer competent
T.K.S. Builders Pvt. Ltd.	Delhi High Court, 28 October 2024	Concurrent jurisdiction
Mark Studio India Private Limited	Madras High Court, 20 December 2024	Same
M/s Patran Foods Pvt. Ltd.	Punjab and Haryana High Court, 20 December 2024	Revived 2021 notices stay with the jurisdictional officer
Talati and Talati LLP	Gujarat High Court, 1 October 2024, as recorded in T.K.S. Builders (paras 96 and 97)	Recorded as holding search cases outside automated allocation
Snehdham Trust	Gujarat High Court, 17 September 2025, as recorded in Jyoti Sareen (para 38)	Recorded as holding that the officer passing the section 148A(d) order issues the notice
Deepanjan Roy	Supreme Court, 16 July 2025	Dismissal in limine
Tej Partap Singh	Supreme Court, 10 April 2026	Remit after section 147A; interim stay
Bala Sreenivas Rao Somisetty	Andhra Pradesh High Court, 12 October 2026	Section 147A struck down; commencement ground
Bharat Industrial Enterprises Pvt Ltd	Supreme Court, order of 18 September 2026	Stay of Jyoti Sareen on condition
Dilip Enterprises	Bombay High Court, order of 30 October 2026	Petition allowed on Hexaware and restored on 20 July 2026; amendment on limitation allowed; ad interim relief
Rajendra Dadasaheb Pandhare	Bombay High Court, order of 30 October 2026	Same
Girdhar Gopal Dalmia	Calcutta High Court, 1 October 2026	Proceedings stayed
Manisha Behera	Orissa High Court, 7 October 2026	No further interim order needed in view of the stay
Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd.	Supreme Court, Constitution Bench, 25 April 1969	Validating legislation
NHPC Ltd.	Supreme Court, 6 September 2023	Same
M/s. Serajuddin & Co.	Orissa High Court, 15 March 2023	Mechanical approval under section 153D
Anuj Bansal	Delhi High Court, 13 July 2023	Same
Sapna Gupta	Allahabad High Court, 12 December 2022	Same
Shiv Kumar Nayyar	Delhi High Court, 15 May 2024	Single approval for seven years; 43 cases in a day
Shri Champaklal Narayanlal Prajapati	Tribunal, Ahmedabad, 12 March 2026	Mechanical approval ground rejected
Chhugamal Rajpal	Supreme Court, 21 January 1971	Mechanical sanction
Chetan Sabharwal	Supreme Court, 28 October 2026	Same passage restated
Capital Broadways Pvt. Ltd.	Delhi High Court, 3 October 2024	“Yes I am satisfied”
Mehrunnisa Mohamed Fazal Maniar	Gujarat High Court, 20 January 2021	Brief sanction upheld where application of mind demonstrable
Kailash Moudgil	Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Special Bench, Delhi, 2 December 1999	Approval administrative; no reasons needed
Joseph Chacko	Karnataka High Court, 16 April 2026	Remit to consider section 292BC
Jasbir Singh	Tribunal, Delhi, 22 May 2026	Section 292BC applied
Suraj Rolling Pvt. Ltd.	Tribunal, Raipur, 2 July 2026	Same
Clarion Agro Products Private Limited	Tribunal, Hyderabad, 8 July 2026	Same
Manohar Gangwani	Tribunal, Raipur, 16 October 2026	Own order recalled
Shri Minji Kiran Kumar Goud	Tribunal, Hyderabad, 1 July 2026	Wrong authority not cured
Atul Kumar Bansal	Delhi High Court, 9 October 2026	Earlier line applied; section 292BC not referred to
S.R. Bhagwat	Supreme Court, 12 September 1995	Final judgments and validating law
Madan Mohan Pathak	Supreme Court, 21 February 1978	Same
Arooran Sugars Ltd	Supreme Court, Constitution Bench, 31 October 1996	Madan Mohan Pathak distinguished
Dr. Jaya Thakur	Supreme Court, 11 July 2023	Mandamus binding between the parties
Vatika Township Private Limited	Supreme Court, Constitution Bench, 15 September 2014	Retrospectivity
M/s Martin Lottery Agencies Ltd	Supreme Court, 5 May 2009	“For the removal of doubts” not conclusive
Sedco Forex International Drill. Inc.	Supreme Court, 17 November 2005	Same

Part 1 takes up the assessment itself under section 144B of the 1961 Act and section 273 of the 2025 Act, the show cause notice, the hearing, the relief and limitation for the fresh order, and open questions 1 to 3. Read it at Faceless assessment under section 144B: show cause notice and hearing. Part 3 takes up the appeal: the hearing before the Commissioner (Appeals), the forum for the further appeal and open questions 8 to 10. Read it at Faceless appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals): hearing and remedies.

This note is general commentary on the law as at 11 November 2026 and is not advice on any matter. The position in a particular case depends on its own facts.