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s.119 — Instructions of the Board to subordinate authorities

The Board's power to instruct every income-tax authority, the two things it may not direct, and the unresolved question of what an assessment made in breach of an instruction is worth.

Currently operative

Income-tax Act, 1961

s.119

Income-tax Act, 2025

s.239

In force from 1 April 2026, but s.536(2)(c) preserves the 1961 Act for tax years beginning before that date.

In short

Section 119(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 empowers the Board to issue such orders, instructions and directions to other income-tax authorities as it may deem fit for the proper administration of the Act, and requires those authorities and all other persons employed in the execution of the Act to observe and follow them. The proviso sets two limits: no instruction may require an authority to make a particular assessment or to dispose of a particular case in a particular manner, and none may interfere with the discretion of the Joint Commissioner (Appeals) or the Commissioner (Appeals) in his appellate functions. Sub-section (2)(a) then permits general or special orders, in respect of any class of incomes or class of cases, setting out the guidelines, principles or procedures to be followed in the work of assessment, collection and penalty, provided they are not prejudicial to assessees; clause (b) permits the Board to authorise the admission of belated claims for exemption, deduction, refund or other relief to avoid genuine hardship; and clause (c) permits relaxation of a requirement for a deduction under Chapter IV or Chapter VI-A where the default was beyond the assessee's control and the requirement was complied with before the assessment was completed, every order under clause (c) being laid before Parliament. The annual guidelines for compulsory selection of returns for scrutiny, the monetary limits for allocation of cases between ranks and the instructions on limited scrutiny are generally treated as instructions of this kind. The letters do not always recite the section, and the scrutiny guidelines for 2024-25 recite no power at all, which is why the first question on any file is what the document is. The counterpart in the Income-tax Act, 2025 is section 239, where the two limits are a sub-section of their own, (2).

What the provision does

Makes the Board's instructions binding on the Department's officers. It does not make them binding on the appellate authorities in their appellate functions or on the courts, it does not allow the Board to decide a particular case, and it says nothing about the consequence for an assessment where an officer has not followed an instruction. That consequence has been supplied by case law, and the case law is divided.

Threshold questions

  • Whether the document relied on is an order, instruction or direction of the Board at all, or a letter or press note that recites no power and is addressed to officers for their guidance
  • Whether the instruction confers a benefit or protection on the assessee, or only distributes work inside the Department
  • Whether the instruction is about whether a case may be taken up, about which officer takes it up, or about how the assessment is to be made, because the decisions treat the three differently
  • Whether the breach was raised before the Assessing Officer and, if it concerns the officer's jurisdiction, within the one month allowed by section 124(3)
  • Whether the instruction is consistent with the section it operates under, since an instruction contrary to the statute or to a decision of the Supreme Court or a High Court is not enforced by a court

In practice

The recurring disputes.

Whether breach of a scrutiny selection instruction voids the assessment

The assessee's line is that an instruction under section 119 binds the officer, so a return taken up or a notice issued contrary to it is taken up without authority. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Smt. Nayana P. Dedhia (27 August 2004) upheld the Tribunal's view that the authorities could not select a case the Board's scrutiny norms excluded. The Orissa High Court in Nababharat Shiksha Parishad v. DCIT (15 December 2022) held a required approval mandatory and set the assessment aside. The Delhi High Court in Pr. CIT-7 v. Raja Arora (14 May 2025) found no infirmity in a Tribunal order quashing an assessment selected without the approval the instruction required, though it disposed of the appeal as raising no substantial question of law. The Revenue's line is that the power to scrutinise is given by section 143(2), which an instruction cannot take away. The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh held in Reshi Construction Company v. CIT (31 August 2024) that a breach of a selection circular may invite administrative action but is no ground for setting the assessment aside. The Allahabad High Court in Janta Metal Works v. ITO (18 July 1990) held that selection instructions create no legal right in the assessee, though the Court held the Chairman's letter before it not to be an instruction under section 119 at all. The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court distinguished Nayana P. Dedhia as a case where the Board had placed a complete embargo on selection. None of these decisions is of the Supreme Court, and the point is open.

What the proviso to sub-section (1) forbids

In Reshi Construction the High Court relied on the first limb of the proviso, reasoning that an instruction which limits when a case may be scrutinised would amount to requiring the officer to dispose of a case in a particular manner. The assessee's answer is that the clause speaks of a particular assessment and a particular case, that is, of the Board deciding an individual matter, and that sub-section (2)(a) expressly contemplates general orders for a class of cases laying down guidelines, principles and procedures for the work of assessment. On that reading a class instruction on selection or allocation is within the power and the proviso does not touch it. The Revenue's reply is that an instruction which fixes when an officer may take up a return does, for every return it covers, tell him how to dispose of the case. The question is open.

Instructions that benefit the assessee and instructions that organise the Department

In UCO Bank v. CIT (13 May 1999) the Supreme Court held that a circular toning down the rigour of the law is binding on the Department under section 119 and that its benefit is available to the assessee even though it departs from the strict tenor of the provision. Assessees read that as covering any instruction. The Revenue confines it to instructions that confer a benefit, and says that an instruction which merely allocates work between officers, or between the faceless centre and the jurisdictional officer, gives the assessee nothing to enforce. The Tribunal in Salman Qureshi v. DCIT (ITAT Delhi, 9 October 2026) treated a selection and allocation letter as mandatory, and an assessment framed in breach of it as a nullity; other Benches, where the Revenue relied on the same series of letters, have called them selection parameters and no more, or merely administrative. A single judge of the Madras High Court in Mark Studio India Private Limited v. ITO (20 December 2024) described the letter for the previous year as issued under section 144B(2), and the Delhi High Court in Sanjay Gandhi Memorial Trust v. CIT (Exemption) (26 May 2023) described an earlier letter as limited to selection. The descriptions have not been reconciled, and the point is open.

An instruction contrary to the statute or to a court's decision

A Bench of five judges in Commissioner of Central Excise, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries (14 October 2008) held that circulars and instructions are binding on the authorities under the statute, but that once the Supreme Court or a High Court has declared the law it is the decision and not the circular that is given effect to. It added that a circular contrary to the statutory provisions has no existence in law. The Revenue uses this against an assessee who relies on an instruction that goes beyond the section; the assessee uses the first half of the same passage against an officer who has ignored an instruction that is consistent with the section. Which half applies depends on whether the instruction can be read with the provision it operates under, and that has to be argued on the text of each.

Common questions

Frequently asked.

Are CBDT instructions binding on the Assessing Officer?

Yes. Section 119(1) says that the income-tax authorities shall observe and follow the Board's orders, instructions and directions. They do not bind the Commissioner (Appeals) in his appellate functions, the Tribunal or the courts, and a court will not enforce an instruction that is contrary to the Act.

If the officer ignored a CBDT instruction, is my assessment invalid?

It depends on the instruction and on the High Court. Several High Courts have upheld the quashing of assessments where a scrutiny selection instruction or the monetary limits instruction was not followed. Others have held that such a breach is an internal matter for the Department. The objection is strongest when it was taken in writing before the Assessing Officer at the first opportunity.

Can the Board tell an officer how to decide my case?

No. The proviso to section 119(1), and section 239(2) of the Income-tax Act, 2025, forbid any instruction requiring an authority to make a particular assessment or to dispose of a particular case in a particular manner. The Board may lay down general guidelines, principles and procedures for classes of cases.

Related

Provisions that travel with this one.

This page states general principles as at September 2026 and is not advice. Section numbers were verified against the Act as enacted and as amended by the Finance Act 2026; note that mapping tables built from the February 2025 Bill or the Select Committee draft can carry outdated headings, sub-section numbers and rates.