Is there a right to a personal hearing in a faceless appeal?

Yes, on request. Paragraph 12(2) of the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021 lets the appellant request a personal hearing through the National Faceless Appeal Centre, and paragraph 12(3) says the Commissioner (Appeals) 'shall allow the request' and communicate a date and time. The hearing is by video conferencing. The words 'to the extent technologically feasible' appear in sub-paragraph (4), on the mode of hearing, and not in sub-paragraph (3). The Mumbai Bench of the Tribunal held in Bank of India (30 June 2022) that there is 'no question of any discretion' once a request is made, and the Pune Bench followed it in Atpadi Education Society (15 October 2024).

What if the faceless appeal was decided without a hearing and I never asked for one?

The point is open. The appellant can argue that section 250(1) and (2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are mandatory, and that the Kerala High Court set aside an order for want of hearing in Rajadhani Fashions (6 September 2024) without recording any request. The Revenue can argue that paragraph 12(2) of the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021 makes the request the trigger and that written submissions are the default mode. Our view is that an appellant who made no request is on weak ground unless the notice for submissions was not served or gave unreasonably short time.

Can the Commissioner (Appeals) dismiss a faceless appeal for non-prosecution?

Sections 250(6) and 251(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 require a written order stating the points for determination, the decision and the reasons, and do not mention dismissal for default. The Orissa High Court held in Ashok Kumar Shaw (31 March 2022) that the Commissioner (Appeals) 'was thus obliged to have heard the appeal on merit', and the Calcutta High Court in Vedansh Traders (7 February 2025) read clause (c) of section 251(1) 'in conjunction with clause (a) and (b)'. Both restored appeals dismissed for non-prosecution by jurisdictional Commissioners (Appeals), the Calcutta one on condition that no adjournment be sought, because the assessee had not been diligent.

What relief does the Ahmedabad Bench of the Tribunal give against an ex parte faceless appellate order?

Usually restoration, not quashing. In 2025 the Ahmedabad Bench generally granted one more opportunity, sending the matter to the Commissioner (Appeals) or to the Assessing Officer, often on costs of Rs 5,000 to Rs 10,000 (Govindji Budhaji Thakor, 12 March 2025; Gaurav Vinodbhai Mitra, 19 November 2025). Relief was refused in Mikal Bhupendrabhai Patel (17 October 2025), where the default was unexplained and continued before the Tribunal. On a point of law on admitted facts the Tribunal decided the issue itself in Ashvinkumar Naranbhai Patel (28 July 2025).

What if the appeal notices went to an old e-mail address?

The Karnataka High Court, in Suresh Kumar Paruchuri (12 June 2025), quashed a faceless appellate order where Form 35 gave a new e-mail address and the appeal communications still went to the old one, holding that the Department ought to have used the address within its knowledge. The Ahmedabad Bench condoned a short delay on an explanation that included a similar fact in Yakin Jayantilal Shah (15 October 2025). Against that, the Raipur Bench in Vineet Singh Construction (28 June 2024) dismissed a late appeal where the appellant had opted in Form 35 to receive notices by e-mail. Check the e-filing account and do not wait for an e-mail.

Can the Commissioner (Appeals) set aside an assessment and send it back to the Assessing Officer?

Only in a limited case. The proviso to section 251(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in force from 1 October 2024, lets the Commissioner (Appeals) set aside an assessment and refer the case back where the appeal is against an order made under section 144. Tribunal Benches have held that an order under section 147 read with section 144B alone does not qualify (Sanjay Jayantilal Shah, ITAT Ahmedabad, 7 October 2025; Al Safa Foods, ITAT Visakhapatnam, 3 July 2026). The Ahmedabad Bench added that the proviso cannot apply retrospectively to assessments of earlier years. The word 'may' makes the power discretionary (The Wardrobe Theorem, ITAT Ahmedabad, 8 July 2025).

Must a jurisdictional ground be decided before a best judgment assessment is set aside?

The Ahmedabad Bench held in The Wardrobe Theorem (8 July 2025) that a legal ground on the reopening had to be decided first by the Commissioner (Appeals) and could not be set aside to the Assessing Officer; the Hyderabad Bench reasoned likewise in Mamatha Gubbala (30 January 2026). But in Yakin Jayantilal Shah (15 October 2025) the Ahmedabad Bench decided the jurisdictional ground itself, against the assessee, and upheld the set-aside. The question is open. Our view is that the ground must be decided first, and the appellant should ask for that in terms.

Can a High Court fix a time limit for a faceless appeal that has been pending for years?

Section 250(6A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 sets a one-year period 'where it is possible' and attaches no consequence. The Bombay High Court has fixed time limits for pending faceless appeals in Vodafone Idea (6 August 2024, four months) and Katmandu Apparel (16 September 2026, sixteen weeks); in the first an earlier direction had been disobeyed and in the second the Revenue did not dispute the facts. The Gujarat High Court, in Sunil Dahyalal Modi (28 March 2022), disposed of a petition seeking expedition, refund and stay as 'thoroughly misconceived'. Our view is that in Gujarat such a petition needs a record that distinguishes that order.

Can refunds be adjusted against a demand while the faceless appeal is pending?

Stay is with the Assessing Officer under section 220(6) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The twenty per cent figure is from the Board's memoranda of 29 February 2016 and 31 July 2017, which the Karnataka High Court read in Bidar Nirmiti Kendra (27 May 2019) as confined to the first appeal and giving no right to a cap on recovery in all circumstances. In Katmandu Apparel (16 September 2026) the Bombay High Court directed refund of refunds adjusted under section 245 despite a stay order on payment of twenty per cent. The Gujarat High Court refused refund of recovery above twenty per cent in Sunil Dahyalal Modi (28 March 2022).

Does the Income-tax Act, 2025 change the faceless appeal?

Not for files now in hand. The Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021 govern appeals for every tax year beginning before 1 April 2026, whenever filed. For tax year 2026-27 onwards, section 359(1) and (2) of the Income-tax Act, 2025 keep the right to be heard at the hearing, section 359(4) the reasoned order and section 360(1)(b) the power to set aside a best judgment assessment made under section 271. Section 359 has no counterpart to section 250(6B) to (6D); the scheme-making power is in section 532, and section 536(2)(u) continues existing faceless schemes in force.

Faceless appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals): hearing and remedies

Q: Which Tribunal Bench and High Court hear the further appeal from a faceless appellate order?

Paragraph 8(1) of the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021 sends the appeal to the Tribunal having jurisdiction over the jurisdictional Assessing Officer of the appellant. For the High Court, the Supreme Court held in ABC Papers (18 August 2022) that the appeal lies to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order is situated, and the Delhi High Court applied that to a faceless assessment by the seat of the jurisdictional officer in Ramesh Kumar Bagri (2 April 2026). A Gujarat assessee goes to the Ahmedabad, Rajkot or Surat Bench and the Gujarat High Court.

In short

A faceless first appeal under section 250 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 runs under the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021. Under paragraph 12(2) and (3) the appellant may request a personal hearing by video and the Commissioner (Appeals) 'shall allow the request'. The Tribunal's Mumbai Bench held in Bank of India (30 June 2022) that once a request is made this leaves no discretion, and the Pune Bench followed it (15 October 2024); whether an order is bad where no request was made is open. If the appellant does not respond, section 250(6) requires a reasoned order; the Orissa and Calcutta High Courts restored appeals dismissed for non-prosecution, and the Ahmedabad Bench usually gives one more opportunity, on costs. The proviso to section 251(1)(a), from 1 October 2024, lets the Commissioner (Appeals) set aside only an assessment made under section 144; the Ahmedabad Bench has said it does not reach assessments of earlier years. Tribunal Benches held it discretionary and required a legal ground on jurisdiction to be decided first, but the Ahmedabad Bench has upheld set-asides. The further appeal goes to the Tribunal Bench of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer and, as the Delhi High Court has applied ABC Papers, to his High Court. The Income-tax Act, 2025 keeps the right to be heard, the reasoned order and the set-aside power in sections 359 and 360 from tax year 2026-27.

This is Part 3 of a three-Part series on faceless assessment and faceless appeal. Part 1 covers the assessment itself under section 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and section 273 of the Income-tax Act, 2025; Part 2 covers jurisdiction and form after the Finance Act, 2026 (the Document Identification Number, the signature, the officer who issues the section 148 notice and approvals); this Part covers the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).

A notice under section 250 arrives on the e-filing portal from the National Faceless Appeal Centre, asking for written submissions within a few days. Months later an order is uploaded to the same account: the appeal is dismissed because the notices went unanswered, or the best judgment assessment (one made under section 144 on the officer’s own estimate) is sent back to the Assessing Officer without a decision on the ground that the notice was bad.

This Part is about the appellant’s position on that file, under the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the Income-tax Act, 2025: when a video hearing must be given under paragraph 12 of the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021, what the Commissioner (Appeals) must still decide when the appellant stays away, and how far the proviso to section 251(1)(a) lets him send the case back.

Key points

Under paragraph 12(2) and (3) of the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021 (Notification No. 139/2021, 28 December 2021) the appellant may request a personal hearing by video, and the Commissioner (Appeals) “shall allow the request”. None of the decisions cited here holds the hearing discretionary.
The Kerala High Court (Rajadhani Fashions, 6 September 2024) and the Karnataka High Court (Thayappa Balakrishna, 1 April 2026) set aside faceless appellate orders on natural justice grounds; neither order records a refused request for personal hearing. Two Tribunal orders turn on a request made and not granted: the Mumbai Bench held that under paragraph 12(3) there is “no question of any discretion” (Bank of India, 30 June 2022), and the Pune Bench followed it (Atpadi Education Society, 15 October 2024). Whether an order is bad where no request was made is open (open question 8).
Neither section 250(6) nor section 251(1)(a) mentions dismissal for default. The Orissa and Calcutta High Courts restored appeals dismissed for non-prosecution (Ashok Kumar Shaw, 31 March 2022; Vedansh Traders, 7 February 2025). The Ahmedabad Bench usually restores them as one more opportunity, on costs.
The proviso to section 251(1)(a), in force from 1 October 2024, permits a set-aside only of an assessment “made under section 144”. The Ahmedabad Bench has also said that it does not reach assessments of earlier years (Sanjay Jayantilal Shah, 7 October 2025, para 5.7). The Ahmedabad Bench required a legal ground on reopening to be decided first (The Wardrobe Theorem, 8 July 2025), yet in Yakin Jayantilal Shah (15 October 2025) decided the jurisdictional ground itself and upheld the set-aside (open question 9).
Section 250(6A) sets a one-year period “where it is possible”, without consequence. The Bombay High Court has fixed time limits for pending faceless appeals (Vodafone Idea, 6 August 2024); the Gujarat High Court called a petition for expedition, refund and stay “thoroughly misconceived” (Sunil Dahyalal Modi, 28 March 2022) (open question 10).
The further appeal lies to the Tribunal Bench having jurisdiction over the jurisdictional Assessing Officer (paragraph 8(1) of the Scheme). For the High Court, ABC Papers (Supreme Court, 18 August 2022) sends the appeal to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order is situated; that judgment does not deal with faceless orders, and the Delhi High Court applied it to a faceless assessment by the seat of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer (Ramesh Kumar Bagri, 2 April 2026).
The Income-tax Act, 2025 keeps the right to be heard, the reasoned order and the set-aside power in sections 359 and 360 and moves the scheme-making power for the Commissioner (Appeals) to section 532. Appeals for tax years beginning before 1 April 2026 remain under the 1961 Act and the 2021 Scheme.

Where the faceless appeal comes from: section 250(6B) and the two Schemes

A first appeal under the Income-tax Act, 1961 is heard under section 250. Sub-section (1) requires the appellate authority to “fix a day and place for the hearing of the appeal” and to give notice of it. Sub-section (2) gives the appellant and the Assessing Officer “the right to be heard at the hearing of the appeal”. The faceless amendments touched neither; the only later change, by the Finance Act, 2023 with effect from 1 April 2023, added the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) to sub-section (1). The faceless appeal is laid over them by three sub-sections inserted by the Finance Act, 2020 (Act No. 12 of 2020) with effect from 1 April 2020: section 250(6B), (6C) and (6D).

Sub-section (6B) lets the Central Government notify a scheme “for the purposes of disposal of appeal by Commissioner (Appeals), so as to impart greater efficiency, transparency and accountability” by eliminating “the interface between the Commissioner (Appeals) and the appellant in the course of appellate proceedings to the extent technologically feasible”, by optimising resources, and by introducing “an appellate system with dynamic jurisdiction”.

Sub-section (6C) is the power to switch off the ordinary law. To give effect to the scheme, the Central Government may direct that any provision of the Act “relating to jurisdiction and procedure for disposal of appeals by Commissioner (Appeals) shall not apply or shall apply with such exceptions, modifications and adaptations as may be specified in the notification”. The proviso enacted with it sets a cut-off: “no direction shall be issued after the 31st day of March, 2022”. A second proviso, inserted by the Finance Act, 2023 with retrospective effect from 1 April 2022, lets the Central Government amend, by notification, a direction issued on or before that date. Sub-section (6D), also inserted in 2020, requires the notifications to be laid before Parliament.

So any change to the hearing under sub-sections (1) and (2) has to be found in the Scheme, not in sub-section (6B).

The Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2020

The first Scheme was notified on 25 September 2020 (Notification No. 76/2020, S.O. 3296(E)). It worked through a National Faceless Appeal Centre, Regional Faceless Appeal Centres and appeal units of “one or more Commissioner(Appeals)” (para 4(3)). The appellant could ask for a personal hearing, but under para 12(3) the Chief Commissioner or the Director General in charge of the Regional Faceless Appeal Centre “may approve the request for personal hearing”.

The Delhi challenge and how it ended

The approval-based hearing was challenged in Lakshya Budhiraja v. Union of India & Anr., W.P.(C) 8044/2020 (Delhi High Court); notice issued on 16 October 2020 and the Scheme was not stayed. The Board sought transfer of the High Court petitions to the Supreme Court (Central Board of Direct Taxes v. Lakshya Budhiraja & Anr., Transfer Petition(s) (Civil) Nos. 1445 and 1446 of 2021). On 1 October 2021 the Additional Solicitor General asked for three months because the Department was “having a second look at the matter”. On 10 January 2022 he submitted that under the notification of 28 December 2021 a request for personal hearing “shall” be allowed by the Commissioner (Appeals), and the Court held that the transfer petitions “have become infructuous in view of the Notification issued by the Central Government”. On 24 February 2022 the Delhi High Court held that the grievance “stands addressed”, and the writ petition was “disposed of as satisfied”.

Neither Court ruled on the validity of the 2020 Scheme or of sub-sections (6B) to (6D). The Kerala High Court closed its batch the same way in Anitha Zachariah v. Union of India & Ors. (W.P.(C) No. 6074 of 2021, heard with W.P.(C) Nos. 1437, 6085, 6088 and 6116 of 2021, 28 May 2024): the grievance “does not survive”. The hearing clause of the 2021 Scheme was thus the Government’s answer to the challenge.

The Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021

The present Scheme is Notification No. 139/2021, S.O. 5429(E), dated 28 December 2021. It is made under sub-sections (6B) and (6C) together, “in supersession of the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2020”, and came into force on publication (para 1(2)).

In the Income-tax Act, 2025 the hearing provisions are section 359(1) and section 359(2), and the scheme-making power is section 532.

Who decides, and which appeals stay out

Under paragraph 4 of the 2021 Scheme the Board may set up “a National Faceless Appeal Centre to facilitate the conduct of e-appeal proceedings in a centralised manner” and appeal units, each with “one Commissioner (Appeals)” and supporting staff (para 4(3)). The Regional Faceless Appeal Centres are gone.

One identifiable Commissioner (Appeals) decides the appeal: the Centre assigns it “to a Commissioner (Appeals) of a specific appeal unit through an automated allocation system” (para 5(1)(i)), and the order is his, digitally signed (para 5(1)(x)). But the appellant never deals with him directly, because para 4(2) routes “all communication between the Commissioner (Appeals) and the appellant or any other person or the Assessing Officer” through the Centre. Under para 5(2) the appeal “may be transferred at any stage of the appellate proceedings, if considered necessary, by an order in accordance with section 120 of the Act, to such Commissioner (Appeals) as may be specified in the order”.

Appeals outside the Scheme. The Scheme does not list the appeals it covers. Paragraph 3 says that appeals shall be disposed of under it “in respect of such territorial area or persons or class of persons or incomes or class of incomes or cases or class of cases, as may be specified by the Board”. Paragraph 3 of the 2020 Scheme was in the same words, and the Department’s explanatory page says of that Scheme that appeals were to be finalised facelessly “with the exception of appeals relating to serious frauds, major tax evasion, sensitive and search matters, international taxation and black money”.

The Joint Commissioner (Appeals). Section 250(1), (3) to (6A) and (7) speak of “the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) or the Commissioner (Appeals)”. Sub-section (6B) authorises a scheme only for “disposal of appeal by Commissioner (Appeals)”, and the 2021 Scheme defines “appeal” as one “filed by a person under sub-section (1) of section 246A or section 248 of the Act” (para 2(1)(iii)). An appeal that lies to the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) under section 246 is therefore outside the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021. Those appeals have their own scheme-making power, section 246(5), and their own instrument, the e-Appeals Scheme, 2023 (Notification No. 33/2023, S.O. 2352(E), 29 May 2023). That Scheme is outside this Part.

The procedure in a faceless appeal

Paragraph 5 of the Scheme lays out the steps.

Step	Source and content
Filing	The Department’s guide to Form 35 (the form of first appeal): the appellant gives an e-mail address and “has to decide whether notices/communication may be sent on email or not”.
Delay in filing	The Commissioner (Appeals) may condone delay (para 5(1)(ii)(a)).
Notice for submissions	Notice through the Centre to file a submission by the date specified, “or such extended date and time as may be allowed on the basis of an application made in this behalf” (para 5(1)(ii)(b), (iii)).
Report and inquiry	Further information; a report of the Assessing Officer; further inquiry under section 250(4) (para 5(1)(ii)(c) to (e), (iv)).
Additional grounds	Filed through the Centre with “the reason for omission of such ground in the appeal filed by him”; comments of the Assessing Officer; admission, or refusal with reasons in the appeal order (para 5(1)(v), (vi)).
Additional evidence	Filed through the Centre, stating “how his case is covered by the exceptional circumstances specified in sub-rule (1) of rule 46A of the Rules”; report of the Assessing Officer; admission or rejection with written reasons (para 5(1)(vii), (viii)).
Enhancement	A show cause notice “containing the reasons for such enhancement or reduction”, served by the Centre (para 5(1)(ix)).
Order	Written, reasoned order under section 251 (para 5(1)(x)).
Communication; penalty	Order communicated through the Centre with any penalty notice (para 5(1)(xi)); para 6.

Additional grounds. The test in section 250(5) is that the omission was not “wilful or unreasonable”. The Scheme puts it as “not wilful or not unreasonable” (para 5(1)(vi)(d)(A)); the statute governs. A jurisdictional or limitation ground missing from Form 35 should therefore come in by application, not only in the written submission.

Additional evidence and the remand report. Rule 46A admits fresh evidence in appeal only in the exceptional circumstances its sub-rule (1) lists. Before admitted evidence is used, the Assessing Officer must get an opportunity “to examine such evidence or to cross-examine such witness” or to rebut it (para 5(1)(viii)(e)). The Scheme does not say in terms that his report goes to the appellant; the appellant’s claim to see and answer it rests on section 250(2), and the safe course is to ask for it in writing.

Enhancement. Section 251(2) forbids enhancement “unless the appellant has had a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement or reduction”. An enhancement that first appears in the appeal order has been made without the notice that section 251(2) and the Scheme both require, and is open to challenge before the Tribunal on that ground. In the 2025 Act the rule is kept by section 360(2).

Penalty and rectification. Under para 6 the Commissioner (Appeals) may, “for non-compliance of any notice, direction or order issued under this Scheme”, issue a show cause notice for penalty through the Centre. Paragraph 7 deals with rectification and para 14 applies section 154; Swapn Developers, in the Gujarat section below, shows the power misused.

The hearing: paragraph 12

“12. (1) A person shall not be required to appear either personally or through authorised representative in connection with any proceedings under this Scheme before the income-tax authority at the National Faceless Appeal Centre or appeal unit set up under this Scheme. (2) The appellant or his authorised representative, as the case may be, may request for personal hearing so as to make his oral submissions or present his case before the Commissioner (Appeals), through the National Faceless Appeal Centre, under this Scheme. (3) The concerned Commissioner (Appeals) shall allow the request for personal hearing and communicate the date and time of hearing to the appellant through the National Faceless Appeal Centre. (4) Such hearing shall be conducted through video conferencing or video telephony, including use of any telecommunication application software which supports video conferencing or video telephony, to the extent technologically feasible, in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Board.”

The hearing starts with a request, made through the Centre. Once it is made, the Commissioner (Appeals) “shall allow” it; nobody else’s approval is needed.

The words “to the extent technologically feasible” appear in sub-paragraph (4), and again in sub-paragraph (5) on recording of statements, but not in sub-paragraph (3). On the text they qualify the mode of hearing, not the duty to allow it. That differs from section 144B(6)(viii), where the duty and the qualifier sit in one clause (see Part 1).

Decisions for the appellant

The Department itself reads the clause as a right. Its explanatory page says that under the 2021 Scheme “a by-default right of personal hearing through video conferencing has been vested in the appellant”. The Kerala High Court said in Anitha Zachariah (para 2): “As per the amended Scheme, opportunity of personal hearing through video conferencing has been made mandatory.” That was said while closing a challenge, not while setting aside an order.

In Rajadhani Fashions v. Assessment Unit, National Faceless Assessment Centre & Ors. (Kerala High Court, W.P.(C) No. 26770 of 2024, 6 September 2024, 2024:KER:67850) the Revenue said that written submissions had been called for, filed and considered; but “it is not disputed that personal hearing does not appear to have been granted” (para 2). The single judge held that the order “is liable to be set aside on the ground that it was issued without affording an opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner” (para 4), quashed it and restored the appeal for fresh orders after hearing. The order does not cite paragraph 12 and does not record that a hearing had been asked for.

In Sri Thayappa Balakrishna v. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), NFAC & Ors. (Karnataka High Court, W.P. No. 9752 of 2026, 1 April 2026, NC: 2026:KHC:17861) a notice of 23 January 2025 gave four days for written submissions; the appellant asked for four weeks; and the appeal was decided, without any order on the request, on 10 February 2026. The single judge said (para 8): “Clearly, the Faceless Appeal Scheme would indicate that when the request is made for personal hearing, same to be considered and date fixed.” The order was set aside “only on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice” and the appeal sent back to the stage of written submissions. What decided the case was the unanswered request for time, not a request for personal hearing.

In Cooper Corporation Pvt. Ltd. v. The Union of India and Ors. (Bombay High Court, Writ Petition No. 14063 of 2026, interim order of 19 October 2026) an order of the same Court of 19 January 2022 had directed that, before the appeal was disposed of, “the Petitioner shall be granted a personal hearing” (para 4). The petitioner’s case is that the appellate order of 8 September 2026 was passed “without giving a personal hearing and without taking into consideration the written submissions” (para 6). The Division Bench found “some substance in the argument” and, the Revenue’s reply being awaited, granted ad-interim stay “strictly without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties” (para 9). The order does not refer to paragraph 12; the complaint as recorded rests on the Court’s earlier direction, and the order notes that the written submissions, called for by 21 August 2025, “were belatedly submitted” on 23 September 2025 (para 5).

Two Tribunal orders turn on a request that was made and not granted. Bank of India v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 2(1)(1), Mumbai (ITAT Mumbai, ‘B’ Bench, ITA Nos. 112 and 203/Mum/2022, assessment year 2010-11, 30 June 2022) decided cross-appeals against an appellate order of the Centre dated 24 November 2021. The proceeding sheet recorded the assessee’s submission of 17 August 2021 asking for “the opportunity of being heard through video conferencing mode” (para 3), and the assessee’s case, on which the Bench proceeded, was that the appeal had been decided on the record without that request being disposed of. The appellate order had been made under the 2020 Scheme, and the Departmental Representative submitted that under it the hearing “was not mandatory”, though he left the matter to the Bench (para 4). The Bench held that even under the 2020 Scheme the authority “does not have a choice about taking or not taking a call on this request” (para 7). It then read paragraph 12(2) to (4) of the 2021 Scheme, which it called rule 12, and said (para 9):

“There is no question of any discretion about allowing or not allowing the opportunity of a personal hearing, as upon a request being made by the assessee for a personal hearing, such an opportunity is required to be afforded to him.”

Treating the 2021 clause as a curative amendment with retrospective effect (para 9), the Bench remitted the matter to the first appellate authority for decision afresh, by a speaking order, after a personal hearing under paragraph 12 of the 2021 Scheme (para 10).

The Pune Bench followed it in Atpadi Education Society’s Employee Sahakari Path Mandal Limited v. ITO, Ward 5, Sangli (ITAT Pune, ‘A’ Bench, ITA No. 918/PUN/2024, assessment year 2017-18, 15 October 2024), an appeal against an order of the Centre dated 4 March 2024 arising from an assessment under section 144. The Bench found from the appellate order itself that the assessee “had requested for personal hearing” and that “no personal hearing was granted” (para 4), and said (para 4.2): “Thus faceless Appeal Scheme 2021 has made it mandatory to provide Virtual Hearing if asked by the Assessee.” It set the order aside “for de-novo adjudication after granting opportunity of virtual hearing as asked by the assessee” and directed the Commissioner (Appeals) also to consider the documents the assessee had filed. The assessee did not appear before the Tribunal, and the appeal was heard in its absence (para 3).

Decisions against the appellant

None of the decisions above holds the hearing under paragraph 12 of the 2021 Scheme discretionary, and Bank of India holds in terms that it is not. The Revenue’s answers are of another kind.

The first is that no request was made: paragraph 12(2) makes the request the trigger, and the Karnataka formulation is itself conditional (“when the request is made”). The second is want of prejudice, the Revenue’s submission in Thayappa Balakrishna (para 5): “unless prejudice is demonstrated, the Court ought not to interfere”. It failed on the facts but was not rejected as a proposition.

The third is the alternative remedy, where the grievance is recovery. In Uber9 Business Process Services Private Limited v. The Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors. (Madras High Court, W.P. No. 44312 of 2026, order dated 29 October 2026) the petitioner, whose appeal to the Tribunal was pending, challenged a notice of 14 October 2026 and asked that the demand not be enforced meanwhile; the want of notice and hearing in the faceless appeal was counsel’s narration (para 2). The single judge declined to entertain the petition because a stay application lay to the Tribunal under section 254(2A) (para 5), deferring the notice for two weeks so that one could be filed (para 6). The appellate order itself was not under challenge.

The fourth is silence. In Pragnesh Amrutlal Gajjar v. ITO, Ward 5(3)(2), Ahmedabad (ITAT Ahmedabad, single member, ITA No. 2207/Ahd/2025, 10 April 2026) ground 4 complained that the challenge to the section 148 notice had been rejected “without granting to appellant the opportunity of being heard through the Video Conferencing Mode”; the written submission had asked for a hearing only if the contentions “did not find favour”. The Tribunal upheld the appellate order (para 7) without dealing with the ground. The request there was conditional, unlike the request in Bank of India, a decision the order does not mention.

The fifth goes to the weight of the two Tribunal orders. Neither records a submission for the Revenue on paragraph 12 of the 2021 Scheme: in Bank of India the appellate order had been made under the 2020 Scheme and the Departmental Representative left the matter to the Bench, and Atpadi Education Society follows Bank of India in an appeal heard in the assessee’s absence.

Open question 8: no request on record; and what “technologically feasible” excuses

The question. Is a faceless appellate order bad for want of hearing when no request is on record? Where one was made, what can “to the extent technologically feasible” excuse?

For the appellant. Section 250(1) and (2) are mandatory in form, and paragraph 14 applies Chapter XX of the Act to faceless appeals save “as otherwise provided in this Scheme”. On this argument paragraph 12 changes the medium of the hearing and removes any obligation to attend; it does not turn a statutory right into something to be applied for. Rajadhani Fashions supports the result, since no request is recorded there.

For the Revenue. Paragraph 12(1) and (2) are the “otherwise provided”. The default mode is written: the notice under para 5(1)(ii)(b) invites a submission, and an appellant who files one has been heard as the Scheme provides. A video hearing must be asked for. Rajadhani Fashions does not construe the Scheme, and Thayappa Balakrishna speaks only of the position “when the request is made”. Bank of India and Atpadi Education Society were both cases of a request on record.

Our view. On the text the request is the trigger. An appellant who made none is on weak ground unless the notice for submissions was not served or gave unreasonably short time. Once a request is on record, sub-paragraph (3) leaves no discretion, as the Mumbai Bench held in Bank of India and the Pune Bench in Atpadi Education Society, and “technologically feasible” can excuse only a failed video link on a given day, which calls for another date and not for an order without hearing.

The ex parte order: the Commissioner (Appeals) must still decide the appeal

A faceless appeal is often decided ex parte, that is, without the appellant, and dismissed because nobody answered the notices on the portal. Section 250(6) says what an appellate order must contain:

“(6) The order of the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) or the Commissioner (Appeals) disposing of the appeal shall be in writing and shall state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reason for the decision.”

Paragraph 5(1)(x) of the Scheme repeats it. Section 251(1)(a) lists what the Commissioner (Appeals) may do with an assessment: “confirm, reduce, enhance or annul”. The Explanation to section 251 lets him “consider and decide any matter arising out of the proceedings in which the order appealed against was passed” even if the appellant did not raise it. None of this mentions dismissal for default. The 2025 Act carries all three provisions, in section 359(4), section 360(1)(a) and section 360(3).

The High Courts

Two High Courts have held that a first appeal cannot be dismissed for default.

In Sri Ashok Kumar Shaw v. Principal Chief Commissioner, Income Tax, Bhubaneswar and others (Orissa High Court, W.P.(C) No. 15223 of 2016, 31 March 2022) the appeal had been dismissed “for non-prosecution on account of non-appearance of the Petitioner” (para 1). The Division Bench held (para 6) that the Commissioner (Appeals) “could not have by the impugned order proceeded to dismiss the appeal in default” and “was thus obliged to have heard the appeal on merit”. The appeal was restored (para 7).

In Vedansh Traders Private Limited v. Income Tax Officer, Ward-13/1, Kolkata (Calcutta High Court, ITAT/233/2024, 7 February 2025) the Division Bench set out section 251 with its Explanation and said: “Thus, on a plain reading of the above provision indicates that the Commissioner (Appeals) should decide the appeal petition on merits.” The Revenue relied on section 251(1)(c), under which the Commissioner (Appeals) may in any other case “pass such orders in the appeal as he thinks fit”. The Bench answered: “Clause (c), in our opinion, should be read in conjunction with clause (a) and (b).”

Vedansh Traders also shows the limits. The assessee had ignored several notices and reached the Tribunal 1288 days late. The Court recorded that the assessee “was not diligent” and restored the first appeal “subject to the condition that the appellant should not seek for any adjournment”. Both cases concerned jurisdictional Commissioners (Appeals); the Calcutta reasoning is on section 251, which applies equally to an appeal unit.

The Ahmedabad Bench

The Ahmedabad Bench’s orders of 2025 do not, as a rule, declare such a dismissal illegal. They restore the matter as an indulgence, usually on costs.

Section 250(6) is invoked in terms in two orders. In Gaurav Vinodbhai Mitra v. ITO, Ward 1(2)(1), Ahmedabad (ITA No. 1802/Ahd/2025, 19 November 2025) the notices, “duly delivered at the registered e-mail address”, went unanswered; the assessee pleaded hospitalisation. The Bench said (para 5.5): “Section 250(6) of the Act mandates that the first appellate authority must dispose of the appeal by means of a reasoned and speaking order on merits.” It restored the appeal on payment of Rs 10,000 (para 5.6). In Ashvinkumar Naranbhai Patel v. ITO, TDS Ward-1, Ahmedabad (ITA No. 722/Ahd/2025, 28 July 2025) the Bench held (para 9.1) that the Commissioner (Appeals) “failed to discharge the statutory obligation cast under section 250(6) of the Act”; the point being one of law on admitted facts, the Tribunal decided it and deleted the demand.

More often the footing is one more opportunity. In Govindji Budhaji Thakor v. ITO, Ward-3(3)(2), Ahmedabad (ITA No. 87/Ahd/2025, 12 March 2025) the Commissioner (Appeals) had relied on decisions that an appeal not prosecuted is no appeal. The Bench did not say that was wrong; it held that “one more opportunity should be granted” (para 10.1), restored the matter to the Assessing Officer and imposed a cost of Rs 5,000 (para 10.2). Gomtidas Govindram Sadhu v. ITO, Ward 2, Gandhinagar (ITA No. 344/Ahd/2025, 9 April 2025) and Mukeshbhai Hirabhai Prajapati v. ITO, Ward-1, Nadiad (ITA No. 373/Ahd/2025, 6 May 2025) went the same way, each with a cost of Rs 5,000. In Menaba Charitable Trust v. ITO, Ward-1 (Exemptions), Ahmedabad (ITA No. 1361/Ahd/2025, 6 November 2025), where the trust’s accountant had died and the Commissioner (Appeals) had dismissed the appeal “both for non-prosecution and on merits” (para 4), the appeal was remitted “for de-novo consideration” without costs (para 8).

The other side is Mikal Bhupendrabhai Patel v. ITO, Ward 1(3)(1), Petlad (ITA Nos. 473 and 474/Ahd/2025, 17 October 2025). The Commissioner (Appeals) had dismissed for non-prosecution and, without prejudice, had also upheld the addition on merits (para 4). The second appeal was 304 days late without a condonation application. The Bench found “consistent and deliberate non-compliance” before all three authorities and dismissed the appeal “in limine” (para 5).

What relief to expect

Restoration, not quashing, usually on costs of Rs 5,000 to Rs 10,000, and only on an explanation for the default. Where the assessment was itself ex parte under section 144, the matter usually goes to the Assessing Officer.
A finding on merits added to a dismissal for non-prosecution does not by itself bar restoration (Menaba Charitable Trust); in Mikal Bhupendrabhai Patel the decisive facts were the unexplained delay of 304 days and the default before the Tribunal.
A purely legal ground on recorded facts can be decided by the Tribunal (Ashvinkumar Naranbhai Patel).

Notices on the portal and by e-mail

Every communication between the Centre and the appellant is electronic (para 9 of the Scheme), and para 14 applies sections 282 and 282A. Under para 11(1) a notice or order is delivered to the appellant by “placing an authenticated copy thereof in the appellant’s registered account”, or by sending it to “the registered email address of the appellant or his authorised representative”, or through the Mobile App; the three are alternatives. “Registered e-mail address” is defined in para 2(1)(xx) to include, among others, the address in the e-filing account, the address in the last return and “any e-mail address made available by the addressee to the income-tax authority or any person authorised by such authority”. Rule 127(2)(b) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 has a list in like terms.

Each side has an argument on that text. The Revenue can say that placing the order in the registered account is delivery by itself. The appellant can say that an address given in Form 35 is one “made available” to the authority and must be used. The Department’s guide to Form 35, speaking of the order appealed against, says that “all orders are electronically uploaded to the registered e-filing account of the assessee, so the date of order and the date of service of the order are the same”. If the same view is taken of the appellate order, it is communicated on the day it is uploaded.

That matters for the further appeal because of the way section 253(3) counts time. The appeal to the Tribunal “shall be filed within two months from the end of the month in which the order sought to be appealed against is communicated to the assessee”. The words “two months from the end of the month in” were substituted for “sixty days of the date on” by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024 (Act No. 15 of 2024) with effect from 1 October 2024. So the event is communication of the order, and the period is counted from the end of the month in which that happens, not from the day itself; if upload is communication, it fixes the month. Under section 253(5) the Tribunal may admit an appeal after that period on sufficient cause. In the 2025 Act the same rules are in section 362(3) and section 362(5).

The address in Form 35

The clearest decision is Mr. Suresh Kumar Paruchuri v. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), NFAC & Ors. (Karnataka High Court, Dharwad Bench, W.P. No. 103507 of 2025, 12 June 2025, NC: 2025:KHC-D:7578). Form 35, filed on 29 March 2024, gave a specific e-mail address for the appeal. The appeal communications of 1 and 9 August 2024 still went to the earlier address, which the petitioner’s counsel said was that of his former auditor (para 6), and the order under section 250 was passed on 17 March 2025. The Revenue said the notices went to the address “furnished by the petitioner at the first instance” (para 7). The single judge held (para 8):

“Once the email address is changed and it is within the knowledge of the department, the department ought to have issued notice or communication to the petitioner to the present email address to facilitate him to contest the case and provide fair opportunity of hearing and decide the matter in accordance with law.”

The appellate order was quashed and the authority directed to reconsider the appeal and to “rectify the email address of the petitioner for communication”. The assessment order was left standing. The order discusses neither section 282 nor the alternative remedy.

The Ahmedabad Bench has accepted the same fact as part of a sufficient cause. In Yakin Jayantilal Shah v. ITO, Ward-2(1)(1), Ahmedabad (ITA Nos. 1292 to 1296/Ahd/2025, 15 October 2025) the assessment notices had gone to the e-mail address of the assessee’s former chartered accountant, who had died (para 4.7), and the appellate orders to a former consultant’s address, though the assessee’s own address was “mentioned in Form No. 35” (para 2.2). The affidavit also pleaded ignorance of the proceedings and absence from town (paras 2.2, 2.3). The Tribunal condoned a delay of 35 to 36 days in the second appeals, the Revenue not seriously objecting, as “minimal and adequately explained” (para 3.1).

Where notices were issued and simply went unanswered, the Ahmedabad Bench has treated the question as one of sufficient cause, not of jurisdiction: Gaurav Vinodbhai Mitra, Menaba Charitable Trust and Mikal Bhupendrabhai Patel all turn on the explanation.

The tick box

The Revenue’s authority is Vineet Singh Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. v. JCIT, Range-1, Bilaspur (ITAT Raipur, ITA No. 239/RPR/2024, 28 June 2024). The second appeal was 371 days late: the appellate order was uploaded on 20 March 2023 and an employee was said to have noticed it only on 2 May 2024. The Bench noted (para 6) that in Form 35 the appellant had opted “Yes” against the field “Whether notices / communications may be sent on Email ID?”, called the plea “incomprehensible”, and dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation (paras 6, 9).

What is not decided

The converse of Vineet Singh Construction: an appellant who ticked “No” for e-mail and was then served only by e-mail.
How paragraph 11, section 282, rule 127 and the Form 35 option fit together; Suresh Kumar Paruchuri rests on fairness and the Department’s knowledge of the new address.
Whether an order placed in the e-filing account but not e-mailed to the Form 35 address is communicated for the purpose of section 253(3); the Ahmedabad orders condoned delay on facts.

Our view is that upload to the registered account is communication of the appellate order for section 253(3), because paragraph 11(1) makes it a complete mode of delivery, so that the two months are counted from the end of the month in which the order is uploaded; and that a notice of hearing e-mailed only to an address the appellant has replaced in Form 35 is not a fair opportunity. Where the notice was also placed in the registered account, paragraph 11(1)(a) is against the appellant, and Suresh Kumar Paruchuri does not say whether the notices there were in the account as well; the argument then rests on fairness alone. The appellant should check the account and not wait for an e-mail.

The proviso to section 251(1)(a): set aside or decide

Since 1 October 2024 the Commissioner (Appeals) can do one thing he could not do before: send a best judgment assessment back to the Assessing Officer to be made again. As the Ahmedabad Bench recounts in Sanjay Jayantilal Shah v. ITO, Ward-2(1)(1), Ahmedabad (ITA No. 79/Ahd/2025, 7 October 2025, para 5.1), the express power to set aside “was specifically withdrawn w.e.f. 01.06.2001”. A limited power has been put back. The proviso to section 251(1)(a) reads:

“Provided that where such appeal is against an order of assessment made under section 144, he may set aside the assessment and refer the case back to the Assessing Officer for making a fresh assessment;”

It was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024 (Act No. 15 of 2024) with effect from 1 October 2024. The proviso sits in sub-section (1), on the powers of the Commissioner (Appeals). Sub-section (1A), on the powers of the Joint Commissioner (Appeals), has none.

Discretionary; and the legal ground first

ITO, Ward-3(1)(1), Ahmedabad v. The Wardrobe Theorem (ITAT Ahmedabad, ITA No. 937/Ahd/2025 with C.O. No. 45/Ahd/2025, 8 July 2025) is the leading Ahmedabad order. The reassessment under section 147 read with section 144 was dated 23 May 2023. The Commissioner (Appeals) set it aside under the proviso. Both sides challenged the order, the Revenue by appeal and the assessee by cross objection: the Revenue because the assessee had in fact replied before the Assessing Officer, the assessee because the challenge to the reopening and the merits were left undecided. The Bench held (para 9):

“The use of word “may” in this proviso makes this provision discretionary in nature. Therefore, it was obligatory on the part of the Ld. CIT(A) to first decide whether the matter was required to be set- aside at all to the Assessing Officer.”

And on the legal ground, in the same paragraph: “since the assessee had raised a legal ground in respect of reopening of the case, this matter was required to be first decided only by the Ld. CIT(A). This issue couldn’t have been set aside to the AO.” The matter went back to the Commissioner (Appeals) “with a direction to first decide the legal ground raised by the assessee and, thereafter, adjudicate the addition” (para 10).

The Hyderabad Bench gave fuller reasons in Mamatha Gubbala v. ITO, Ward-15(1), Hyderabad (ITA No. 1170/Hyd/2025, 30 January 2026). If an assessment framed without jurisdiction is simply sent back, “impliedly the lack of jurisdiction by the A.O will be given a go by and the challenge of the assessee appellant to the validity of the assumption of jurisdiction would stand frustrated” (para 14). The proviso “does not compulsorily require the CIT(A) to set aside and refer the assessment in every case where it is made u/s 144 of the Act” (para 15). The Mumbai Bench took the same course in Vishal Bharat Shah v. ITO, Ward 41(3)(4), Mumbai (ITAT Mumbai, ‘F’ Bench, 15 September 2026, para 6.2).

Orders upholding a set-aside

The Ahmedabad Bench has also gone the other way. In Yakin Jayantilal Shah the Commissioner (Appeals) set aside five ex parte reassessments without deciding the assessee’s jurisdictional ground, which was that section 153C and not section 148 applied. On the assessee’s appeals the Tribunal did not send the ground back; it decided the ground itself, against the assessee, held that “the CIT(A) has rightly restored the matter to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication on merits” (para 7.21) and dismissed all five appeals (para 8). In Pragnesh Amrutlal Gajjar the Commissioner (Appeals) had rejected the challenge to the section 148 notice because it had not been raised before the Assessing Officer, and had then set the assessment aside. The single member upheld both steps (para 7).

In neither order was an undecided jurisdictional ground left to the Assessing Officer. But The Wardrobe Theorem says the ground must be decided “only by the Ld. CIT(A)”, and in Yakin Jayantilal Shah a differently constituted Bench, with the same Judicial Member, decided it in his place. An assessee who appeals a set-aside order to press a jurisdictional point runs the risk that the Tribunal decides it there, against him.

Only an order “made under section 144”

Here the orders are consistent, and the Revenue has used the rule as well as the assessee. In Sanjay Jayantilal Shah the faceless reassessment of 31 March 2022 was under section 147 read with section 144B, and the Commissioner (Appeals) set it aside as a best judgment order. The Bench identified “two pre-conditions”, the first that there “must be an appeal against an order of assessment made under section 144 of the Act” (para 5.4), held the set-aside “clearly unsustainable in law” (para 5.6), and restored the appeal for decision on merits within six months (para 5.9).

In ITO, Ward-1, Vizianagaram v. Al Safa Foods (ITAT Visakhapatnam, ITA No. 829/Viz/2025 with C.O. No. 06/Viz/2026, 3 July 2026) the assessee argued that an order under section 147 read with section 144B was in substance a best judgment assessment. The Bench refused (para 12): “as the assessment is explicitly stated to be framed under section 147 r.w.s. 144B of the Act, there can be no justification for considering it as an assessment framed under section 144 of the Act.” ITO, Pune v. Raman Kumar (ITAT Pune, ITA No. 288/PUN/2026, 25 May 2026, paras 4, 5) is to the same effect for an order under section 143(3) read with section 144B.

So the section recited in the assessment order decides whether the proviso is available. A faceless order that recites section 144 qualifies; one under section 143(3) or section 147 read with section 144B alone does not.

A set-aside is not costless: it gives the Assessing Officer a second assessment. In P Srinivasa Babu v. Union of India (Andhra Pradesh High Court, W.P. No. 8502 of 2026) the petitioner’s case is that the proviso was wrongly invoked against an order made under section 143(3) read with section 147, and that the fresh assessment went “over and above the remand Order, virtually amounting to reassessment”; the order of 16 June 2026 only gives time for a counter-affidavit and extends an interim direction.

Earlier assessments

In Sanjay Jayantilal Shah the Bench gave a second ground (para 5.7): the assessment order was dated 31 March 2022, the proviso was inserted with effect from 1 October 2024, and “applying such provision retrospectively to assessments of earlier years would not be legally permissible unless the statute so provides expressly”. The paragraph ends by resting the result “on both counts”, the first that the assessment was not made under section 144 and the second “that the proviso cannot apply retrospectively”. The paragraph opens with the words “We may also observe” and continues “Even otherwise”, but because it closes on both counts it is a stated ground of the order and not an aside. The point had been put by the assessee’s representative (para 3.4). The Departmental Representative conceded that the order was not one under section 144 and asked only that the matter be restored to the Commissioner (Appeals) for decision on merits (paras 4 and 4.1), so the Bench decided the point without an answer from the Revenue. On the other side, in The Wardrobe Theorem (reassessment of 23 May 2023) and Mamatha Gubbala (reassessment of 19 March 2024) it was the Commissioner (Appeals) who had invoked the proviso against an assessment made before 1 October 2024. In each the Tribunal reversed the set-aside on other grounds, the discretion in the word “may” and the legal ground left undecided, and treated the proviso as available, no objection founded on the date of the assessment being recorded. None of these orders tests the question by the date of filing or decision of the appeal. The appellate order reproduced in Mamatha Gubbala (para 5) quotes the Memorandum explaining the amendment as saying that it “will be applicable to appellate orders passed by the Commissioner (Appeals)” on or after 1 October 2024. The Tribunal did not comment on that passage.

Our view differs from that second ground of the Ahmedabad Bench. We read the proviso as a power of the appellate authority, available in any appeal decided on or after 1 October 2024 whatever the date of the assessment, because it adds to what the Commissioner (Appeals) may do in disposing of an appeal and does not change the assessment under appeal. But para 5.7, though reached without argument from the Revenue, stands as one of the two stated grounds of that order until a later Bench considers it, and before the Ahmedabad Bench a party who asks for, or defends, the set-aside of an assessment made before 1 October 2024 has to meet it.

The 2025 Act: section 360(1)(b)

Section 360(1)(b) of the 2025 Act re-enacts the proviso as a clause: where the appeal is against an order of assessment “made under section 271” (the best judgment provision), “the Commissioner (Appeals) may set aside the assessment and refer the case back to the Assessing Officer for making a fresh assessment”. The verb is still “may”. Section 360(1) opens by giving the listed powers to “the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Joint Commissioner (Appeals)”, yet clause (b) names only “the Commissioner (Appeals)”, as in the 1961 Act.

Open question 9: set-aside without deciding a jurisdictional or limitation ground

The question. Where the appellant has raised a ground that the assessment is without jurisdiction or out of time, can the Commissioner (Appeals) set a best judgment assessment aside without deciding it?

For the appellant. A set-aside presupposes an assessment that can lawfully be made again. If the notice was bad or the order out of time there is nothing to send back. Section 250(6) requires a decision on “the points for determination”, and a jurisdictional ground is one. The proviso says “may” and leaves the power to annul untouched. The Wardrobe Theorem, Mamatha Gubbala and Vishal Bharat Shah so hold.

For the Revenue. The proviso contains no such condition; it is engaged by the kind of order under appeal. An assessee who stayed away from the assessment can raise his evidence and his legal objections before the Assessing Officer in the fresh round. In Yakin Jayantilal Shah the Tribunal did not send the ground back to the Commissioner (Appeals), as The Wardrobe Theorem had; it decided the ground and upheld the set-aside. Pragnesh Amrutlal Gajjar upheld a set-aside made after the ground was rejected for not having been taken before the Assessing Officer.

Our view. The ground must be decided first. A direction to make “a fresh assessment” assumes the power to assess, and the Assessing Officer cannot rule on his own notice in the remand. The appellant should take the ground separately, ask for a decision on it before any set-aside, and weigh Yakin Jayantilal Shah before carrying a set-aside order to the Tribunal.

Delay, stay and refunds while the appeal waits

Section 250(6A)

Under sub-section (6A) the appellate authority, “where it is possible, may hear and decide such appeal within a period of one year from the end of the financial year in which such appeal is filed”. The words make it a target, and the Act attaches no consequence to missing it. The courts have used it to ground a direction to decide, not to invalidate a late order. The 2025 Act repeats it in section 359(5).

High Courts that have fixed a time

In Shasha Fashion Trendz Private Limited v. Union of India & Ors. (Delhi High Court, W.P.(C) 14658/2022) the order of 2 November 2022 said: “Prima facie it seems to this Court that appeals filed by the assessees are not being heard and disposed of expeditiously.” On 18 November 2022 the Principal Commissioner of the National Faceless Appeal Centre, directed to appear, stated that “the appeals henceforth shall be taken up for hearing in accordance with principle of seniority”. The petitioner’s appeal had by then been decided and the petition was disposed of as infructuous. No mandamus issued.

The Bombay High Court has gone furthest. In Vodafone Idea Limited v. National Faceless Appeal Centre, NFAC, Delhi & Anr. (Writ Petition (L) No. 19190 of 2024, 6 August 2024, 2024:BHC-OS:11816-DB) appeals filed in January 2020 and September 2021 had been heard but not decided, and an order of 2 May 2023 (reproduced in para 3), which referred to section 250(6A) and directed a decision preferably within six months, had not been complied with. The Division Bench directed the Commissioner (Appeals) “to decide both the appeals in accordance with law within a period of four months from today and after an opportunity of hearing is granted to the petitioner” (para 5).

In Katmandu Apparel Private Limited v. National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi & Ors. (Bombay High Court, Writ Petition No. 2113 of 2026, 16 September 2026, 2026:BHC-OS:20377-DB) an appeal against an assessment order of 27 December 2018 had been “pending for almost 7 years”; the Court directed disposal “as expeditiously as possible and in any event within the period of 16 weeks from today” (para 6(a)).

Two orders of November 2026 give lesser relief. In Babuddin v. Union of India and 2 Others (Allahabad High Court, Writ Tax No. 4284 of 2026, 5 November 2026) the Revenue did not object; the petitioner was given liberty to make a representation, and the Commissioner (Appeals) was directed to decide within three months from presentation of a certified copy of the order, subject to the petitioner’s co-operation (para 6). In Energy Management Centre v. Union of India (Kerala High Court, W.P.(C) No. 37738 of 2026, 3 November 2026) no period was fixed: an appeal against an intimation under section 143(1) was to be decided “as expeditiously as possible”, with no coercive proceedings meanwhile.

Each of these orders has a feature of its own: statements recorded and no mandamus (Shasha Fashion Trendz), an earlier direction disobeyed (Vodafone Idea), facts not disputed (Katmandu Apparel), no objection from the Revenue (Babuddin). None of them decides, against opposition, that section 250(6A) entitles an appellant to a decision by a date.

The Gujarat order that refused

In Sunil Dahyalal Modi v. National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC) (Gujarat High Court, R/Special Civil Application No. 5230 of 2022, J.B. Pardiwala and Nisha M. Thakore JJ, oral order of 28 March 2022) the prayers were for refund with interest of Rs 7,74,902 “being amount recovered pending appeal of the petitioner which is in excess of 20%”, a direction “to expedite the appeal”, and stay of a demand notice of 19 December 2018. The reasoning is in paragraphs 2 and 3:

“2. This writ application is thoroughly misconceived. Instead of coming to this Court, the writ applicant should pursue his appeal before the CIT(A). 3. With the aforesaid, this writ application stands disposed of.”

Stay of demand, the twenty per cent figure and adjustment of refunds

Filing an appeal does not stay the demand. Under section 220(6) (section 411(12) of the 2025 Act), where a first appeal has been presented the Assessing Officer “may, in his discretion and subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose in the circumstances of the case, treat the assessee as not being in default in respect of the amount in dispute in the appeal”. The application goes to him.

The figure of twenty per cent comes from the Board, not from the Act. The instruments are set out in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Kalaburagi & Ors. v. Bidar Nirmiti Kendra & Anr. (Karnataka High Court, Writ Appeal No. 200650/2018, 27 May 2019). Paragraph 2 of the office memorandum of 31 July 2017, reproduced in para 37, recites that O.M. No. 404/72/93-ITCC of 29 February 2016 had laid down that where the demand is disputed in first appeal “the Assessing Officer shall grant stay of demand till disposal of first appeal on payment of 15% of the disputed demand”, unless the case fell within a stated category; the 2017 memorandum revised the rate to 20% (para 31). Rejecting reliance on the memoranda at the stage of a second appeal before the Tribunal (para 38), the Division Bench held (para 39) that the assessee “cannot contend as a matter of right, that under all circumstances, Department cannot recover more than 20% of the tax demand”: the memoranda refer only to the Assessing Officer’s power under section 220(6) while the first appeal is pending.

The strongest order for the assessee is Katmandu Apparel. The assessee held a stay order of 23 April 2019 conditional on payment of twenty per cent of the demand and had paid it; refunds of later years, Rs 39,41,720 in all, were nevertheless adjusted under section 245, that is, set off against the demand. The Revenue did not dispute the facts (para 5). The Court directed refund of the amounts adjusted, with interest, within four weeks of the order being brought to the attention of the respondent concerned, and that “no further amounts [other than the 20% already deposited by the Petitioner] shall be adjusted against the demand” (para 6(c) to (e)). The order rests on an existing stay order; it does not decide that refunds cannot be adjusted where no stay has been granted.

Against it stand Sunil Dahyalal Modi, which refused a prayer for refund of recovery in excess of twenty per cent, and, once the first appeal is decided, Uber9 Business Process Services: stay is then to be sought from the Tribunal under section 254(2A), and the High Court gave only two weeks’ deferment for that purpose.

Open question 10: a writ to compel disposal, in Gujarat particularly

The question. Will a writ lie to compel the National Faceless Appeal Centre to decide a pending appeal, and will the Gujarat High Court entertain it?

For the petitioner. Inaction is not an order; no appeal lies against it, so there is no alternative remedy to exhaust. Section 250(6A) states the period Parliament thought proper. Bombay and Allahabad have fixed time limits, Kerala has directed expeditious disposal, and Delhi called the Centre to account. Sunil Dahyalal Modi is a short order on a petition that joined expedition with refund and stay; it states no principle that such a writ never lies.

For the Revenue. Section 250(6A) says “where it is possible” and “may”; it gives no right to a decision by a date. A court-fixed date moves one appellant ahead of others, contrary to the assurance of seniority given to the Delhi High Court. None of the orders fixing a time was a contested ruling on the sub-section. And in Gujarat a Division Bench has called this very petition “thoroughly misconceived”.

Our view. The writ lies in principle, because there is no other remedy against inaction. In Gujarat it needs a record that distinguishes Sunil Dahyalal Modi: long pendency after submissions are complete, written requests for disposal left unanswered, and concrete prejudice such as refund adjustment contrary to a stay order. The prayer should be confined to a time limit for disposal after hearing.

Writ or appeal against the appellate order

The statutory remedy against a faceless appellate order is the appeal to the Tribunal under section 253, and the Tribunal can stay the demand under section 254(2A). Writ petitions have nevertheless been entertained: on natural justice grounds by single judges in Karnataka (Thayappa Balakrishna; Suresh Kumar Paruchuri) and Kerala (Rajadhani Fashions), by the Gujarat High Court on the wrongly uploaded order in Swapn Developers, and at the interim stage in Bombay (Cooper Corporation). None of the four final orders discusses the alternative remedy, so none is authority that the objection fails. Where it was taken, in Uber9 Business Process Services, it succeeded, though on recovery; and Sunil Dahyalal Modi sent the petitioner back to his pending appeal. The safe course is to file the appeal to the Tribunal within time, with a stay application, whatever else is done.

Where the further appeal lies

The Centre is at Delhi and the Commissioner (Appeals) who signs the order may be anywhere. Neither fact decides where the next appeal goes. Paragraph 8(1) of the Scheme settles the Tribunal Bench: the appeal lies before the Tribunal “having jurisdiction over the jurisdictional Assessing Officer of the appellant assessee”. For the High Court the rule is in Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax-I, Chandigarh v. M/s. ABC Papers Limited (Supreme Court, Civil Appeal No. 4252 of 2022 and connected appeals, 18 August 2022), para 33:

“In conclusion, we hold that appeals against every decision of the ITAT shall lie only before the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Assessing Officer who passed the assessment order is situated.”

The judgment says nothing about the faceless schemes. Its test is the officer “who passed the assessment order”, which in a faceless assessment is, on the face of the order, the National Faceless Assessment Centre.

Applied to faceless orders

The Delhi High Court resolved that difficulty in favour of the jurisdictional officer’s seat. In Ramesh Kumar Bagri v. Income Tax Officer, Ward 2(1), Faridabad (ITA 280/2026 to ITA 284/2026, 2 April 2026) the assessee argued that “the assessment order was passed by the National Faceless Assessment Centre, which is situated in Delhi” (para 2). The Division Bench held, “in light of the judgment of the Supreme Court” in ABC Papers, that the forum follows the seat of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer (para 4), and disposed of the appeals “as not maintainable before the Delhi High Court”, with liberty to approach the Punjab and Haryana High Court (paras 5, 8).

For Gujarat the order to know is DCIT, Circle-4(1)(1), Ahmedabad v. Surendranagar District Co-op Milk Producers Union Limited (ITAT Ahmedabad, ITA Nos. 1552 and 1553/Ahd/2026, 13 August 2026). The Revenue had appealed to the Ahmedabad Bench against two faceless appellate orders; the assessments had been made at Surendranagar. Both sides agreed that, on ABC Papers, “the jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the present appeals lies with the Rajkot Bench of the Tribunal” (para 2), and the appeals were dismissed with liberty to file there with applications for condonation of delay (para 3). It is an order on agreement. The Delhi Bench reached the same result on a point it took itself in ITO, Ward-23(3), New Delhi v. Shreevar Overseas Limited (ITA No. 3793/Del/2024 with C.O. No. 127/Del/2025, 27 November 2025, para 2.1), where the assessment had been made at Kolkata.

For a Gujarat assessee, then, the appeal under section 253 from a faceless appellate order goes to the Ahmedabad, Rajkot or Surat Bench according to the station of the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, and the appeal under section 260A goes to the Gujarat High Court. For an order relating to a tax year beginning before 1 April 2026 those sections apply whenever the further appeal is filed (section 536(2)(c) of the 2025 Act; see which Act governs your appeal). The 2025 Act counterparts, for tax year 2026-27 onwards, are section 362 and section 365.

The same reasoning bears on whose law the appeal unit applies. In ABC Papers the Supreme Court said that “a decision of a High Court is binding on subordinate courts as well as tribunals operating within its territorial jurisdiction”, and that for this reason “the Assessing Officer, Commissioner of Appeals and the ITAT operate under the concerned High Court as one unit” (para 29). Against applying that to an appeal unit it can be said that the Court was not dealing with a faceless appeal, and that a unit sitting in another State does not, on the words quoted, operate “within” the territorial jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court. Our view is that the “one unit” follows the Assessing Officer, as the forum of appeal does: paragraph 8(1) sends the further appeal to the Tribunal having jurisdiction over the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, and the appeal from that Tribunal lies to his High Court. On that reading a faceless Commissioner (Appeals), wherever he sits, is bound in a Gujarat assessee’s appeal by the decisions of the Gujarat High Court.

The writ forum

ABC Papers concerns statutory appeals. Whether a writ against a faceless order can be filed in Delhi because the Centre is there was referred to a larger Bench of the Delhi High Court and was not answered. In GPL-RKTCPL JV v. National Faceless Assessment Centre Delhi (W.P.(C) 5546/2021 and connected petitions, 17 November 2022, 2022/DHC/005408), a faceless assessment matter, the Division Bench said that the Court “can refuse to entertain the writ petitions where the jurisdictional assessing officer i.e. JAO is based outside the NCT of Delhi”, but referred the matter “to a larger bench for a conclusive view” (para 14). The Bench was doubting an earlier coordinate Bench which “had decided to exercise its jurisdiction in a similar matter where the jurisdictional assessing officer was located outside the NCT of Delhi” (para 16), and it added that nothing in its order “would be read as adjudicating or deciding the said questions” (para 17). On 22 September 2026 a Bench of three Judges closed the reference without deciding it: GPL-RKTCPL JV was “dismissed as withdrawn” with liberty to file before the Chhattisgarh High Court, a second petition was withdrawn with liberty to approach the jurisdictional High Court, and the third was disposed of “because the question referred has become academic”.

Neither of the Gujarat High Court orders discussed in this Part deals with the point; in both, the writ against the Centre was filed in the Gujarat High Court. For filing in Delhi it can be said that the Centre is there and that a coordinate Bench of the Delhi High Court entertained such a petition, a view since doubted but not overruled. Against it, the later Division Bench said that the Court can refuse a petition whose jurisdictional Assessing Officer is outside Delhi, and the larger Bench left the question unanswered. Our view is that a Gujarat assessee should file in the Gujarat High Court, where jurisdiction is not in doubt, and not in Delhi, where it is.

The Income-tax Act, 2025: sections 359 and 360, and the scheme under section 532

What section 359 keeps. Sub-sections (1) and (2) reproduce section 250(1) and (2): a day and place fixed for the hearing, and “the right to be heard at the hearing of the appeal”. Sub-section (3) gathers the powers to adjourn, to make further inquiry and to admit a ground whose omission “was not wilful or unreasonable”. Sub-sections (4) to (6) keep the reasoned written order, the one-year period and the duty to communicate the order.

What it leaves out. Section 359 has no counterpart to section 250(6B), (6C) and (6D). For the Commissioner (Appeals) the power to run appeals facelessly comes from the general provision, section 532; for the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) section 356(5) keeps the specific power that was in section 246(5). Under section 532(1) the Central Government may “make a scheme for any of the purposes of this Act”; under sub-section (2) it may direct that provisions of the Act shall not apply or shall apply with modifications; and under sub-section (3) it may “amend or modify” a scheme notified under the 1961 Act. Section 532 is not confined to the Commissioner (Appeals), does not repeat the “appellate system with dynamic jurisdiction”, and puts no cut-off date like 31 March 2022 on the power of direction.

The position as it stands. For faceless assessment the 2025 Act has a prescribed procedure, Rule 176 of the Income-tax Rules, 2026 (see Part 1). The Rules contain no corresponding rule for faceless appeals. The Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021 is carried into the new Act by section 536(2)(u): a scheme notified under the 1961 Act “with a view to eliminating the interface with the assessee or any other person” is deemed to have been made “under the corresponding provisions of this Act” or, “where there is no such corresponding provision”, under section 532, “and shall continue in force accordingly”. Section 359 has no scheme-making provision, so the Scheme continues as one made under section 532 and can be amended under section 532(3). The general saving is in section 536(2)(j), “so far as it is not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions of this Act”.

None of this affects an appeal for a tax year beginning before 1 April 2026: the 1961 Act governs those years, and proceedings for them even if begun later (section 536(2)(c) of the 2025 Act). Assessment year 2026-27 relates to the year ended 31 March 2026 and stays under the 1961 Act; tax year 2026-27 begins on 1 April 2026 and is the first under the 2025 Act. An appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) against an assessment for assessment year 2026-27 or an earlier year is an appeal under section 246A, heard under section 250 and the Faceless Appeal Scheme, 2021, whenever it is filed. First appeals for tax year 2026-27 onwards are governed by section 359 and section 360.

Gujarat: what the record shows

Date	Decision	What was decided
28 March 2022	Sunil Dahyalal Modi (Gujarat High Court)	Writ for refund, expedition and stay: “thoroughly misconceived”.
12 March 2025	Govindji Budhaji Thakor (ITAT)	To the Assessing Officer; cost Rs 5,000.
9 April 2025	Gomtidas Govindram Sadhu (ITAT)	Same.
6 May 2025	Mukeshbhai Hirabhai Prajapati (ITAT)	Same.
8 July 2025	The Wardrobe Theorem (ITAT)	Proviso discretionary; legal ground first.
28 July 2025	Ashvinkumar Naranbhai Patel (ITAT)	Section 250(6) not met; demand deleted.
26 August 2025	Swapn Developers (Gujarat High Court)	Rectification order founded on a wrongly uploaded order quashed.
7 October 2025	Sanjay Jayantilal Shah (ITAT)	Proviso only for an order under section 144, and not for earlier assessments (para 5.7); appeal restored.
15 October 2025	Yakin Jayantilal Shah (ITAT)	Set-aside upheld; jurisdictional ground decided against the assessee.
17 October 2025	Mikal Bhupendrabhai Patel (ITAT)	Delay of 304 days and continued default; dismissed in limine.
6 November 2025	Menaba Charitable Trust (ITAT)	Remitted to the Commissioner (Appeals); no cost.
19 November 2025	Gaurav Vinodbhai Mitra (ITAT)	Speaking order on merits required; cost Rs 10,000.
10 April 2026	Pragnesh Amrutlal Gajjar (ITAT, single member)	Set-aside upheld; ground on video hearing not dealt with.
13 August 2026	Surendranagar District Co-op Milk Producers Union (ITAT)	Appeals lie to the Rajkot Bench.

Swapn Developers v. National Faceless Appeal Centre (NFAC) & Anr. (R/Special Civil Application No. 4807 of 2025, Bhargav D. Karia and Pranav Trivedi JJ, 26 August 2025) is, among the decisions discussed in this Part, the one in which the Gujarat High Court quashed an order of the Centre. In an appeal against an assessment under section 143(3), the Centre passed an order on 16 February 2023 confirming a penalty (para 10), later corrected for what the petitioner called the mistake “of wrongly uploading the order of different assessee on different subject matter” (para 20); a further rectification order of 21 November 2024 again confirmed penalty (para 17). The Revenue’s counsel “could not controvert the facts emerging from the record” (para 21), and the Court, saying “it can be said res ipsa loquitur” (para 22), quashed that order (para 23).

The two Gujarat High Court decisions above do not decide whether an appellate order passed after an ignored request for video hearing can stand, whether a first appeal can be dismissed for non-prosecution, the scope of the proviso to section 251(1)(a), or service at an address other than the one in Form 35; on a time limit for a pending appeal, Sunil Dahyalal Modi is against the petitioner. On the ignored request the Mumbai and Pune Benches have held for the appellant (Bank of India; Atpadi Education Society), and the Ahmedabad Bench left the ground undecided in Pragnesh Amrutlal Gajjar. The Ahmedabad Bench has differed on who decides a legal ground left undecided by the Commissioner (Appeals): The Wardrobe Theorem sent it back to him; Yakin Jayantilal Shah decided it. On whether the proviso reaches assessments made before 1 October 2024, Sanjay Jayantilal Shah says in para 5.7, as one of two grounds, that it does not, while in The Wardrobe Theorem, where the Commissioner (Appeals) had invoked it against such an assessment, the Bench treated the proviso as available without the point being taken.

Open questions, argued both ways

Three questions in this Part are open; each is argued in the section named. Part 1 carries questions 1 to 3 and Part 2 questions 4 to 7.

Open question 8: an appellate order passed without hearing where no request is on record, and what “technologically feasible” excuses. See “The hearing: paragraph 12”. In our view the request is the trigger.
Open question 9: a set-aside without a decision on a jurisdictional or limitation ground. See “The proviso to section 251(1)(a): set aside or decide”. In our view the ground must be decided first.
Open question 10: a writ to compel disposal of a pending appeal, in Gujarat particularly. See “Delay, stay and refunds while the appeal waits”. In our view the writ lies, but in Gujarat it needs a record that distinguishes Sunil Dahyalal Modi.

On a live file

Form 35. Enter an e-mail address the appellant himself reads, and treat the option on e-mail notices as a commitment (Suresh Kumar Paruchuri; Vineet Singh Construction). If the consultant changes, update the address at once.
Legal grounds, separately. Put jurisdiction, limitation, approval and want of notice as distinct grounds at the head of Form 35, each with a prayer for annulment. For a missed ground, file an application under section 250(5) with the reason for the omission.
Ask for the hearing and keep proof. Make a specific, unconditional request for a personal hearing by video under paragraph 12(2), on the portal, with the first submission, and repeat it with each response. A request on record is what Bank of India and Atpadi Education Society turned on; a request made only in the alternative went unanswered in Pragnesh Amrutlal Gajjar.
Submissions that stand on their own. Set out the facts, each ground, the evidence and the decisions relied on, so that an order which ignores them can be tested against section 250(6).
Time. If the time given is too short, apply for extension on the portal before it expires (para 5(1)(iii)); Thayappa Balakrishna turned on such an application left unanswered.
Additional evidence. File a separate application naming the clause of rule 46A(1) relied on. In an appeal from a best judgment order, say whether the appellant wants the appeal decided on the evidence or accepts a set-aside, which gives the Assessing Officer a second assessment.
Best judgment orders. Check that the assessment order recites section 144; otherwise the proviso is not available. If a jurisdictional or limitation ground is the real case, oppose a set-aside until it is decided (The Wardrobe Theorem).
Enhancement. On a notice under para 5(1)(ix), reply in time and ask for a hearing on it.
On an ex parte order. Download it at once, check that every ground and application is dealt with, and appeal within the time in section 253(3), two months from the end of the month in which the order is communicated, with a specific ground under section 250(6) and an affidavit explaining each missed notice. Expect restoration with costs; on a pure point of law, ask the Tribunal to decide it.
Recovery. Apply to the Assessing Officer under section 220(6) when the first appeal is filed, citing the Board’s office memoranda of 29 February 2016 and 31 July 2017, and keep the stay order and the challan. If refunds are adjusted contrary to a stay order, rely on Katmandu Apparel. After the first appellate order, seek stay from the Tribunal under section 254(2A).
Forum. File the second appeal before the Bench covering the jurisdictional Assessing Officer’s station: Ahmedabad, Rajkot or Surat.
A timeline from the High Court. Consider a writ only when submissions are complete, written requests for hearing and disposal are unanswered, and prejudice can be shown. In Gujarat the petition must meet Sunil Dahyalal Modi.

Concordance: Income-tax Act, 1961 and Income-tax Act, 2025

Subject	Income-tax Act, 1961	Income-tax Act, 2025
Appeals before the Joint Commissioner (Appeals); scheme for them	Section 246; section 246(5)	Section 356; section 356(5)
Appealable orders before the Commissioner (Appeals)	Section 246A	Section 357
Form of appeal and limitation	Section 249	Section 358
Hearing: day, place and notice; right to be heard	Section 250(1), (2)	Section 359(1), (2)
Adjournment; further inquiry; ground not in the grounds of appeal	Section 250(3), (4), (5)	Section 359(3)(a), (b), (c)
Written order with points, decision and reasons	Section 250(6)	Section 359(4)
One year, where possible	Section 250(6A)	Section 359(5)
Faceless scheme; directions; laying before Parliament	Section 250(6B), (6C), (6D)	No counterpart in section 359; section 532(1), (2), (4); power to amend 1961 Act schemes in section 532(3); existing schemes saved by section 536(2)(u)
Communication of the order	Section 250(7)	Section 359(6)
Confirm, reduce, enhance or annul	Section 251(1)(a) and (1A)(a)	Section 360(1)(a)
Set aside a best judgment assessment	Proviso to section 251(1)(a) (order under section 144)	Section 360(1)(b) (order under section 271)
Opportunity before enhancement; matters not raised by the appellant	Section 251(2); Explanation to section 251	Section 360(2); section 360(3)
Stay of demand pending first appeal	Section 220(6)	Section 411(12)
Appeal to the Tribunal; orders of the Tribunal	Sections 253, 254	Sections 362, 363
Time for the appeal to the Tribunal; admission after time	Section 253(3), (5)	Section 362(3), (5)
Appeal to the High Court	Section 260A	Section 365

Decisions referred to in this Part

Decision	Court and date	Cited for
Lakshya Budhiraja	Delhi High Court, 16 October 2020 and 24 February 2022	Challenge to the 2020 Scheme
Central Board of Direct Taxes v. Lakshya Budhiraja	Supreme Court, 1 October 2021 and 10 January 2022	Transfer petitions infructuous
Anitha Zachariah	Kerala High Court, 28 May 2024	Challenge closed
Swapn Developers	Gujarat High Court, 26 August 2025	Order of the Centre quashed
Rajadhani Fashions	Kerala High Court, 6 September 2024	Want of personal hearing
Thayappa Balakrishna	Karnataka High Court, 1 April 2026	Request for time unanswered; order set aside
Cooper Corporation	Bombay High Court, 19 October 2026 (interim)	Ad-interim stay
Bank of India	ITAT Mumbai, 30 June 2022	Request for video hearing; no discretion
Atpadi Education Society	ITAT Pune, 15 October 2024	Hearing mandatory if asked
Uber9 Business Process Services	Madras High Court, 29 October 2026	Stay from the Tribunal
Pragnesh Amrutlal Gajjar	ITAT Ahmedabad, 10 April 2026	Set-aside upheld
Ashok Kumar Shaw	Orissa High Court, 31 March 2022	No dismissal in default
Vedansh Traders	Calcutta High Court, 7 February 2025	Conditional restoration
Gaurav Vinodbhai Mitra	ITAT Ahmedabad, 19 November 2025	Section 250(6); cost
Ashvinkumar Naranbhai Patel	ITAT Ahmedabad, 28 July 2025	Section 250(6)
Govindji Budhaji Thakor	ITAT Ahmedabad, 12 March 2025	One more opportunity
Gomtidas Govindram Sadhu	ITAT Ahmedabad, 9 April 2025	Same course
Mukeshbhai Hirabhai Prajapati	ITAT Ahmedabad, 6 May 2025	Same course
Menaba Charitable Trust	ITAT Ahmedabad, 6 November 2025	Remitted de novo
Mikal Bhupendrabhai Patel	ITAT Ahmedabad, 17 October 2025	Dismissed in limine
Suresh Kumar Paruchuri	Karnataka High Court, 12 June 2025	Old e-mail address
Yakin Jayantilal Shah	ITAT Ahmedabad, 15 October 2025	Form 35 address; set-aside upheld
Vineet Singh Construction	ITAT Raipur, 28 June 2024	E-mail option in Form 35
Sanjay Jayantilal Shah	ITAT Ahmedabad, 7 October 2025	Order must be under section 144; proviso not retrospective
The Wardrobe Theorem	ITAT Ahmedabad, 8 July 2025	Legal ground first
Mamatha Gubbala	ITAT Hyderabad, 30 January 2026	Jurisdiction first
Vishal Bharat Shah	ITAT Mumbai, 15 September 2026	Same course
Al Safa Foods	ITAT Visakhapatnam, 3 July 2026	Not a section 144 order
Raman Kumar	ITAT Pune, 25 May 2026	Same
P Srinivasa Babu	Andhra Pradesh High Court, order of 16 June 2026	Fresh assessment said to exceed the remand
Shasha Fashion Trendz	Delhi High Court, 2 and 18 November 2022	Disposal by seniority
Vodafone Idea	Bombay High Court, 6 August 2024	Four months
Katmandu Apparel	Bombay High Court, 16 September 2026	Sixteen weeks; refund
Babuddin	Allahabad High Court, 5 November 2026	Three months
Energy Management Centre	Kerala High Court, 3 November 2026	No period fixed
Sunil Dahyalal Modi	Gujarat High Court, 28 March 2022	Writ “thoroughly misconceived”
Bidar Nirmiti Kendra	Karnataka High Court, 27 May 2019	The Board’s memoranda on stay
ABC Papers	Supreme Court, 18 August 2022	Forum; binding High Court
Ramesh Kumar Bagri	Delhi High Court, 2 April 2026	Seat of the jurisdictional officer
Surendranagar District Co-op Milk Producers Union	ITAT Ahmedabad, 13 August 2026	Rajkot Bench
Shreevar Overseas	ITAT Delhi, 27 November 2025	Kolkata Benches
GPL-RKTCPL JV	Delhi High Court, 17 November 2022 and 22 September 2026	Reference closed unanswered

The appeal starts from the assessment order. Part 1 takes up the assessment under section 144B of the 1961 Act and section 273 of the 2025 Act, the show cause notice and the hearing there, and open questions 1 to 3. Read it at Faceless assessment under section 144B: show cause notice and hearing. Part 2 takes up the Document Identification Number, the signature, the officer who issues the section 148 notice and approvals after the Finance Act, 2026, and open questions 4 to 7. Read it at Faceless assessment after Finance Act 2026: DIN, sections 147A and 292BC.

faceless appealFaceless Appeal Scheme 2021section 250section 251Commissioner (Appeals)National Faceless Appeal Centrepersonal hearing by video conferencingex parte appellate orderproviso to section 251(1)(a)section 359 Income-tax Act 2025ITAT Ahmedabad

This note is general commentary on the law as at 11 November 2026 and is not advice on any matter. The position in a particular case depends on its own facts.

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